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ABSTRACT 
This stndy examines post-apartheid South African foreign policy under former 
President Nelson Mandela, and the apparent ambiguities that were its recurrent 
feature in the period from 1994 to 1999. Its focus is on the inherent irreconcilability 
of the economic national interests and the foreign policy principles which included 
the promotion of and respect for universalist principles and interests such as human 
rights, democracy, international peace and security. 
In examining South African foreign policy during this period, it would appear that 
the country was trapped between two competing priorities: the need to promote 
universalist" principles and the need to satisfy its national economic interests. The 
main aim of the study is to explain how this "irreconcilability" between universalist 
principles and national economic interests would later create ambiguities and 
contradictions in South Africa's foreign policy, weaken respect for its foreign policy 
n 
principles, and ultimately lead to ideological failure among politicians who 
employed 'short-term gain' policy decision-making in dealing with 'pariah states'. 
The study further demonstrates that "realist" national interests are frequently short-
term, realizable and vital for a country, while universalist interests are long-term, 
idealistic and usually not easily realizable. It will be argued, therefore, that a country 
faced with making decisions about its vital national interests, will not make efforts 
to pursue long-term universalist interests if that choice would in any way endanger 
its fundamental national interests. 
In order to better assess this ambiguity, this thesis will provide a case study of 
Pretoria's arms sales to 'pariah states' during the period. The purpose of this study is 
not to attempt to explain all of the issues around post -apartheid foreign policy-
making, or even to argue whether the sale of arms to 'pariah states' was 'politically 
incorrect', but to provide a 'piece of the puzzle' which might explain how the social 
and economic situation may have compelled Pretoria to sell arms when these actions 
disregarded universalist principles of foreign policy. The conclusion seems to 
confirm the realist view that universal values and principles can be regarded only 
when they are in harmony with a state's perceived self-interests. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Background to the Research 
The year 1994 marked the first democratic election in South African history, which, 
on a wave of national and international optimism, brought the African National 
Congress CANC) into power. The ANC's decades-old struggle against the apartheid 
regime was instrumental in bringing the injustices, the violations of universal human 
rights and fundamental liberties to the attention of the international community. In 
addressing the past injustices of the apartheid legacy, the ANC could now finally 
influence the new South Africa's policy. 
It therefore came as no surprise that the ANC-led Government of National Unity 
wanted to make a clean break with the previous militant and racist foreign policy of 
the apartheid regime. This determination to break with the past was demonstrated by 
the desire to base the foundations of the new South African foreign policy on the 
promotion and respect of universalist values. I These values consisted of human 
rights, promotion of democracy worldwide, pursuit of domestic and global peace 
and security and the respect for international law and international justice. Thus, in 
the course of negotiating the transition to democracy, ANC president Nelson 
Mandela put forward several foreign policy principles that included the promotion 
of such inclusive values. These principles would constitute the central core of 
I Universalism also termed as Kantianismlidealism emphasizes and relies on reason in human 
affairs, and puts confidence in the peace-building function of the international political system. This 
perspective holds that there is an international solidarity (natural harmony) of interests by men, 
which are morally bound. The core of the universalist perspective holds that international politics is 
about relations among individuals and groups that states are composed of. Accordingly, the highest 
interest of the individual coincides with that of the larger community. 
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Mandela's foreign policy and guide the behaviour of South Africa in international 
politics. 
Between 1994 and 1999, however, tbe ANC-Ied government proposed and approved 
a number of apparently controversial arms sales to Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Syria, 
Algeria, Uganda, Republic of Congo, Taiwan and Colombia, among otber countries. 
The controversy aroused suspicion. On the one hand, tbe new South African foreign 
policy was committed to the respect for human rights and international peace, and 
on the otber, the sale of arms was directed to countries characterized as 
'autboritarian' or 'undemocratic', usually witb poor human rights records or 
experiencing botb internal and external conflicts. Clearly the government appeared 
to be departing from its core foreign policy principles. How tben could one explain 
tbis 'about-turn' in policy principles? 
Perhaps tbe explanation is to be found in tbe economic sphere. Immediately 
following tbe April 1994 elections, tbe Mandela administration was faced witb tbe 
need to address the realities faced by the majority of Soutb Africa's citizens -
unfortunate realities such as poverty, social exclusion, unemployment, social unrest, 
crime, underdevelopment and low investment. The new administration was tbus 
under political obligation to implement an economic programme/plan to address 
tbese key priorities. 
This 'obligation' was reflected in Soutb Africa's foreign policy content, especially 
in its preoccupation with foreign trade. The defence industry was among several 
crucial domestic industries tbat would playa big part in Pretoria's drive for foreign 
trade. As Pretoria geared itself towards creating employment and increasing foreign 
exchange earnings to further develop industries domestically, the defence industry 
would play an even larger role in dealing witb tbe harsh economic realities tbat 
Soutb African citizens faced. 
2 
Even during the post-apartheid era, the defence industry continued to play an 
important part in stimulating the South African economy and providing significant 
strategic value. Despite a considerable decrease in the number of jobs, the defence 
industry provided employment for several tens of thousands of people and generated 
considerable foreign exchange earnings for the government. In order to sustain 
employment and bring in sufficient foreign exchange earnings, however, the defence 
industry had to gear itself for the export market. Accordingly, it was in Pretoria's 
national interest to ensure that the production and export of armaments and related 
equipment continued. 
In pursuing its national interest on the global market, however, South Africa had to 
face competition from big producers like the United States, United Kingdom, 
France, Italy, Japan and smaller producers like Spain, South Korea, Singapore, 
India, Switzerland, and so on. As noted by the prestigious Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI, 2001) world military expenditure and arms trade in 
1998 formed the largest spending in the world at over $780 billion. Of this amount 
high-income countries, which hold only 16 percent of world population, accounted 
for about 75 percent. 2 In 1998, South Africa was the 10th largest weapons producer 
in the world and the biggest in Africa, even though its sales accounted for only just 
over 1 % of the global arms trade (Dispatch, 1998), and bad managed to sell arms 
worth more than R 3.3 Billion (US$ 600 million) to 91 countries between April 
1994 and August 1999 (Marais, 1999). 
The available data therefore shows that South Africa is not one of the major players 
on the global arms market and that it occupies the middle range of the hierarchy of 
2 The combined military spending of these countries was thus slightly higher than the aggregate 
foreign debt of all low-income countries and 10 times higher than their combined levels of official 
development assistance in 2001 (SIPRI,2001). 
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arms producing countries together with Israel, Sweden, Brazil and Argentina 
(Buzan, 2002).3 However, South Africa is still the biggest arms producer on the 
African continent, which helps it to maintain its regional power status. 
The acquisition of power, influence and the allegiance of lesser powers in addition 
to other political interests, combined with economic push-factors mentioned above 
are strong enough reasons for a country to engage in the production and sale of 
arms.4 However, the global arms trade is a result of "supply push from producers 
and demand pull from consumers" (Buzan, 2002).5 
It can be argued that the global arms trade addresses the imbalances between the 
'haves' and 'have-nots'. The dynamics of power politics, however, compels states to 
acquire more military power than their potential adversaries. The acquisition of 
military power is achieved, among other things, by the qualitative advance m 
weapon technology, which preserves the qualitative distinction between the 
countries. In other words, for the small group of technologically innovative states a 
qualitative edge remains a critical ingredient of their military power (Buzan, 2002).6 
J Among 100 world largest arms-producing companies (excluding China), South Africa' s 
manufacturer Denel was ranked 901h in 2002 and 791h the previous year (SIPRI, 2003). 
4 Justifications for developing and maintaining a national defence industry are discussed more in 
detail in Chapter 4. 
5 According to Buzan (2002) the desire of producers to sell arms is complemented by the assertion 
of the right to recei ve arms by non-producers and part-producers of weapons. Thus, there is a shared 
interest between suppliers and recipients in maintaining the arms trade. Moreover, the right to buy 
and possess arms is closely related to the maintenance of the international society based on the 
sovereign equality of states. 
6 In the literature this drive for technological development is described as 'technological 
determinism' or ' technological imperative', which means that once technological developments are 
under way, they are unstoppable, inevitable, unavoidable and irreversible (Chandler, 2000). 
Regarding military technology Buzan and Herring (Kinsella, 2002: 218), however, distinguiSh 
between technological determinism and technological imperative, the latter representing 
unavoidable requirement to consider how to respond to the frequent technological advances of the 
contemporary world, but not determining what the response will be or even whether there will be a 
4 
Technological advancements, however, are not only boosted by state's drive for 
military power but also by the arms trade, since the increased access to the modem 
weaponry and the perceived increased insecurity as a result, generate incentives for 
the continued military technological innovations by the leading states (Kinsella, 
2002: 212). Therefore, by selling arms South Africa is necessarily engaged in the 
arms dynamics described above, which means that this is an additional reason for 
the country to maintain its arms industry and supply countries, which seek arms that 
they cannot produce themselves. 
On the demand side armaments are required and thus frequently acquired by regimes 
that engage in war, violence and repression. The South Africa case study was chosen 
because it can hopefully expose the problems regarding the pursuance of a foreign 
policy agenda that contradicts the very country's foreign policy aspirations. Through 
this case study we will attempt to demonstrate that South Africa created 
contradictions that violated the very underpinnings of its own 'moral' foreign policy 
- a situation which was the antithesis of the values that should have informed South 
Africa's foreign policy. The Mandela administration therefore, would appear to have 
faced a dilemma in pursuing universalist values and economic national interests 
concurrently when formulating its foreign policy. 
1.2. The Literature Review 
The controversy surrounding the arms deals - and foreign policy in general - has 
been the subject of discussion by South African and other scholars. A number of 
researchers have observed that the foreign policy orientation of the post-apartheid 
South African government has often fluctuated between 'realism' and 'moral 
response at all. That will be influenced to varying degrees by political, domestic structure, and 
action-reaction factors. 
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internationalism'. For example, Van Nieuwkerk, (1998) and Mills, (1997:4) assert 
that the foreign policy mood in South Africa under Mandela reflected this dual 
approach; and while there was a strong nationalist focus on the promotion of South 
Africa's own national interests, there was an international moral commitment to the 
promotion of human rights as well. 
This 'fluctuation' between "the commitment to respect human rights and the 
practice of selling arms to so-called 'pariah states' 7 has led a considerable number of 
scholars to describe post-apartheid South African foreign policy under Mandela as 
'ambiguous', 'incoherent' and 'inconsistent.' Batchelor (1999) observes that, 
because of the pressures to satisfy its economic objectives, Pretoria flouted its arms 
sales policy and foreign policy by extension, all of which appeared confused and 
non-coherent as a result. Tony Leon (cited in Van Wyk, 1999:297) similarly 
observes that South Africa's " ... performance on the world stage has been 
characterized by contradictions, inconsistencies, backtracking ... Our foreign policy 
appears to be schizophrenic ... " 
Leon's views are echoed by Chhabra, (1997) who contends that after 1994, 
Pretoria's foreign policy had been marked by several contradictions with regard to 
what policies and actions to adopt because of the pressures between stated policy 
and national interest. Other scholars, however, emphasize that Pretoria violated its 
foreign policy principles by selling arms to 'pariah states' and suggest that it should 
7 The term 'pariah states' in this research denotes states that are non-democratic, conflict-ridden or 
conflict-prone, including those involved in arms races. Otherwise, the concept 'pariah states' is a 
Western term which carne to be used to describe states that were/are at the centre of Western 
concern and consequently are labelled as such by Western governments, more specifically the US 
and its allies (Niblock, 2001: 10-15). The term has been used interchangeably with other terms such 
as ' rogue states' or 'states of concern'. Such states were/are seen to be playing an international role 
that was disruptive to American interests while also going contrary to norms and values of the 
international order. Subsequently, economic and diplomatic relations with these states had to be 
annulled since they could not be trusted to follow international commitments. 
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have adhered to those principles and constitution regardless of its econOlIl1C 
interests. Thus, Cock (1996:23), observes that although human rights and the 
promotion of democracy were pillars of post-apartheid South Africa's foreign 
policy, Pretoria's arms sales undoubtedly contributed to violent conflicts and the 
infringement of human rights in the states to which Pretoria sold arms. 
Similarly other authors have questioned whether Pretoria's 'opportunistic' arms 
sales have served to further hamper both economic and human development on the 
continent. Edmunds (1997a and 1997b) analyses Pretoria's arms sales to Turkey and 
Rwanda and concludes that in the sales to both states, the government put short-term 
economic national interests before the country's foreign policy principles and 
constitution by extension, and in the process, the government violated the very 
principles it was supposed to uphold. Shelton' s (1998) in-depth study of South 
Africa's arms sales to the Middle East questions whether Pretoria's sales have 
promoted peace or contributed to increased conflict in an already volatile region. He 
argues that there needs to be firmer adherence to the official policy guidelines, that 
decision-makers need to be highly informed about the states and regions to which 
they intend to sell arms, and concludes that in the case of arms sales to the Middle 
East, Pretoria did not comply with stated policy. 
Supporting Shelton's vIews are other scholars who have tried to explain these 
ambiguities in terms of the in-built contradiction between Pretoria's perceived 
national interests and its role as a defender of universalism in the world. Thus, Le 
Pere et al. (1999:3) have acknowledged that, 
" ... there was a palpable tension between prioritizing its perceived commercial, 
trade, and political interests and its role as a moral crusader in the promotion of 
global human rights and democracy." 
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Battersby (1999) similarly argues that although South Africa had regulations for the 
sale of arms that had to be adhered to, problems emerged at the onset of the Mandela 
regime because there were in-built contradictions between Pretoria's need to create 
jobs and boost exports on the one hand, and its need to promote human rights and 
moral values as reflected in its constitution on the other. Other scholars have 
attributed this flaw to the foreign policy-making process in post-apartheid South 
Africa. Top decision-makers are not always unified in their approaches. Could the 
ambiguity and confusion found in the new South African foreign policy document 
have been the result of compromises among novice parliamentarians? Or was it 
perhaps because the foreign policy document was so hastily put together (i.e., to 
satisfy national economic interests and the needs of the 'pariah states'), that radical 
changes to supposed key 'universalist' principles were announced without clarity? 
Thus, Fabricius, (2000) asserts that the executive seems to have usurped the role of 
being the sole foreign policy decision-maker. Le Pere and Van Nieuwkerk, (1999) 
seem to concur by arguing that the reasons for Pretoria's ambiguous foreign policy 
lie in the fact that the executive appears to have appropriated excessive decision-
making power. 
Existing literature on the ambiguities and contradictions in Pretoria's foreign policy 
1994 to 1999, generally, has tended to concentrate on its economic aspects, or on 
historical events connected to the transition to democracy. The result is that, while 
there is substantial information available on these issues, very little of it explains 
how and under which conditions South Africa 'needed' to act opportunistically and 
so, 'had' to ignore the economic and social needs of those who brought the ANC 
into power. Furthermore, the literature does not go beyond mere observations to 
explain the in-built tension between stated policy and action. More research is also 
needed on the "irreconcilability of 'universalist' and realist theories and on the 
explanations behind these contradictions. Thus, while scholars have identified the 
problem of Pretoria's inconsistent and ambiguous foreign policy, it would seem that 
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rigorous theoretical expositions have been lacking. In other words, the question of 
pursuing national interests based on a set of 'moral' principles has not been posed 
and/or sufficiently dealt with. This question is not only relevant for South Africa, 
but also for any state implementing its foreign policy in the international arena. 
1.3. Research Question and Hypothesis 
This thesis will attempt to address the following question: 
"Can the promotion of human rights, democracy and world peace as 
'universalist values' be reconciled with the pursuance of national 
economic interests such as the export of arms when a state is engaged in 
relations with another state that disregards the exact 'universalist 
values' the first state is trying to promote?" 
With this question III mind, the thesis proposes to critically examme the 
contradictions that emerged in South Africa's foreign policy as a result of the 
pursuance of both universalist principles and economic national interests in its 
foreign policy. In this regard, the attempt will be made to prove the following 
hypothesis: 
'The ambiguities and contradictions observed in South Africa's foreign 
policy can be explained by the irreconcilability of South Africa's 
universalist foreign policy principles with its economic national interests 
when pursued in relation to 'pariah states '. The ambiguities were 
facilitated by the nature of foreign policy decision-making in South 
Africa. 
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In other words, the thesis proposes to argue that a foreign policy based on 
universalist principles is not viable in the context of harsh domestic economic 
conditions fuelled by poverty, migration, discrimination and powerlessness. In 
addition, the international environment compels states, which seek profits by selling 
arms, for example, to engage in competition for clients and overlook the atrocious 
actions of the client 'pariah states'. 
It should be pointed out at the outset of this thesis, however, that there are some 
limitations to the research. The study of the tensions and 'irreconcilability' of 
realism and universalism in a country's foreign policy is a relatively new, untested 
area, and thus very little quantitative research is available on the subject. 
Furthermore, it is very difficult to prove the extent of the influence of individual 
factors on the government's decisions to sell arms to 'pariah states'. At the same 
time, the study's hypothesis does not imply that some other factors or a combination 
of factors carmot explain the ambiguities and contradictions seen in South Africa's 
foreign policy in relation to 'pariah states'. 
1.3. Methodology 
As mentioned earlier, the thesis aims to address a gap that has existed in the 
literature on South Africa's foreign policy during the five-year period following the 
regime change. The research will provide a theoretical explanation for certain 
foreign-policy decisions that were made in this period by Nelson Mandela and his 
close associates. To this end, the underlying theoretical foundations to both 
economic national interests and universalism will be interrogated. 
This debate will hopefully provide answers with regard to the relation between 
foreign policy principles and national interests, a state's hierarchy of national 
interests and the variety of interests a state can have. The theoretical conclusions 
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will be applied to the case study of South Africa's foreign policy between 1994 and 
1999, and its arms sales in particular. 
Historical sources, whether 'behind the scenes ' , or from public archives will attempt 
to supply explanations of the intent behind various policy decisions. The context in 
which shifts in foreign policy occurred will be documented using official 
government communiques, media clippings, and the content of diplomatic letters. 
Using process-tracing the study will document how the new South African foreign 
policy shifted towards the national economy supporting policies - and seek to 
explain why the shift led to engagement with 'pariah states' and how it undermined 
'universalist' principles by identifying and charting intervening causal processes. 
Supplementing the analysis in the thesis, statistical data will be used to show the 
amount of arms sold to various 'pariah states' as well as the impact of those sales on 
the recipient states. In addition, there will be data on the economic benefits the arms 
sales had for Pretoria as well as statistics on the economic situation of South Africa 
prior to the arms sales which appeared to have been a motivating factor for the sales. 
It needs to be pointed out, however, that some data relevant for this research was 
unavailable. This data pertains to arms sales during the apartheid era as well as arms 
sales during the Mandela administration. This is understandable since arms sales are 
often done in secrecy and consequently, the statistics regarding these sales are also 
secretive. In order to compensate for this omission, the data was obtained from 
overseas research institutions as well as local research institutes and think tanks. 
Other information that was not readily available, related to identification of the key 
decision-makers during the Mandela administration. It is hoped, however, that these 
shortcomings do not significantly affect the quality of this research. 
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Why is this topic relevant to the study of international relations? Why should it 
matter whether a state adopts a realist or universalist approach to its foreign policy? 
Why should it matter if these two perspectives are "irreconcilable"? The South 
African case study can help answering these questions because it will show how the 
pursuit of universal values cannot be reconciled with the pursuit of economic 
interests when a state's trade partner disregards the same universal values on which 
that state's foreign policy is based. At the same time the case study will demonstrate 
that the irreconcilability of universalist principles with economic national interests 
gave rise to the ambiguities and contradictions in South Africa's foreign policy in 
relation to 'pariah states' . 
Hopefully, the findings of this study will be applicable to the foreign policy of any 
state, that is trying to function and survive in international relations by engaging in 
trade relations that are vital for the survival and functioning of any state as well as 
for the well-being of citizens. The findings would have practical value for state 
foreign policy. If a state wants to have a coherent foreign policy, it would need to 
consider the 'irreconcilability' of the universalist and national economic interest 
when pursued in relation to 'pariah states' . 
1.4. Structure of the Thesis 
Chapter one gives an overview and introduction to the thesis. It also looks at the 
methodology and structure of this study. Chapter two examines the three theoretical 
perspectives of realism, rationalism and universalism. It debates the different 
perspectives and looks at their many facets in terms of international politics, foreign 
policy and national interest. This theoretical debate also provides the background for 
an in-depth analysis of the two concepts - foreign policy and national interest -
most relevant to this research. 
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The application of these two theoretical perspectives will be critical to the study's 
arguments because they can explain both the realism of economic national interests, 
and the universalism that appears to have been pursued concurrently in post-
apartheid South African foreign policy. Prior to analysing both perspectives, 
substantial defmitions are provided to ensure that all underlying theoretical 
foundations are fully understood. 
The theoretical framework chapter provides the basis for the discussion about post-
apartheid South Africa's universalist foreign policy. Subsequently, chapter three 
discusses South African foreign policy-in-the-making between 1990 and 1994 in 
order for one to understand how and when South Africa's universalist foreign policy 
was subjugated by "stronger competing national economic interests". Hence, a 
historical overview of the ANC's foreign policy is given which illustrates the ways 
in which it was, essentially, geared at addressing the domestic political, social and 
economic situation. 
Managing the contradictions of South Africa's foreign policy, which arose between 
1994 and 1999, is the subject of chapter four. The chapter attempts to show how the 
ambiguities that emerged in Pretoria's foreign policy, discrepancies in foreign policy 
decision making, fostering cordial relations with 'pariah states ' - were managed. In 
this regard, the chapter looks at a few case studies where problems of 
implementation and subsequent ambiguities emerged under Mandela and further, 
how they were dealt with. 
Chapter five focuses on the domestic, economic and social factors that influenced 
Pretoria's arms sales. In this regard, it analyses the South African defence industry 
as well as the domestic economic and social demands faced by the government. The 
chapter will attempt to demonstrate that the economic and social situation in South 
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Africa did influence the foreign policy and national interest of the new government, 
at least with regards to its arms sales, from the onset of the Mandela presidency. 
Chapter six discusses the creation a new South African arms sales policy under the 
Mandela administration. It argues that the arms sales policy was aimed at 
reconciling South African economic interests and universalist principles in its 
foreign policy as well as was enabling the country to have a transparent and 
legitimate arms sales policy. This new policy would then do away with suspect arms 
deals that were characteristic of the former apartheid regime. 
The next chapter focuses on post-apartheid South Africa's arms sales to the so-
called pariah states after April 1994, which ultimately compromised Pretoria's 
foreign policy principles, its arms sales policy, and the constitution by extension. 
The critical argument in this chapter will be that Pretoria's foreign policy principles 
were not adequately implemented - and hence the ambiguity between policy and 
action emerged. 
The final chapter gives a summary of the main theoretical findings, as well as a 
summary of conclusions concerning the South African case study. The chapter also 
highlights the implications for future South Mrican foreign policy and suggests 
some potential research areas. 
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2. THEORETICAL PERPECTIVES AROUND FOREIGN POLICY 
AND NATIONAL INTEREST 
2.1. Introduction 
International relations is a relatively new discipline. It only developed as a separate 
discipline after the end of the Second World War when scholars, strategists and 
politicians tried to explain the causes of the two world wars and how they could go 
about avoiding future conflicts. The classical realist writing Politics Among Nations 
by Hans Morgenthau signifies the beginning of international relations/politics as a 
special discipline within the social sciences. Since then numerous approaches, 
schools and perspectives have developed within the discipline. 
It is in this regard that scholars such as Bull, (1977), Hassner, (1994), Lieshout, 
(1995) and Wight, (1991) have observed that the ideas of various scholars can be 
roughly grouped into three theoretical perspectives on international relations, 
namely realism, rationalism and universalism.8 
The chapter starts with an examination the debate around these three theoretical 
perspectives. It will attempt to outline the main characteristics of the realist, 
rationalist and universalist perspectives. A discussion of these perspectives will be 
followed by theoretical explanations relating to differences between the theoretical 
traditions, and how they view international politics, foreign policy and national 
8 The purpose of this theoretical chapter is not to cover all the approaches in international relations, 
rather, it focuses on and discusses one possible division of the theoretical perspectives in 
international relations to address the main problem of the thesis. The application of the three 
perspectives (realism, rationalism and universalism), however, does not imply that other 
approaches, such as constructivism, would not be relevant for the analysis in the thesis. 
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interest. These explanations will help us understand Pretoria foreign policy between 
1994 and 1999. 
It is hoped that this debate will also provide the background for an in-depth analysis 
of two concepts relevant for this research, namely 'foreign policy' and 'national 
interest.' As this chapter attempts to show, these concepts are closely linked, since 
national interest ultimately leads to foreign policy action. In other words, foreign 
policy action is an extension and a product of a state's national interest. Therefore, 
the theoretical background in this chapter will give a necessary insight into the 
factors that influence a state' s foreign policy behaviour and explain how this 
behaviour is linked to its national interests. 
This chapter is based on two assumptions: one, that ideas and teachings about 
international relations fall into three major theoretical perspectives; namely realist 
(also termed as Machiavellian or Hobbesian), rationalist (Grotian), and universalist 
(Kantianlidealist or revolutionist) perspectives. These perspectives would appear to 
be representative of the major contending issues studied in international relations 
today. Each is valuable in its own respect and offers plausible perceptions on how 
people should view the relations between states and further, how international 
relations should be conducted. 
The second assumption is that - even though each perspective has its own more or 
less elaborate explanation as regards the essence of international politics - the reality 
of international politics cannot be explained by one perspective only. It can also be 
argued that the truth about international politics lies in the debate amongst the three 
perspectives. 
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2.2. The Realist Perspective in International Politics 
The realist teachings have been probably the most influential in the theory of 
international politics. Realism was originally the dominant school of medieval 
philosophy and it concerned itself with the doctrine that universals (general ideas 
and abstract concepts) have an objective existence, as opposed to nominalism, which 
asserted that universals were 'mere names'. In the eighteenth century, reality 
became 'matter', whereas in the twentieth century, realism meant a frank acceptance 
of the disagreeable aspects of life such as violence, sin, suffering and conflict (Bull, 
1977; Hassner, 1994; Lieshout, 1995 and Wight, 1991). 
Realist thinking was also influenced by scientific theory - biology in particular. For 
example, Charles Darwin (1899)'s book The Origin of Species was associated with 
realist philosophy and thereby expounded the hypothesis of natural selection in 
biological evolution. Consequently, the expression "survival of the fittest" came into 
being, and was subsequently turned into a sort of cliche for 'the struggle for 
existence', not only in science but also in international politics. 
According to realists the relations between states in the international system reflect 
the relations between human beings. Realists have a somewhat gloomy view of 
human nature and they have written extensively on its negative aspects. This view 
has also been influenced by other social sciences such as psychology. 9 
9 For example, the ideas of Sigmund Freud, (1939:35, 77), who asserted that "the tendency to 
aggression is an inherent independent instinctual disposition in man ... and that the greatest obstacle 
to civilization is the constitutional tendency in man to be aggressive against one another. ..... 
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Machiavelli, (1928:134,142), who is seen as the real 'inventor' of political realism 
as he was the first person since the Greeks to look at politics without ethical 
presuppositions, concluded that: 
" ... human beings are ungrateful, fickle, false, cowards, covetous and as long as 
you succeed, they are obedient and will give you anything possible including 
their life, children when the need is far distant. But when the need approaches, 
they tum against you ... if human beings were entirely good, this precept would 
not hold, but because man is bad, and will not keep faith with you, you too are 
not bound to observe it with them (keep faith)." 
Similarly, in his classic work, the Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes, (1946:81) noted that: 
" ... one finds three principal causes of disagreements in human beings: 
competition, timidity and grandeur. The first makes man invade for triumph, 
the second for security and the third for status. The first uses aggression to 
make human beings masters of other human beings and their properties; the 
second to preserve them; the third for trifles - as a word, a smile, or any other 
sign of under value." 
He goes on to note that during the time when human beings live without a common 
power to keep them all in awe, they are in a condition which is called war; and such 
a war is of every human against fellow humans (bellum omnium contra omnes). 
Realists further contend that people are egotistic. It is in this regard that realist 
scholars such as Carr (1942), Waltz (1979) and other neo-realist scholars observe 
that humans display egoism or the will to assert themselves at the expense of others. 
And since humans who are egoistic rule states and are power-hungry, a state of war 
exists because all states seek power and seek to ensure their own safety in an 
international society where peace is fragile. 
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Thus, Waltz, (1979:103) sums up the realist perspective's view of human beings as 
follows: " ... the life of man is solitary, poor, nasty, brutal and short." Hence, it is this 
nature of human beings that is reflected in the relations among nation-states. 
From this perspective, therefore, it is assumed that in international relations conflict 
is the rule rather than the exception. It is further assumed that the international 
society does not exist and that international law is somewhat vague and constantly 
violated. Consequently, the international society looks like a peacetime convenience 
of sovereign states. This interpretation of the international society was originally put 
forward by Hobbes who viewed international relations as an arena that resembles the 
state of nature. In other words, war and conflict are synonymous and are a part of the 
international system/society (Bull, 1977 and Cohen et al., 1974). 
For realists, the existing diplomatic system is a network, whose purpose is 
aggrandisement and defence. Further, they hold that there can be no world society 
without a world state. Their secondary premise is that the international system is 
constituted of nothing but great powers, which then go on to comprise and 
determine the nature of the international society. 
Further, there is no international society integrated to the extent that it is able to 
define for national societies the concrete meaning of justice or equality, as national 
societies do for their individual members (Hegel, 1949: 340; Morgenthau, 1951:34; 
1958:80-81). Hence, states seek passions, private interests, selfish ends, force, vices 
and wrongdoings in order to enhance their national power or strength. 
Power is another concept frequently used by realists, especially also discussed in 
relation to morality, law and national interests. The fundamental premise of realism 
is that politics forms the basis of morality and law, and that power in all its features 
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is self-justifying. Morgenthau, (1951 :34) agrees with Hobbes that the state crafts 
morality as well as law and that there is neither morality nor law outside the state. 
To realists, the major rationale of the state is to maintain and increase power for 
survival in an anarchical international society, since a state's policy is determined by 
the pressure of conflict. Bull (1977: 40-51) and Cohen, (1974) concur with 
Morgenthau that the state's moral role is to achieve power since this power 
guarantees its survival in the international system. Consequently, it is in the national 
interest of a state to pursue this power, and achieve it by whatever means necessary. 
For this reason, all states have a moral obligation to achieve their national interest. 
2.3. Rationalism 
Rationalists believe in the value of international cooperation III a predominantly 
anarchic and hostile international society or system. They believe that though human 
beings are sinful and bloodthirsty creatures, they are also rational. Consequently, the 
word 'rationalist' emerges from this assumption. 
Rationalists 10 such as Grotius, Locke, Burke and Bull argue that conflict exists at the 
same time that international cooperation among states takes place. Although states 
are not subject to a common superior, they form a society whose workings are 
evident in institutions such as diplomacy, international law, the balance of power 
and the concert of great powers. Proponents of this perspective argue that although 
states interact with one another, they are not free of moral and legal restrictions and 
are subsequently bound by the rules of the international society they comprise of and 
have a stake in. 
10 Rationalists are divided into ' realists ' and 'idealists ' . The realists observe the actual state of the 
international society and they envisage how the society should be administered in recognition of the 
existing anarchical society. The idealists believe that the laws and regulations be enacted so that 
man can live in harmony and that the nature of man is good and they pursue ideals on earth 
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Rationalism therefore argues that reason is a source of knowledge in itself, superior 
to and independent of sense perceptions. In the seventeenth century, rationalism 
came to acquire an epistemological importance in describing, "How do we obtain 
knowledge?" It claimed that reason itself, aided by observation, could provide us 
with philosophical knowledge, which is true knowledge. This could be arrived at 
through deduction from necessary ideas (Wight, 1991:15-17). 
Rationalism has also a spiritual conception of the universe, which in some way is 
illusory. This spiritual conception of the universe theory was developed by scholars 
such as Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz. 
Rationalists hold natural law in high regard. Earlier writers of intemationallaw were 
divided into naturalists, positivists and Grotians. 11 Grotians place emphasis on 
treaties and customs underlining that both are essential to the law of nations. 
Rationalism is linked to reason within the concept of natural law and the belief in 
natural law is a belief in a huge, moral constitution to all created things, including 
human beings. 
Rationalism is an understanding that enduring and permanent principles originate 
from a source that transcends earthly power. In addition, it is a belief that men and 
women have an inherent association with this law and some inherent response to it. 
This is because of their possession of a rational ability. Reason in this respect means 
the competence to know this natural law and the obligations it imposes. As a result, 
men and women are in essence rational creatures and reason consequently becomes 
11 Grotians are taken to be rationalists. Writers on international law also came to be known as 
'naturalists'. Naturalists uphold that the solitary law of nations is the law of nature. The foremost 
naturalist was Pufendorf who understood natural law as one entailing anarchic liberty and not as a 
principle of social cohesion. Positivists on the other hand sustain the reverse in that the only law of 
nations is what is found in custom and treaties, thus the law of nature is non-legal and non-existent. 
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a manifestation of the spiritual brilliance in humans - 'Ratio est radius divini 
luminis'. This is the validation for using the word 'rationalist' in relation to 
international theory (Wight, 1991:14). 
On the aspect of human nature, rationalists do not have a definitive position. As a 
result they are neither pessimistic nor optimistic about human nature. They describe 
human nature as a kind of 'tension'. In a way, rationalists are seen as towing the 
middle line as a 'compromise' between anarchy and a perfect harmonious world. 
For example Taylor (1952: 262) spells it out best when he observes that there is a 
third way between despair and utopianism; and that is to take the world as it is and 
improve it by having faith and hope in humankind. He concludes that the rational 
side of human beings in the end always proves stronger than the irrational one. 
Rationalism in essence appeals to reason in both the Christian and secular forms. 
Scholars of this school view human beings as sinful, pugnacious and irrational. At 
the same time they perceive individuals as rational beings who have reason and are 
subsequently capable of succeeding at creating peace and harmony in society. 
Rationalists acknowledge the fact that society is in most parts a culmination of 
cooperation amongst rational people. In a way, one could term rationalists as 
reformers because though they admit the presence of an anarchical society, they 
reiterate that human beings are gifted with the ability to reason to strive and create 
harmony and peace in society (Wight, 1991: 19-20). 
The rationalists possess firm conceptions of the underpinnings of the international 
society. There is a solidarity or potential solidarity of states that comprises the 
international society. Furthermore, the international society and its laws are binding 
on member states in their relations with one another. With respect to the use of 
force, rationalists assert that the legitimate use of force or violence is a monopoly of 
the entire community of states. Consequently, the international society'S laws 
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sanction certain kinds of wars, a service they render to the entire international 
society (Butterfield and Wight, 1966: 52-53). 
Rationalists assert that the state of nature is still bound by the law of nature (pre-
Hobessian moral law of nature). Hence the sovereignty of states is passed on to 
different states by social contracts and there is a law of nations acknowledged by 
sovereigns as social contracts and are legally binding and not only a moral 
imperative. The major assumption amongst rationalists is that law is the source of 
society and precedes society. Moreover, this law originates from some transcendent 
source such as God's will. Consequently, there is no absolute distinction between 
the state of nature and a human beings' soul condition (ibid). 
Hugo Grotius' doctrine of sociability explains that it is the social contract that gave 
way to the condition of sociability, and of the capacity to be social. The law of 
nature determines sociable behaviour; hence, the state of nature is a condition of 
sociability that leads to conditions of peace and common interaction, but is at the 
same time unstable, formless, insecure and liable to collapse into war. The state of 
war is a state of enmity, malice and mutual destruction; the state of nature on the 
other hand is one of goodwill, mutual assistance and preservation. Ultimately, a 
rationalist views the international society as a customary society, one that uses 
customary law to guide relations though not perfect. It follows that at any given 
time, the greater part of the amalgam of international relations adopts custom rather 
than force. To rationalists, the role of force would be to remedy the insufficiencies 
of custom - force emerges when custom breaks down (Wight, 1991:17-25). 
With regards to national power, scholars of this perspective do not put faith III 
certain conditions of which power (resultant from human beings aggregation III 
political society) is the most vital. To them, powers are not self-justifying but must 
be justified by reference to some source outside or beyond itself and are transformed 
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into 'authority' (Lauterpach, 1946 and Wight, 1991: 99). Rationalists also hold the 
premise that human beings are logically and morally superior to the state and that 
political institutions are made for human beings. 
This theoretical perspective embraces 'moral realism' - realism in the 
classical/philosophical sense, which means that goodness, value and moral norms 
are all grounded in nature, independent of human interest and opinion. In this sense, 
moral realism in politics implies the doctrine of natural law - "the law behind the 
law" (ibid). Natural law therefore assumes respectable philosophical grounds for 
believing that promises, treaties ought to be honoured and wars should not be waged 
with unnecessary cruelty to civilians. The sanction of natural law ultimately lies 
with the human conscience. The doctrine of natural law with its sanctity in human 
conscience means that the eventual reality of politics and the guarantee of political 
well-being lies in the individual, passing judgement on the false justice and lawless 
power of his judges and torturers (Lauterpach, 1946; Van Vollenhoven, 1919 and 
Wight, 1991:99-102). 
Rationalists also have an established VIew about foreign policy and national 
interests. Their view of foreign policy is of the assumption of the desirability of co-
operation and adopting the principle of concert (togetherness). This perspective 
seeks security in cooperation and defensive alliances, because in the international 
society at any given time there are more law-abiding powers that strive to ensure 
peace is maintained whereas there are aggressive powers that want to upset this 
peace. To rationalists, this is the key assumption, the chief political interest 
underlying the international society, which is to hold together all states in the 
presence of looming anarchy (Shaw, 1995: 21-28, 91-93 and Von Glahn, 1996: 25-
30). 
24 
On the issue of national interests, rationalists observe that states pursue national 
interests with varying degrees of consideration for the interests of other states. They 
also assume a tension of interests between states, which at times can lead to conflict. 
They do however acknowledge that there is a possibility of mutually adjusting these 
interests. In other words, there is a partially resoluble tension of interests that is open 
to reconciliation. It is this belief in the resolution of tension of interests that makes 
them advocates and theorists of international law and organization (Barker, 200:4-6 
and Wight, 1991: 125-135). 
2.4. Universalism 
The third theoretical perspective III international politics is universalism,12 also 
termed Kantianism or idealism. This perspective emphasizes and relies on reason in 
human affairs, and puts confidence in the peace-building function of the 
international political system. 
Universalism holds that international politics is about relations among the 
individuals and groups that states are composed of. Accordingly, the highest interest 
of the individual coincides with that of the larger community (Dougherty and 
Pfaltzgraff, 1997:6-11). Moreover, universalists appeal to international morality, in 
that revolutionary consequences require all individuals to work for global harmony 
amongst people. 
12 The teachings of this perspective are further divided into two 'sub-perspectives' depending on 
their revolutionary or religious nature. Revolutionary teachings emphasize changing the world 
through revolutions whereas religious teachings focus on changing the world over a period of time 
by way of religion (also called evolutionary). 
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Scholars of this perspective also believe in the moral unity of the society of states or 
international society and those who identify themselves with it. Hence, they 
advocate this unity as the foremost aim of their international policies. 
For universalists, international theory and policy have a missionary disposition. 
According to Dawson (1950: 12), the historical basis underlying the foundation of 
the society of states was firstly , the purpose of considering universalism as a means 
and way of life and secondly, that it was in a way representative of Western 
civilization. In other words, Western civilization identified itself with universalism. 
In this regard, the distinguishing factor between Western customs and other world 
civilizations was its missionary culture - the desire to transmit a continuous series 
of spiritual and ideological movements. Some examples of international 
universalists would include the religious universalists 13 of the sixteenth and 
seventeenth century, the French universalists,14 and the totalitarian universalists of 
the twentieth century. 
13 The religious universalists were both Protestant and Catholic. The Catholics asserted that the 
existing international society of Christendom Europe was being subverted by rebellion and as a 
result it needed to be reinstated. The Protestant form of universalism found its classic expression in 
the Calvinists, especially the French Huguenots, and the Catholic form in the Jesuits. The political 
philosophy of the Calvinists and the Jesuits was influenced by developed along their theories of 
power based upon popular consent, and of the right to oppose royal governments and despotism 
(Wight, 1991: 8). 
International universalists such as Calvin, came up with a doctrine that stressed the supremacy and 
sovereignty of God. According to them Calvinists, authority bestowed upon kings and magistrates 
came from God. For this reason, in the eyes of God, all men were equal and if a king commanded 
anything immoral or non-religious, the natural duty of obedience changed into the special duty of 
disohedience. This was the source of the Calvinist doctrine of the duty of resistance to tyrants and 
the right to depose kings. Though kings had authority from God, the people judged if the king had 
forfeited that authority. What God was for Calvin, the general will (the social God), was for 
Rousseau. 
14 A similar view of French universalist international theory is made through their perception of the 
rights and duties related to the intervention in other states to liberate the adherents of one' s own 
faction, as well as in the doctrine about the nature of the international society. 
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Although universalists tend to be optimistic and perfectionist about human nature 
(individuals are naturally good and are destined for salvation), they are at the same 
time sceptical of the character of human beings. This uncertainty about humans 
amongst universalists results in different arguments about the nature of individuals. 
For example, on the one hand, there is an ideological homogeneity among 
individuals that makes them strive for goals that are of common good to all people 
(Bull, 1977: 238). On the other hand, there is a pessimistic assumption about human 
nature. This is because universalists believe that, though people are born free, they 
are in actuality still in chains - this is the Rousseauite paradox. i5 The paradox 
comes from the fact that the humans who manage to be exceptions to the rule that all 
people are naturally good and free, are the very same people who have put other 
humans in chains. 
With regard to international society, universalists would like to reVIve the 
underground medieval idea of a simple republic, and solidify the international 
society into a world state, in order to rebuild it into a super-state. In this way, 
universalist theory assimilates international relations with a condition of domestic 
politics. The more the international society is conceived of as a great society/super-
state, where individual states are 'citizens' and exercise authority over them (civitas 
maxima), the more international relations can be thought of as representing the 
domestic politics of the universal' civitas'. 
15 This paradox emerges, for example, in the works of Marx where the world is divided into two 
spheres: one inhabited by the majority peace-loving people of the world, and the other which is 
ridden with and controlled by secret enemies (imperialists) and vestiges in the presence of peace 
loving people. Consequently, it is the duty of the elect, the party - who at times speak of 
themselves as the majority of the human race - to coerce the remainder of the human race into 
goodness, into freedom. In universalist perspective, the duty of coercing the human race is often 
accompanied by extermination. This is an extreme form of optimism of the belief that by 
decimating the human race, one creates a virtuous world (Wight, 1991: 26-29) or international 
society. 
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Universalists therefore, desire to assimilate international politics to domestic 
politics; they are concerned with aspiration rather than fact. Their major problem is 
the gap between universalist prescription and the actual state of international 
relations. 
With regard to the concept of national power, proponents of universalism do not 
find power self-justifying but rather see power as being something beyond itself. 
Universalists condemn the existing system of power from the political perspective 
that prescribes human goals, the right to moral judgement and duty of action. 
'Force rather than power' is a term used by scholars in this perspective to connote 
something liberating, in that it destroys established power and bogus authority, and 
liberates new social elements and impulses. Force is a universalist concept, which 
has the capacity to overthrow power, to destroy existing political organizations in 
the name of universalist doctrine, and to facilitate the necessary reconstruction 
(Carr, 1939: 35-76). 
Not all universalists, however, subscribe to force as a means of achieving the civitas 
maxima. Universalists can be divided into hard and soft camps. Hard universalists 
like Lenin believe in creating a brotherhood of living beings (i.e. civitas maxima), in 
which international politics is assimilated into the condition of domestic politics by 
violence. On the other hand, soft universalists such as Kant, Nehru, Woodrow 
Wilson, prefer yearning and talking to achieve their goals (Bull, 1977:252-278 and 
Wight, 1991: 40-48) 
* * * 
On the basis of the above overview of the mam characteristics of the three 
theoretical perspectives in international politics, it can be shown that the conceptions 
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of human nature, international society, national power and the essence of 
international politics, differs substantially. 
While realists believe that human nature is gloomy and negative and that human 
being's egoism and hunger for power is the root of all problems, rationalists argue 
that they possesses a rational ability to reason. It is this reasoning ability that makes 
men and women rational creatures in essence. Consequently, reason becomes a 
manifestation of the spiritual brilliance in humans and this makes one have faith and 
hope in human beings. Universalists tend to be optimistic and perfectionist about 
human nature (individuals are naturally good and is destined for salvation). 
With regard to international society, realists argue that the existing diplomatic 
system is a network, whose purpose is aggrandisement and defence. In addition, 
conflict in the international society is the rule rather than the exception. Rationalists 
however, argue that the solidarity of states is what comprises the international 
society. Universalists view the international society as a simple republic to solidify 
the international society into a world state, in order to define it and constitute it as a 
super-state. 
Realists view national power as primary to the existence of states and believe that it 
is this state power, which forms the basis of morality and law. By extension, this 
power in all its features is self-justifying. They argue that the major rationale of the 
state is to maintain and increase power for survival in an anarchical international 
society, since the 'pressure of conflict' determines a state's policy. Rationalists 
take a different view in that power is not self-justifying but must be justified by 
reference to some source outside or beyond itself. Universalists place human goals 
within the existing system of power. In other words, human values and power 
determine national power. Similarly, the three theoretical perspectives differ in their 
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understanding of national interests and foreign policy, the two concepts relevant for 
the analysis in this thesis, which will be examined in the following sections. 
The assessment of the three theoretical perspectives has laid the foundation for the 
analysis of the concepts of 'foreign policy' and 'national interest' in the context of 
international relations. This framework will consequently help the reader to better 
understand the determining factors in the foreign policies and national interest of 
states. In fact, both foreign policy and national interest can be analysed within the 
context of the three theoretical perspectives. Ultimately, one can determine which 
type of foreign policy and national interest was pursed by a particular state 
depending on the prevailing characteristics of its foreign policy 
2.5. Foreign Policy and National Interest 
2.5.1. The Definition of Foreign Policy 
The term 'foreign policy' , like most commonly used terms in international relations 
theory, does not have a generally accepted definition. 16 Scholars differ on foreign 
policy's definitions, aspects, content, and functions. 17 However, it can be argued that 
there is a consensus about the general meaning of the term and what functions it 
entails. 
There is agreement among a number of scholars (Frankel, 1968: 1 and Coulter, 
1991: 272) that foreign policy consists of decisions and actions that involve, to some 
16 For a detailed analysis of the evolution of the concept of foreign policy see Hudson, (1995: 209-
238) and Hermann, (1987). 
17 Said et al. , (1995:30-31) note that the definition of foreign policy is problematic. This is because 
the term refers, on the one hand, to the general principles by which a state governs its relationship 
with the international political environment. On the other hand, however, the term can be defined as 
a course of action oriented towards a single objective, and therefore a state can have many policies 
as its objectives. 
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extent, relations between one state and others, and at a different level, the choice of 
directions that one takes towards one's national goals. 
Similarly, Holsti, (1972:21) defines foreign policy as the actions of a state toward 
the external environment and the conditions under which those actions are 
formulated. It is also seen as the pattern of behaviour that one state adopts while 
pursuing its interests in relation to other states (Viotti and Kauppi, 1999: 478; and 
Rodee et al., 1983: 458-9). 
Foreign policy can also be explained as something 'lesser than' the sum of all 
policies that have an effect upon national governments relations with other national 
governments (Millar, 1969:57). This explanation concurs with the argument that 
foreign policy refers by implication to the actions and purposes of personalised 
national governments with respect to areas and objects lying beyond their territory 
(Meehan, 1971: 266). 
It has been observed that there are two basic approaches to foreign policy. The first 
is the ideological approach, whereby the policies of states vis-a- vis the rest of the 
world are merely expressions of prevailing political, social and religious beliefs. 
Foreign policies that fall under this approach are classified as democratic or 
totalitarian, libertarian or socialist, and peace-loving or aggressive. 
The second approach to foreign policy is analytical. The main idea behind this 
approach is that foreign policy is based on multiple determinants including a state's 
historic tradition, geographical location, national interest, purposes and security 
needs. In order to understand foreign policy, an observer needs to take into account 
and analyse a host of factors (Macridis, 1962: 1-2). Consequently, whatever 
definition of foreign policy one uses, that definition can fall under the ideological 
approach, analytical approach, or can be a combination of both approaches. 
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For the purpose of this thesis, however, foreign policy is defined as a policy 
formulated by a state in relation to other states and external environment. Such a 
policy includes general orientations and principles on which specific actions for the 
attainment of objectives/goals of a state are based. These general orientations and 
specific actions are influenced not only by ideology, but also by a host of other 
factors, such as geographical location, historical experience, security concerns, size 
of a state's population, to name but a few. 
Nevertheless, it is important to single out one particular factor namely ideology,18 
defined as a system of beliefs, ideas and values characteristic of a group of people or 
a community. This system forms a lens through which the world is viewed and 
consequently, ideology influences policy-making and foreign policy-making in 
particular. 19 The extent of this influence, however, is determined by other factors 
that also influence foreign policy-making. 
As mentioned, there are numerous differences in understanding amongst scholars as 
to what foreign policy is. For example, in some cases, foreign policy is equated 
with, or derived from official pronouncements of national governments; in others, 
18 Macridis (1962:2) has defined ideology as " ... a set of closely related beliefs, or ideas, or even 
attitudes, characteristic of a group of people or community." Evans (1998:236-237) notes that the 
term means a " ... set of assumptions and ideas about social behaviour and social systems, 
consequently, ideology becomes a lens through which policy-makers perceive their various 
environments and react accordingly." Similarly, Hague et al. (1992:91) view ideology as an 
organised set/system of beliefs and values about human society. In practice, ideology is identified 
by the intense desire of its adherents to transform the world in accordance with their key values. For 
more on ideology and foreign policy, see Carlsnaes (1986). 
19 The importance of ideology to foreign policy-making can be illustrated by numerous historical 
examples. Nazism and fascism as state ideOlogies fed the foreign policies of Hitler' s Germany or 
Mussolini's Italy. Similarly, the system of apartheid was based on racist, nationalistic ideOlogy that 
was reflected in South Africa's foreign policy. Today, the leadership of the new South Africa bases 
its foreign policy on democratic and liberal ideas, including respect for human rights. 
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foreign policy is equated with the actions of states vis-a-vis with other governments. 
More significant differences are visible, however, when one takes a closer look at 
how foreign policy is viewed by the individual perspectives discussed above. 
2.5.2. Realist Conception of Foreign Policy 
From a realist perspective, states are the basic units of analysis, which co-exist and 
collide with each other in the absence of any political superior. And these states are 
in a constant state of mutual insecurity; thus self-preservation is their foremost 
concern attainable by self-sufficiency mostly in defence and weapons. 
Some scholars argue that states are unable to satisfy their desire for power within the 
national community and consequently, they project those unsatisfied aspirations 
onto the international scene where they come into conflict with other states having 
the same ambitions (Morgenthau, 1966: 97-99). In such an international system, 
states use their foreign policy to enhance their power so they can survive in the 
system and prevail upon other entities. More power also means more security, both 
domestic and international. In this system, war is just a pursuance of foreign policy 
by other means. 
The realist perspective, however, is by no means uniform when it comes to an 
understanding of foreign policy. For example, Rose (1998) distinguishes four 
approaches within the realist perspective, namely, offensive realism, defensive 
realism, neo-classical realism and the innenpolitik approach (Rose, 1998:144-154). 
These four approaches to foreign policy take the behaviour of individual states 
rather than the pattern of outcomes of state relations as their independent variable. 
They seek to explain what states try to achieve in their external environment and 
why. 
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2.5.2.1. Offensive Realism 
Offensive realism or aggressive realism underscores the dominant role of systemic 
factors. It assumes that international anarchy is generally Hobbesian, apart from 
situations of bipolarity or nuclear deterrence. Security is scarce and states try to 
achieve it by maximising their relative advantage. In an international society where 
offensive realism dominates, rational states pursuing security are prone to take 
actions that can lead to conflict with other states. Domestic differences between 
countries are considered to be relatively unimportant because pressures from the 
international system are assumed to be strong, consequently making states behave 
alike regardless of domestic characteristics. To offensive realists, relative 
capabilities and the external environment determine a state's foreign policy. 
2.5.2.2. Defensive Realists 
Defensive realists argue that systemic factors drive some kinds of state behaviour 
and not others. They assume that international anarchy is often more benign, in that 
security is in abundance (rather than scarce), and that states learn this over time. In 
defensive realism, all rational states pursuing security respond to threats that rarely 
occur. This deters the aggressor and alleviates the need for actual conflict. The 
exception to this rule exists when certain conditions ensure that states seeking 
security to fear each other for example when the modes of war favour the offensive 
state. Foreign policy is therefore an indication that rational states react positively to 
clear systemic factors. In this regard, states only corne into war with each other 
when security dilemma is heightened. Hence rogue states that misread the security 
incentives offered by their environment only interrupt this period of lull. 
2.5.2.3. Neo-Classical Realism 
The third approach, neo-classical realism, explicitly incorporates both the external 
and internal variables. It also challenges the main elements of the other three realist 
approaches. Neo-classical realism claims that innenpolitik arguments are misguided 
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because the single factor dominating a country's foreign policy is their relative 
material power vis-a-vis the rest of the international system. It also attacks both 
defensive and offensive realism by saying that they are erroneous because their 
emphasis on state responses to threats overlooks the fact that one's perceptions of 
threat is partly shaped by one's relative material power. 
The unique aspect of neo-classical realism lies in its claim that the impact of 
material power capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and complex. This is 
because of the different pressures exerted indirectly by the international system on 
the powers of states as well as intervening variables at the state/domestic level. To 
scholars who adopt this view, relative material power constitutes the core of a state's 
foreign policy. Further, actual political leaders and elites make foreign policy 
decisions; consequently, it is the perception of the decision-makers (with regards to 
power) that matters. 
2.5.2.4. lnnenpolitik Conception of Foreign Policy 
The most relevant approach for this study is the innenpolitik approach, which 
stresses the dominant influence of domestic factors on foreign policy as opposed to 
external factors. It is argued that the most common approach to foreign policy 
analysis has been to assume that foreign policy has its roots in domestic politics 
(Holsti, 1967 and Rose, 1998). 
Authors who adopt this approach claim that internal factors, both political and 
economic, influence how countries behave towards the world beyond their borders. 
These factors would include political and economic ideology, national character, 
partisan politics, or socio-economic structures. In other words, a country's domestic 
political and economic environment (decision-making, economic situation, policies 
and the like) determines a country's foreign policy. 
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There are many variants of the innenpolitik approach, based on different domestic 
independent variables, but they all share a common assumption that foreign policy is 
the product of a state's internal dynamics. 
To explain further the innenpolitik approach we can say that the domestic 
environment20 forms the background against which policy is made domestically as 
well as in the international environment (Evans, 1998: 179 and Frankel, 1970: 87). 
In this regard, foreign policy objectives, decisions and actions are formulated or 
taken on behalf of the state by individuals and groups of individuals, among other 
things, to fulfil the general social needs of a state, to improve the economic 
situation, to achieve lower unemployment, better standards of living and higher per 
capita income, because these can be fulfilled mostly through transactions with other 
states (Holsti, 1967: 375-387). Furthermore, social and economic needs can be 
linked to policy outputs; and since economic welfare is considered a prime national 
value, it can be predicted that a resource-poor country will engage in foreign trade. 
Consequently, the foreign policy of a country would necessarily reflect its domestic 
concerns. 
Moreover, a policy contributing modestly and consistently to prosperity and the 
raising of standards of living is viable and essential for any state's foreign policy. 
Since economic strength has always been an instrument for political power, every 
government is compelled to pursue a policy designed to further the acquisition of 
wealth. Ultimately, the acquisition of wealth becomes a way for a nation to become 
powerful. Stimulating industrial production at home thus becomes a normal function 
of the state. 
20 This includes, among other things, the people in power, political parties, public opinion, pressure 
groups and decision-makers, the international system and relations between states. 
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It must be noted that even though the innenpolitik approach has considerable 
explanatory value, it fails to explain why states with similar domestic systems often 
act differently in the international arena and why unlike states in similar situations 
often act alike. Furthermore, scholars have emphasized that this foreign policy 
approach disregards the influence of external factors. 
The operational definition of foreign policy used in this research allows for both 
systemic and internal factors, which can influence a state ' s foreign policy. This 
study is predominantly underpinned by the innenpolitik approach, however, despite 
its drawbacks; it is useful when one tries to explain how the domestic concerns of a 
government influence the actions of the government taken in the international 
environment. 
2 .5.3. Rationalism and Foreign Policy 
The rationalist view of foreign policy includes the desirability of co-operation and 
adoption of the principle of concert (togetherness). This perspective seeks security 
in co-operation and defensive alliances, because in the international society at any 
given time there are more law-abiding powers that strive to ensure the maintenance 
of peace than there are aggressive powers that want to upset this peace. To 
rationalists, this is the key assumption and the chief political interest underlying the 
international society, which is to hold together all states in the presence of looming 
anarchy. In this regard, Butterfield and Wight (1966: 51-73) argue that co-operation 
under this perspective is based on economic, commercial interdependence, cultural 
links and the acceptance of humanitarian duties. 
The basic principle of rationalists is to unite and influence states. Rationalists 
believe that it is easier to deal with a united satisfied state than with a multitude of 
small frustrated ones. The principles of unity and influence rest on two assumptions: 
that goodwill can evoke friendship and reciprocal goodwill, and that common 
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interests can be found through this co-operation. This is the principle of concert as it 
was experienced in the nineteenth century, the aim of which was to "neutralise and 
bind up all the selfish aims of the powers and establish a system of [checks and 
balances]" (Jones, 1924: 372; Cecil, 1921:331). Apart from being the most elaborate 
theoretical formulation of the principle of concert in the nineteenth century, it is also 
the foundation of the doctrine of collective security (Wight, 1991: 153). 
This view of foreign policy is based on the assumptions that all states, if not most, 
abide by the rule of law and they strive to maintain peace. In addition states under 
this view are not aggressive but rather they cooperate with one another for the 
greater good. Likewise, unity and influence is important so that goodwill can evoke 
friendship and reciprocal goodwill, and that common interests can be found through 
this co-operation. Evidence of this trend can be observed in regional integration. 
If one were to apply the rationalist view of foreign policy in this study, then it can be 
observed that some states do espouse such foreign policy. For example, there are 
states that view the world as abiding by the rule of law and strive to maintain global 
peace. In addition, governments promote cooperation at the economic, commercial 
levels as they endure to ensure interdependence as part of their 'humane' 
responsibilities. This level of cooperation further ensures cultural links and the 
acceptance of humanitarian duties and values across borders. 
2.5.4. The Universalist View of Foreign Policy 
The views of the universalists differ from the realists and rationalists in the sense 
that universalists wish to abolish the individual state's foreign policy altogether and 
this can lead to a global foreign policy (isolation of national interests). Universalists 
focus on the harmonization of state interests; hence this would require a 'universal 
foreign policy', a sort of global policy that would place the interests of the world 
above state interests, which would ultimately support state national interests, already 
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harmonized in the past. Universalists do not believe in the international society but 
rather in human life. As a result, they would prefer to do away with the entire 
traditional diplomatic system and rely solely on beliefs and ideology. The 
consequence of the universalist dislike for diplomacy is the devaluation of 
diplomatic activity and decreasing autonomy of formal diplomats. 
Since universalists favour a moral isolationist stand, the interest of the universal 
state is therefore seen as an amalgam of righteousness and reason; and subsequently, 
universalism appeals to world public opinion and does away with diplomacy and 
divide and rule tactics.21 
Universalists believe that if one has the right kind of state, one will also have the 
right kind of policy. Hence, scholars such as Laski (1941: 181), Dutt (1936: 238) 
and Wight (1991: 107) see the foreign policy of a given state as a function of its 
inner system of class relations. In this regard, the nation state will and does act 
towards other nation-states as it acts towards its own citizens. 
Under this VIew of foreign policy, the research would conclude that individual 
foreign policies tend to be subordinated to the harmonization of global interests that 
would ultimately lead to a global foreign policy. Although difficult to achieve, one 
may observe symptoms of such a global policy within international organisations 
21 The principle of divide and rule is an application of realist foreign policy in international 
relations. For example, in the early nineteenth century Latin American states accused the United 
States (US) of pursuing this policy in the western hemisphere. The Americans boycotted the first 
inter-American congress in Panama in 1826 to create a common policy in foreign affairs because 
they said they had their own system. Furthermore, the Latin Americans believed that the US played 
off Brazil against Argentina, dictatorships against democracies and revolutionaries against liberals. 
This policy was aimed to keep European powers out of Latin America (by proclaiming the Monroe 
Doctrine), while at the same time wielding supremacy through the same unscrupulous methods that 
the US condemned other powers for. 
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such as the United Nations, Amnesty International, Green Peace and so on - the 
focus being the harmonization of interests for the greater good of the world (world 
interests). 
Likewise, states also pursue harmonization policies in their relations with other 
states by placing emphasis on the interests of individuals and not the state(s) since 
ultimately the interests of humans are the interests of the world. This attitude would 
then be the 'norm' across the world. Examples of these prescriptions for behaviour 
would be the promotion of human rights, democracy, fundamental freedoms and so 
on. 
In sum, a country can apply one or more or all of the above views in its foreign 
policy. It is worth noting that these views are not static and can be applied in 
isolation or in combination with one another. Hence a country exhibiting one view 
today can espouse a different one tomorrow depending on the issue at hand. In this 
study, we shall observe some of these views individually or in combination with 
other perspectives. 
2.6. The Concept of National Interest 
A concept closely linked to the concept of foreign policy is that of national interest. 
National interest is a vague, confusing and ambiguous concept because it assumes a 
variety of meanings in the different contexts in which it is used, and often these 
meanings (contexts) cannot be reconciled. For example, national interests have been 
referred to simply as matters of importance to a state (Viotti and Kauppi, 1999: 
482). Other scholars have defined national interest as a general, long-term and 
continuing purpose that the state, the nation, and the regime would ideally see 
themselves as serving at any given time (Said et aI., 1995: 27), whereas others still 
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have termed national interests as a collection of goods and values that a state seeks 
in the world (Coulter, 1991: 271). 
Ultimately, because of the various definitions of the concept, the concept becomes 
somewhat vague and loses much of its analytical usefulness. The definition of the 
concept becomes even more complicated, since, in practice, each state determines its 
own national interest. National interest depends largely on the power of the state, on 
its system of government, social structure, degree of dependence on other states, and 
so on. In this regard, Frankel (1968:130) defines the concept as the general and 
continuing ends for which a nation acts, the total sum of all national and state 
values. 
The problems incurred at arriving at a definition of 'national interest' are numerous. 
First! y, the term 'national' refers to both the nation (social group) and to the state 
(political organisation). Some authors such as Rosenau (1968: 34) have 
distinguished between the use of the concept for political analysis and political 
action. National interest as an analytical tool is used to describe, explain or evaluate 
the sources/adequacy of a nation's foreign policy. As a tool for political action on 
the other hand, it serves as a means of justifying, denouncing or proposing policies. 
The use of the concept for both analysis and action, however, refers to what is best 
for a national society. This analytical distinction still does not offer the means for 
further analysis or for empirical investigation, however. When the term national 
interest is discussed, it is sometimes difficult to assess in which of the two senses the 
concept is used. 
Secondly, within each distinction, and depending on who makes the argument, there 
is no clear-cut difference between the use of the concept, which can have two 
meanings: for analytical purposes or for empirical investigation. For example, when 
it is argued that it is in the national interest of a member of the Southern African 
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Development Conference (SADC) to maintain the organization, it involves either 
the discussion of SADC as an instrument of national strategy or as a prescription to 
maintain or reduce defences vis-a- vis non-member states. 
Thirdly, the various authors adopt two fundamentally different approaches to the 
analysis of the national interest. On one hand, there are the objectivists who assume 
that national interests can be objectively defmed and examined with the help of 
some objective criteria. Subjectivists, on the other hand, interpret the concept as a 
constantly changing pluralistic set of subjective preferences that can be observed 
through the study of decision-making. 
Fourthly, the definition of the concept further depends upon the position a person 
takes within the spectrum of several pairs of extremes such as altruistic-egotistic 
(ideals versus self-interests, idealists versus realists), short and long term concerns, 
active-reactive, radical-conservative, hard and liberal minded, traditional-innovating, 
collectivist-individualist, and so on. In these cases, the attitudes of individuals can 
be ranked after some empirical indicators have measured them. In addition, the 
blurred lines between the domestic and international activities of the state add to the 
confusion since values pursued within these two areas of activity are not necessarily 
identical and receive different priorities (Frankel, 1970:15-17; Barber and Smith, 
1974: 24-29). 
Though confusing and at times ambiguous in their interpretation, national interests 
are often expected to be permanent or extremely durable. Accordingly, the national 
interests of great powers and the methods by which they are to be secured are also 
impervious to ideological and institutional changes (Morgenthau, 1962: 199). The 
permanence of national interests, however, is relative, and is subject to re-
interpretation in relation to changes in power relations. 
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This ambiguity in the meaning of 'national interest' can be partly explained by the 
evolution of the concept. Natural interest's origins can be traced to the early stages 
of the modem state-formation in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, first in 
Italy and later in England (Beard, 1934). Before the emergence of nationalism, other 
terms were used to describe national interests such as: 'will of the leader', 'dynastic 
interests', or 'raison d'etat'. These were gradually replaced by reference to the 
nation. American statesmen have also extensively used this term since the inception 
of the American constitution. Likewise, other terms such as 'national honour', 
'public interest', 'general will' were used (Frankel, 1970: 20). 
In practice, these interests remain vague and obscure because nations act in order to 
satisfy their best interests, and with time and circumstance these interests change. 
Furthermore, the national interest is what the power holders in a state seek to 
maintain and enhance - what the decision-makers suppose that interest to be. 
Additionally, what is vital for a state in foreign affairs is never self-evident because 
people are bound to differ over what constitutes the vital goals for a state; hence, the 
national interest is not a single goal. Moreover, statesmen think and act in terms of 
interest defined as power and since power is an elusive and ambiguous concept, this 
circumstance further increases the vagueness and obscurity of the concept (Rosenau, 
1974: 186-191; Morgenthau, 1966: 7-10). 
Despite all these problems of the definition of national interest, some authors have 
attempted to make a useful classification of the concept. In order to provide a more 
nuanced understanding of the concept of national interest, it is useful to consider the 
following classification of the national interest in its various forms. 
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2.6.1 . The Classification of National Interest 
A number of scholars such as Frankel (1970:31-38), Kirk (1952:110-115) and 
Rosenau (1969) have proposed a functional classification of the term 'national 
interest'. In this regard, they identify three levels of classification: 
A. aspirational; 
B. operational; and 
C. explanatory and polemical. 
The third category overlaps with the first two; hence, this classification is not quite 
precise. 
At the aspirationallevel, national interest refers to some ideal set of goals that a state 
would like to pursue or realize if it were possible. If national interest is professed at 
this level alone, then it is not actively pursued but it is relevant nevertheless. It does, 
however, indicate the general direction desired, and given the opportunity by means 
of favourable changes in the environment or in capabilities, it may become 
operational. Some characteristics of aspirational interests are: 
• they are normally long-term interests; 
• they are generally rooted in history and/or ideology; 
• they command more attention from an opposition free of the restraints of and 
pre-occupation with the tasks of governing, than from the government itself; 
• they provide purpose or direction and even a sense of hope (Pan-Africanism, 
Pan-Arabism); 
• they need not be fully articulated and co-ordinated and can be contradictory; 
• they do not require a 'feasibility study' and are rarely priced; and 
• they are determined by political will rather than by capabilities, ideology 
being a strong determinant in this case, while the influence of power is 
ambivalent. 
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At the operational level, national interests refer to the total sum of interests and 
policies actually pursued, and possess the following characteristics: 
• they are usually short-term interests capable of achievement within the 
foreseeable future; 
• they often originate from considerations of expediency and necessity; 
• they are the m~or concerns of the government/party in power; 
• they are used in a descriptive form rather than a normative form; 
• because of the practical problems of implementation, contradictions among 
them are less easily tolerated than among aspirations; 
• they are generally translated into policies based upon the assessment of their 
prospects of success and policies which can be approximately aggregated; 
and 
• the crucial variable in their determination is found in capabilities rather than 
in political will. Hence, in this case, the classification of states by power is 
more relevant than by ideology. 
On the explanatory and polemical level, the concept of national interest is used to 
explain, evaluate, rationalise or criticise foreign policy. In political argument, this 
explanatory and polemical level sets out to 'prove' itself right and others wrong, and 
the arguments are thus used for this purpose rather than for description or 
prescription. Examples of these are official documents published and statements by 
heads of government or foreign ministries made in parliament, parliamentary 
debates and discussions in the media. 
Subsequently, each of the three theoretical perspectives discussed in this chapter can 
be analysed in the context of the three functional levels of analysis namely, 
aspirational, operational, and explanatory/polemical. 
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2.7. 'The Debate' on the Concept of National Interest between the Three 
Perspectives 
Realists define interests in terms of power, which means that in international 
relations the struggle for the acquisition and use of power by whatever means is the 
primary interest of a state. The basic national interest is to maintain freedom of 
action. Subsequently, a state that is able to preserve its freedom of action and 
consulting its own interests implies that it has the exclusive right to decide what its 
interests are, hence, no outside power can or may define its interests or duties. 
In the pursuance of its national interests, however, a state is confronted with other 
states wishing to exert their wills and secure their interests. In all international 
systems the wills clash and interests conflict, periodically leading to wars and the 
disappearance of some states. 
Within the realist perspective, however, there are differences as regards the 
definition and explanation of the concept of national interest. For example, Niebuhr 
(McKeogh, 1997: 126-135) asserts that every nation acts on the basis of and is 
guided by its self-interests. He correctly observes that nations have pursued seJf-
interest more frequently than high-minded principles, and have competed more than 
they have cooperated. Kissinger suggests that this type of state behaviour has not 
changed from the inception of the state nor is it likely to change in the decades 
ahead. 
Morgenthau, (1951: 117-118) defines interests in terms of power.22 He describes 
national interests as a list of essential national goals. Morgenthau (Robinson, 1969: 
183-185) also defines the concept in many ways to cover a wide variety of meanings 
22 Bringing the desires of a nation into line with the power available for the pursuit of those desires, 
and the designation of those interests that are to be pursued at all costs (Robinson. 1969:185). 
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such as: common interests and conflicting interests, primary and secondary interests, 
inchoate interests, community of interests, vital interests, identical and 
complementary interests, legitimate interests, specific and limited interests, material 
interests, hardcore interests, necessary and viable interests 23 These terms can be 
divided into two general categories: the national interests of a single nation and the 
degree of commonality of interests between two or more nations. In sum, the 
acquisition and use of power by whatever means is the primary interest of a state; 
and the idea of national interest defined in terms of power is the core of state 
behaviour. 
In this regard, it has been noted that in foreign policy the objectives should be and 
are defined in terms of the national interest; consequently, the type of interest 
determining political action at a particular time depends on the political and cultural 
context within which foreign policy is made (Morgenthau, 1966: 525-530). National 
interest, therefore, is relative because nations do what they do in order to satisfy 
23 a. Primary interests include protection of the nation's physical, political and cultural identity and 
survi val against encroachment. These interests can never be comprontised and states will defend 
them at any cost. 
b. Secondary interests include protecting citizens abroad and maintaining immunities for the 
nation's diplomats. 
c. Permanent interests are relatively constant over long periods of time, and vary with time, for 
example Britain's interest over many centuries in navigating the seas. 
d. Variable interests are those interests that a nation at any given time chooses to regard as its 
national interests. 
e. General interests are those which the nation can apply in a positive manner to a large geographic 
area, to a large number of nations, or in several specific fields such as econontics, trade, diplomatic 
relations and so on. 
f. Specific interests are those positive interests not included in (e). These interests are usually 
closely defined in time and I or space and are often the logical outgrowth of general interests. 
g. Identical interests between nations are those that nations hold in common for example the United 
Kingdom and the US have had an interest in assuring that the European continent is not dontinated 
by a single power. 
h. Complementary interests between nations are those that, though not identical, are capable of 
forming the basis of agreement on specific issues. 
i. Conflicting interests are those not included in (g) and (h). 
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their best interests depending on the time and circumstance. This is done with the 
goal of increasing a state's power relative to that of other states. 
When it comes to the issue of national interests and morality, these two are distinct 
and combined at the same time. It is worthwhile observing that the state has no 
moral right to make sacrifices of the nation for the sake of certain moral principles, 
but rather the highest moral principle must be survival (Morgenthau, 1951: 985), 
since the state is entrusted with the very lives of its citizens. Hence, the state must 
ensure their well-being. 
On the other hand, some scholars observe that national interests are a country's 
interests if they serve as a means to creating a moral or ideological objective for the 
country (Bull, 1977:52-53; 66-67). In other words, if the state's interests were in 
harmony with the common interests of the world, such a situation would 
consequently create global stability. The assumption here is the harmonization of all 
interests that are not concrete but general. 
Rationalists take a rather different view of national interest. They argue that states 
pursue national interests with varying degrees of consideration for the interests of 
other states, but they also acknowledge that there is a tension of interests between 
states,24 which at times can lead to conflicts. Although rationalists (Wight, 1991: 
128; Butterfield and Wight, 1966: 51-73) recognize that the reactions of other states 
are part of the complexity of the situation within which national self-interest must be 
pursued, they also believe that mutual adjustment or regulation of these interests is 
possible by reaching a compromise between a state's interests and those of other 
states. Thus the ultimate aim of rationalist foreign policy is to strike a balance 
24 In rationalist theory, there is a resolvable tension between different interests of states, and a 
balance between the interests of the international society as a whole. Individual power is possible 
to achieve. 
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between the national interest and the wider interest of the other states.25 The belief in 
the resolution of tension of interests makes rationalists advocates and theorists of 
international law and organization (Barker, 2000: 4-6 and Von Vollenhoven, 1919). 
While rationalists recognize that national interests have an important place in a 
state's foreign policy, universalists believe there is a natural harmony of interests 
that people are morally bound by. These, however, are not state-determined but are 
human-based interests. Rationalists also emphasize that the interest of a unified 
world is definable and achievable by the inevitable progress of history. According to 
universalists, the general idea behind the inevitable merger of various interests into 
generally-agreed global interests is what is known as the 'harmony of interests', 
'union of interests' or 'solidarity of interests' (Wight, 1991: 114-119). 
Taking account of their views regarding the harmony of interests, universalists can 
be seen as naive or idealistic since conflicting interests seem to predominate in 
today's world. However, the universalist perspective stresses that above all these 
conflicting interests, there are overriding concerns which ultimately require a 
universal foreign policy with the interest of the world's population in mind, a sort of 
world policy. Ultimately, all states would pursue these so-called 'overriding world 
interests' together in support of national interests. 
The final stage of this process would be the emergence of a universal state, which 
would determine and express the real interest and will of the international 
community. Subsequently, such a state would be able to define its interests in 
relation to those of other states. It follows that the universal state would tend to 
25 Though it is important to define another state's national interests and duties, it is possible to 
identify common international interests, which include particular national interests, through 
constitutional machinery and organizations of the international society. 
49 
inform other states of their business and pose as their protector at the same time 
(Wight, 1991: 117). 
Therefore, as opposed to the realist perspective, which argues that states have to 
(selfishly) promote their own national interests in the absence of common interests, 
universalists take their belief in the 'commonality of interests'. They go even further 
than the rationalists by arguing that the highest interest of every individual coincides 
with that of the larger community. Individual states are merely a stage in the process 
of creation of a universal state; thus their interests are important as far as they 
promote universal ones. 
2.8. Conclusion 
This chapter set out to examine the debate around three theoretical perspectives; 
namely realism, rationalism and universalism. According to some scholars these 
three perspectives make up the major contending issues in international relations and 
offer explanations on how people should view the relations between states and 
further, how international relations should be conducted. Consequently, this chapter 
has also shown that each perspective has its own more or less elaborate explanation 
as regards the essence of international politics. 
It has been shown that realists have a rather gloomy view of human nature where 
conflict and power are the rule rather than the exception and are inevitable. 
Rationalism, on the other hand, is premised on the assumption that reason is a 
source of knowledge and that the rational side of human beings always proves 
stronger than the irrational one in making decisions. Universalists appeal to 
international morality, in that revolutionary consequences require all individuals to 
work for global harmony amongst people. They believe in the moral unity of the 
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international society. This unity has a missionary character as the foremost aim of 
their international policies. 
One can ultimately conclude that these theoretical perspectives are useful 'analytic 
tools' that help us to describe and explain situations and sometimes even predict 
future developments. Therefore, it is important to understand the main premises of 
each perspective and the differences between them in order to apply them to the 
realities of international relations. This is important within the dynamic, shifting 
context of the international relations arena, especially since depending on the issue 
that needs to be analysed - one or more theoretical perspectives can be applied. 
This chapter has also attempted to show that the concepts of foreign policy and 
national interest are closely linked, since national interest ultimately leads to foreign 
policy action. In other words, foreign policy action is an extension and a product of 
a state's national interest. The theoretical background in this chapter has given the 
necessary insight into the factors that influence a state ' s foreign policy behaviour 
and explain how this behaviour is linked to its national interests. 
Clearly what emerges from the foregoing analysis is that international relations (as 
well as a state's foreign policy) cannot be explained by one perspective only. For 
example, international relations are not purely about a struggle for power and 
supremacy. States do not engage in constant wars against each other, but these 
phenomena are present nevertheless. 
Moreover, it can be argued that the analysis in this chapter will help explain 
Pretoria's foreign policy between 1994 and 1999, since each perspective described 
in this chapter has some explanatory value concerning the foreign policy of South 
Africa and states in general. The foreign policy of a modem state, therefore, is a 
mixture of realist, rationalist and universalist 'orientations'. As a result, we can 
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describe a foreign policy as realist, rationalist or universalist, depending on which 
'elements' dominate a country's foreign policy in a particular period. Every foreign 
policy, however, whether realist, rationalist or universalist, is aimed at attaining 
national interests. 
It has been observed in this chapter that the concept of national interest is an elusive 
one. This is because the term 'national interest' does not refer or confine itself to one 
particular objective or goal, since states pursue a multiplicity of goals. When all 
these goals are put together, they form the national interest of that state; and since 
these goals change over time, so does the national interest of that state. 
The function of a state's foreign policy is to determine the hierarchy of these 
national interests, and to examine the national interests and principles of other 
states ' foreign policies revealed in practice. 
In the following chapters the conclusions of this theoretical chapter will be applied. 
More importantly, the chapters will attempt to show how the friction between 
universalism and realism in foreign policy can arise when universalist national 
interests are pursued in relation to 'pariah states', and when economic national 
interests are at stake. 
The next chapter begins with the analysis of post-apartheid South African foreign 
policy in the making between 1990 and 1994. A historical overview of post-
apartheid South African foreign policy will be necessary for a better understanding 
of the foreign policy principles that began to be developed before the elections of 
1994. These principles can be described as universalist and they were influenced by 
the ANC's struggle for equality and liberation as well as the ideology that informed 
that struggle. 
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3. THE ORIGINS OF POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICAN 
FOREIGN POLICY AND THE CONCEPTION OF ITS PRINCIPLES 
BETWEEN 1990 AND 1994 
3.1. Introduction 
In 1994, South Africa held its first democratic elections, which symbolically ended 
the apartheid era. As expected, the ANC convincingly won the elections and soon 
established control of the government. The new government was going to make a 
clean break with the undemocratic practices of the former apartheid regime, install 
democracy and advocate the respect of fundamental human rights and liberties. 
The new government headed by Nelson Mandela, however, faced many challenges. 
Among the challenges was the problem that democratic South Africa had to 
convince its neighbouring states that it would pursue a different foreign policy to 
that of the apartheid regime. Thus in 1994, the ANC published a comprehensive 
foreign policy document, which included principles of South Africa's future foreign 
policy. Since the ANC's history revolved around the struggle for liberation and 
human rights, it was not surprising that these principles included the promotion of 
democracy, respect for human rights and international law. 
This chapter will investigate the origins of the new South Africa's foreign policy by 
examining the history of the ruling party and its foreign policy. It will attempt to 
show that while the ANC's foreign policy was concretized in the four-year period 
from 1990 to 1994, the making of that foreign policy began in the mid-1980s. Since 
this process was based on its ideology of a liberation movement, the foreign policy 
of post-apartheid South Africa also reflected that ideology. 
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3.2. The African National Congress' Foreign Policy in the Making 
The African National Congress (ANC) was founded in 1912 as the voice of black 
South Africans. Even though between 1950 and 1959 the ANC focused its resources 
mainly on the domestic political struggle, and paid little attention to issues of 
foreign policy at this time, the foreign polic/6 of this movement can be traced back 
to the Freedom Charter of 1955. 
In this regard, the ANC did include some elements of its future foreign policy in the 
Freedom Charter of 1955. According to the Charter, South Africa was committed to 
respecting the rights and sovereignty of all nations and to strive to maintain world 
peace and settlement of all international disputes by negotiation not war. In addition, 
it recognized the right of the people of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland, 
which were protectorates at the time, to decide their own future and the right of all 
African peoples to independence and self-government, which were to represent the 
basis of close co-operation (Meli, 1988: 210-213). 
26 The use of the term foreign policy to explain the ANC's international activities indicates the 
unique position of liberation movements as non-state actors (NSAs) in the international system, 
which seeks to encompass the state itself. Taylor (1984:3, 17-20) argues that although the primary 
actors in world politics are nation-states, NSAs are also entities in the international political system. 
These NSAs possess the following characteristics: they are transnational (they consist of individuals 
andlor groups residing in two or more states) and are formally organized; they seek to settle 
disputes and "speak with one voice" to more powerful non-member states or within international 
organizations. Furthermore, NSAs can be classified into four categories: economic, security, 
political and cultural/ideological functional groups. Consequently, NSAs are considered 
multipurpose organizations with their political functions being the most salient. They are also 
known as international non-governmental organizations. 
NSAs formally declare the purposes of their organization in a charter that legally binds the 
members of the organization in a set of principles. Alternatively, if the intended functions are not 
stated in a public document then these can be gathered from public statements of the group's leaders 
or by examining the long-term behaviour of the organization or group (Taylor, 1984:21 -29). 
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As a result of its anti-apartheid activities, the ANC was banned by law on 30 March 
1960, nine days after the Sharpeville massacre. The ANC was to remain banned 
together with other organizations such as the Pan African Congress (PAC) and the 
South African Communist Party (SACP) until the historic lifting of the ban by 
President De Klerk on 2 February 1990. 
However, two days before the banning of the ANC, Oliver Tambo (National 
Executive member and Secretary General) was instructed to leave the country and 
set up an External Mission to lobby for outside support.27 The ANC External 
Mission together with Umkhonto We Sizwe (MK) or 'Spear of the Nation' training 
camps was set up in Tanzania (Benson, 1966: 256 and Gibson, 1972). On 28 March 
1960, Oliver Tambo slipped out of South Africa and went on to establish the ANC's 
first overseas office in London.28 
As a consequence of the ban the ANC was forced to go into exile and its members 
were left to continue the struggle by the only other means left to them - the use of 
force and other illegal means. The result was the formation of MK as the military 
wing of the ANC. 
Meanwhile, the government was putting more pressure on the ANC in the early 
1960' s with the arrests, detentions or killings of senior ANC members to the point 
that the movement was almost eliminated both politically and militarily. As the 
South African government's actions began having an effect on the ANC leadership 
27 Tambo's initial task was to raise funds after setting up the External Mission and represent the 
ANC at international organizations (Tambo, 1987: 39-41). Thomas, (1996: 109) observes that the 
ANC created the External Mission for a more permanent diplomatic presence and to mobilize 
international solidarity against apartheid while at the same time giving it a more direct and 
permanent access to the UN. 
28 The ANC's main offices were in Dar-Es-Salaam and London. In early 1962, the ANC set up 
offices in Algiers, Rabat, Cairo, Dar es Salaam and London (Thomas, 1996:32,42). 
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domestically, the party met in the former Bechuanaland in October 1962 to try and 
rectify the organization. It was here that party delegates set out the framework of 
ANC foreign policy in exile by endorsing the military campaign and the policy of 
seeking foreign assistance through diplomacy and fund-raising activities conducted 
by the External Mission (Alden, 1993: 64). It can be observed, however, that 
Alden's position did not represent the ANC's actions across the board. This is 
because the meeting in Bechuanaland was to take stock of the party's performance 
and map the way forward. Amongst other issues discussed were strategies that 
would be adopted in order to realise their goals. 
On the military front, the AN C faced problems within the first decade of its struggle 
from exile. In 1966, there was a lot of restlessness in the MK camps and the ANC 
encountered the problem of incipient mutiny within MK. This situation continued, 
leading up to the Wankie campaign of 196729 where the Zimbabwe African Peoples 
Union (ZAPU) and the ANC forces engaged Rhodesian forces, resulting in heavy 
casualties on the side of both the ANC and ZAPU. The consequence of this defeat 
and subsequent demoralization led to the calling of a conference at Morogoro, 
Tanzania in 1969. 
The main concern of the conference was to take stock of military strategy after the 
Wankie incident, to restore the confidence of ANC members in the National 
Executive and to re-design its political strategy (ANC, 1985: 8 and Sechaba, 1970: 
2-3). It is more probable, however, that the conference was not necessarily convened 
to restore confidence of the party members, but rather to chart a way forward for the 
party, since the lack of confidence was not really an issue as it could easily be raised 
especially after the Wankie incident. 
29 Thomas, (1996: 80) has observed that the ANC's alliance with ZAPU underscored its 
commitment to liberation struggle across Africa as well as its commitment to African unity. 
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The conference was also an opportunity for the members to convince the ANC to 
open up its membership to non-black members. This subsequently strengthened the 
commitment outlined in the 1955 Freedom Charter to a class rather than racial 
analysis of South Africa's condition. The result of the conference was that the ANC 
admitted new members, adopted a document entitled Strategy and Tactics, which 
was a scaled down version of the ANC's programme, and that new officers were 
elected and non-blacks became members of the party. 
As part of the new strategy, the ANC recruited thousands of young South Africans 
leaving the country to take up the armed struggle abroad. Although most of them 
were Black Consciousness (BC) radicals, the ANC had the task of recruiting them 
and converting them into loyal ANC soldiers/members (Ellis, 1991 : 445 and 
McKinley, 1997). These authors viewed the BC's position as 'radical' since it was a 
move away from the 'norm' at the time. It can also be argued that the BC was 
geared to use 'practical means' to ensure their voice was heard. Consequently, BC 
members found that they could get 'a voice' by joining the ANC. 
These new recruits enabled MK to re-launch the armed struggle for the first time 
since the Rivonia raid in 1963, when South African police arrested the leadership of 
the ANC.30 The ANC strategy was to a build a programme of armed machinery 
especially through the Special Operations Unit (SOU), which carried out the attacks 
on the oil from coal plant at Sasolberg and on the military headquarters at 
Voortrekkerhoogte in 1963 (Ellis, 1991: 447 and Sechaba, 1971:14). In addition, the 
External Mission was now going to play a vital role in the military aspect of the 
struggle and not concentrating solely on diplomacy. However, it is worth noting that 
this approach by the ANC was not 'militaristic' in nature as the above authors would 
30 Nelson Mandela was arrested in 1962. Prior to the Rivonia arrests, the ANC was active within 
South Africa by having its own underground structures for the pursuance of the armed struggle 
(Thomas, 1996: 35). These arrests symbolized the transition of ANC strategy from selective 
sabotage to armed struggle (ANC, 1970: 24). 
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have us believe but rather that it was strategic, since it needed military precision to 
effect the ANC's plan of action. 
The apartheid regime's response to these attacks was the destabilization, murder, 
cross-border raids and abductions that began after 1981 with the aim of defeating 
MK's guerrilla war. The consequences of this response were the destabilization and 
disruption of MK's logistics network, which led to the frustration of MK soldiers 
culminating in mutinies in the camps in Angola in early 1984 (for example the MK 
. P ) 31 camp In ango. 
Meanwhile, the ANC exploited the events occurring inside South Africa by 1984, 
which were ushered in by the Vaal Triangle uprising that soon spread throughout 
South Africa, and later resulted in a state of emergency proclaimed by Pretoria in 
1986. As the unrest continued within South Africa, the ANC convened the Kabwe 
Consultative Conference in 1985, where a successful proposal by the party removed 
all the remaining racial barriers to membership of the ANC's governing body (NEC) 
and the organization was set to become racially all-inclusive as it sent out its 
forceful anti -apartheid message to the world. 
On the diplomatic front, the foreign policy of the ANC had undergone considerable 
changes from the time it was a liberation movement to the period when it became 
the ruling party in South Africa. The ANC had to modify the policies it started out 
with because of the changed domestic and international environment. 
As mentioned earlier, the ANC changed its view of South African society by placing 
emphasis on the democratization of the country, which consequently opened up its 
membership to non-blacks. Furthermore, the ANC's foreign policy was influenced 
31 The ringleaders of the mutiny were publicly executed after the loyalists took back control of the 
camps (Ellis, 1991: 446). 
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by its resentment of tbe lack of assistance from tbe West and general imperialist 
ideals on account of two factors: firstly, tbe failure of its diplomacy and endeavours 
to get world public opinion on its side in tbe 1960s, especially in convincing 
Western states to impose economic sanctions on Pretoria tbrough tbe UN; and 
secondly, the OAU's unreliable support for tbe armed struggle, which became 
evident in 1967, when tbe Liberation Committee failed to provide adequate support 
for tbe ANC-ZAPU offensive in Rhodesia (Chakaodza, 1990 and Thomas, 1996: 
150). 
It is important to note tbat one of tbe reasons the ANC failed to gamer world public 
opinion was because most Western states continued to trade with Pretoria despite 
tbe Soutb African government's apartbeid laws and treatment of the majority of its 
citizens. In addition, tbe OAU's inability to support tbe Wankie offensive in 
Rhodesia was a result of tbe inadequate financial capacity of the OAU as well as 
lack of unity witbin the organization itself regarding tbe question of how to deal 
witb Pretoria, since some African states had cordial informal relations witb Pretoria. 
Despite these setbacks, tbe ANC's diplomacy was successful in many ways. The 
ANC's External Mission grew in size and importance as the ANC's ability to 
operate within Soutb Africa became restricted. For example, in addition to the 
London offices, the ANC opened offices in New York as well as in otber European 
countries.32 ANC diplomacy at this point was geared at publicizing tbe injustices 
brought about by apartbeid, and at the same time effecting tbe isolation of South 
32 Between 1960 and 1990, when the ANC was in exile, it acted as a government-in-exile and as 
such was accorded diplomatic status by a number of countries around the world. By 1988, the ANC 
had 33 offices around the world (Norval, 1990: 183) and an even larger number of states and 
organizations recognized its legitimacy. The organizations mentioned above included the Non-
Aligned Movement (NAM) and the UN (which included the UN Special Committee on Apartheid). 
This list of countries that were members of the NAM included Algeria, Indonesia, India, Pakistan, 
Kuwait, Colombia, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Republic of Congo, Oman, Cameroon, Nigeria and Sierra 
Leone. 
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Africa. For this reason, the establishment of the Special Committee on Apartheid by 
the UN in 1962, which acted on behalf of the ANC's interests, supplemented ANC's 
endeavours. Consequently, the UN regularly drafted resolutions condemning 
apartheid. These resolutions included a voluntary ban on arms sales passed by the 
Security Council in 1963 (Barber and Barrat, 1990: 79-80; Mandela, 1994b).33 
Most of the ANC's UN activities were confined to the Special Committee on 
Apartheid's Sub-Committee on Petitions until 1974,34 when it was given observer 
status in the Special Committee.35 The ANC's communications and petitions to the 
Sub-Committee revolved around four issues: the implementation of apartheid, the 
political situation in South Africa, the need for economic sanctions, and the release 
of political prisoners (Thomas, 1996:112). 
Moreover, the ANC's activities and roles in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) 
and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) played an important part in the 
liberation struggle. The ANC supported socialist and nationalist movements that 
emphasized their anti-imperialist commitment (Thomas, 1996: 98). In addition to 
the support by socialist and nationalist movements, the ANC received the support of 
Islamic states such as Iran, which resulted in the suspension of oil shipments to 
South Africa (Kimche, 1973: 101). This would be understandable since Pretoria had 
33 Although it took the UN longer to endorse the armed struggle than the OAU and NAM, by the 
end of the 1960s the General Assembly began to support armed struggle in South Africa because 
the Western permanent members on the Security Council refused to implement mandatory 
economic sanctions on South Africa (Thomas, 1996: 117). 
34 The ANC first came before the Security Council (together with other liberation movements in 
Africa) during the Council's special session in Addis Ababa in 1972 (Bailey, 1988: 132-138). 
35 The ANC and PAC were granted permanent observer status at the request of the Special 
Committee against Apartheid. In 1975 the President of the ANC, Oliver Tambo addressed the 
General Assembly for the first time (UN Yearbook 1975:138). He did so again in 1982 and the 
ANC' s Permanent UN observer Johnny Makatini addressed the Assembly in 1983 (Sechaba, 
February 1984:7-11). 
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good relations with Israel, a country that had enemies throughout the Middle East, 
and which continued to support the apartheid regime. 
Other tangible benefits that the ANC received were the NAM and OAU's influence 
on the development of anti-apartheid diplomacy at the UN in the following ways: 
firstly, the non-aligned states formed a caucusing group at the UN to influence the 
General Assembly's agenda (Mandela, 1994 and Peterson, 1986: 40);36 secondly, 
the non-aligned conferences developed positions on South African issues that were 
adopted and later introduced as resolutions within the UN (Singham, 1977: 246); 
thirdly, the non-aligned summits called for greater co-operation with the UN's anti-
apartheid activities; and finally, the non-aligned conferences included topics that 
were directed to Pretoria's isolation and thus relevant to ANC diplomacy. For 
example, at the 1972 NAM foreign ministers meeting in Guyana, the discussions 
revolved around working papers on better NAM co-ordination at the UN and a paper 
on decolonization (Jankowitsch and Sauvant, 1978:698). 
In its struggle against the apartheid regime, the ANC's affiliated itself with the 
SACP, which brought some changes to the ANC's foreign policy. Firstly, there was 
the formalization of the Revolutionary Council - the joint ANC-SACP executive 
body for administering the armed struggle - and the adoption of democratic 
centralism, which sharpened the decision-making powers of the movement. 
Secondly, the resources of the Soviet Union and its allies were at the disposal of the 
ANC, giving it unlimited access to training and material. 37 Thirdly, the association 
between the ANC and the SACP meant that there was greater ideological cohesion 
between the ANC and the Soviet Union from the late 1960s (Thomas, 1996: 158-
159). 
36 In 1975 the General Assembly asserted for the first time that South African liberation movements 
contributed to the "purposes of the UN" (UN Resolution 3411 B (XXX) 1975). 
37 After Stalin's death, Soviet foreign policy began to support bourgeois nationalist leaders in the 
Third World, ignoring the fact that they were not communist (Thomas, 1996: 59). 
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The 1960s and 1970s saw more African nations gain independence, especially in 
Southern Africa. This meant that the ANC could gain support from 'friendly' 
African states in its fight against apartheid. For example, the collapse of the 
Portuguese colonialism in Mozambique and Angola led to Marxist-Leninist regimes 
in Luanda and Maputo. For the ANC, this was an opportunity to operate from bases 
established on a territory contiguous with South Africa for the first time since the 
early 1960s.38 
Earlier in the decade, during the Morogoro Conference in 1969, the External 
Mission established a plan for the revolutionary overthrow of the South African 
state in accordance with the "four pillars of the revolution". These included first, all-
round vanguard activity of the underground structures; second, the united mass 
action of the people; third, the armed offensive, spearheaded by Umkhonto-we-
Sizwe; and fourth, the international drive to isolate the apartheid regime and win 
world-wide moral, political and material support for the struggle.39 
The first three tenets of this programme were politico-military in nature while the 
latter focused specifically on diplomacy. Hence, the propaganda and political 
mobilization led to the renewal of civil disobedience and boycotts, where protest 
marches and fiery funerals dominated the domestic arena. As a consequence, the 
ANC and the international anti-apartheid movement gained strength in their efforts 
to isolate Pretoria globally.4o In addition, the ANC's leader in exile, Oliver Tambo, 
38 The ANC had support from its allies the MPLA and FRELIMO in Angola and Mozambique 
respectively. After their respective independence, they supported the ANC at the OAU, NAM and 
Frontline States by establishing formal relations with the organization CANC, 1985: 22). 
39 Sechaba May 1970, p.5; Sechaba, March 1984, p.4 
40 Evidence of this was seen in the following events: 
A. a campaign on American university campuses; 
B. the passage of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act by the United States Congress in 
1986; 
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was accorded ministerial status in his visits around the world. By the late 1980s, the 
ANC had more than thirty official diplomatic missions all around the world,41 which 
was more than the South African government had. As a consequence of the ANC's 
emerging strength, position and image on the international arena in its fight against 
Pretoria, the heads of white South African business met with the ANC outside the 
country in defiance of the government. 
Furthermore, the changes taking place in the arena of international politics had a 
significant effect on the ANC's activities. For example, the signing of the New York 
Accords on Angola and Namibia in December 1988 signified the closure of the MK 
camps and the removal of guerrillas from Angola (Ellis and Sechaba, 1992:191). 
While the signing of the Accords did not prevent the ANC from playing a formal 
active role in South Africa's internal affairs, the ANC still made incursions into 
South Africa. However, these actions became less intense with the reduction and 
closure of the MK camps in the neighbouring countries. With the ANC's shift from 
pursuing a military solution to a more peaceful settlement in the struggle in South 
Africa, the foundation was laid for a negotiated settlement with South Africa. This 
was a necessary action and route to pursue as part of the ANC's new strategy. 
Following P.W. Botha's resignation, the new leader of the National Party F.W de 
Klerk responded to the need for attaining a possible negotiated settlement with the 
ANC by releasing several well-known ANC members from prison and easing 
restrictions on demonstrations. All these steps were pre-conditions for engaging in 
C. the Eminent Persons Group (EPG) mission shuttling between South Africa government 
officials, the ANC and Commonwealth officials. 
It can be argued that the above events placed the ANC on the same diplomatic level as Pretoria. 
41 Norval, (1990:82) mentions 33 states/locations where the ANC had diplomatic missions during 
apartheid. These were: Algeria, Angola, Australia, Benelux countries, Cuba, Denmark, Egypt, 
Ethiopia, West and East Germany, Finland, France, Great Britain, Ghana, Hungary, Italy, Greece, 
India, Japan, Canada, Kenya, Madagascar, Mozambique, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Senegal, 
Sweden, Tanzania, United Nations, USSR, Venezuela, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
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direct negotiations that the ANC had asked for. The pre-conditions set forth by the 
ANC were referred to as the Harare Declaration.42 On 2 February 1990, De Klerk 
announced 'the unbanning' of the ANC, the SACP and the PAC and the 
forthcoming release of Nelson Mandela.43 
The first official meeting between the ANC and Pretoria took place in May 1990, 
where they jointly issued the Groote Schuur Minute laying the foundations for 
establishment of a favourable climate for negotiations. Subsequently, on 6 August 
1990 the ANC agreed to a unilateral suspension of the armed struggle, thus creating 
a period of 'detente', during which the peaceful resolution of existing disputes 
would be possible. 
3.3. Foundations of Post-Apartheid South African Foreign Policy: 
Principles and Objectives 
In 1992, the ANC published its policy guidelines entitled Ready to Govern. These 
guidelines outlined the ANC's future foreign policy that in theory and practice 
heralded the end of the ANC's liberation struggle and the introduction of a future 
foreign policy for South Africa (ANC, 1992: 28-31). Since the ANC was perceived 
by many to be a terrorist organization, these policy guidelines were an attempt of the 
ANC to change these perceptions and adopt a universalist stance - a move from its 
previous armed policy against Pretoria. 
As a consequence of this changed strategy, the ANC outlined its position on 
international relations in the post-apartheid era and declared that its foreign policy 
42 The Harare Declaration (August 1989) included the following pre-conditions: the release of 
political prisoners; the removal of restrictions on political organizations; the repeal of security 
legislation and removal of troops from the townships; and an end to political trials and executions. 
43 Concrete discussions between Mandela and the government began as early as 1988. 
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would be shaped by the nature of South Africa's domestic policies and objectives, 
directed at addressing the needs and interests of its citizens. Further, this foreign 
policy would be non-aligned, and South Africa would continue with its membership 
in financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank as well as honour all relevant international treaties.44 
At this stage the ANC took a new approach with regard to its official position. For 
example, in February 1993 the ANC sought to redefine its mission in the 
international solidarity movement beyond that of its anti-apartheid activities and 
transform itself into "an active and positive force for the construct of ... a united, 
non-racial, non-sexist and democratic South Africa" (Pahad, 1991: 9). 
This new position taken by the ANC, genuine as it was, was partly aimed at 
attaining some level of credibility with the international community and indicating a 
changed position focusing on reconciliation, domestic development and democracy. 
This democratic stance discarded the internationalist orientation that was once 
central to the ANC's foreign policy. Some authors argue that this was evidence of 
flexibility and realism of the movement in the face of changing circumstances 
(Alden, 1993: 77 and McGowan, 1993:35-61), but it might be more probable that 
the ANC had little choice but to adapt to the changing circumstances within and 
outside South Africa, which [mally led it to adopt some of those values the apartheid 
government opposed. 
44 Cautious co-operation with the international financial institutions was advised, as was regional 
economic co-operation on a mutually beneficial basis. 
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3.3.1. The Universalist Orientation in South Africa's Foreign Policy 
In 1994, ANC won the first democratic elections in South Africa and, on a wave of 
optimism, assumed control of the government headed by Nelson Mandela. Among 
other things, the new government set out its foreign policy principles, which were 
influenced on the one hand by the history of South Africa as a pariah state and its 
long record of human rights abuses, racism, political oppression, and on the other 
hand, by the ANC's struggle for equality, democracy, human rights and against 
apartheid. 
For example, Bischoff and Southall (1999) and Mbeki (1994:200-206) observe that 
the international role post-apartheid South Africa adopted was derived from the anti-
apartheid and pre-democratic struggles of the past. Selebi (1999:209) concurs by 
saying that the challenges faced by post-apartheid foreign policy stemmed from 
South Africa's history and values that Pretoria would have to deal with. Southall 
(1999) similarly argues that the ANC's foreign policy agenda in post-apartheid 
South Africa was governed and shaped by the past legacy - the search for peace 
and human rights. In this way, the historical experience was an important factor in 
shaping the early post-apartheid foreign policy. 
Even though the ANC's struggle against apartheid was criticized for its military 
efforts, which resulted in the infringement of human rights through killing and 
death, restrictions around its membership and the insensitivity for liberal tendencies 
within the organization, its struggle was nevertheless informed by ethics and 
idealism. 
For example, one of the purposes of the ANC's activities in exile was to inform the 
world of the violations of universal human rights and fundamental liberties 
committed by the apartheid regime. In this regard, Alden (1993:64-65) and Ellis 
(1991:439) observe that the ANC's foreign policy during apartheid was 
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characterized by general pronouncements against Pretoria whilst their diplomacy 
was concentrated on publicizing the injustices brought about by Pretoria. Evans 
(1996:249-251) concurs by observing that the ANC sought an international audience 
to highlight its struggle for civil and political liberties by mobilizing the pan-African 
and anti-apartheid movements. Likewise, Mandela (1990) spoke of the ANC's role 
in ensuring the peaceful abolition of the apartheid system. 
It therefore came as no surprise that the ANC-Ied government of national unity 
based the foundations of post-apartheid South African foreign policy on the 
promotion and respect of universal values such as human rights, democracy, 
domestic and global peace and security, international justice, most of them also 
enshrined in South Africa's new constitution.45 
In 1993, Nelson Mandela put forward several principles that would form the basis of 
South Africa's future foreign policy (Mandela, 1993: 87, Le Pere and Van 
Nieuwkerk, 2002: 175). These principles were further elaborated in March 1994, 
when the ANC published a comprehensive foreign policy document entitled Foreign 
Policy Perspectives in a Democratic South Africa (ANC, 1994; Le Pere and Van 
Nieuwkerk, 1999:198; Nel, 1999). Both documents advanced seven principles that 
were intended to guide the behaviour of South Africa in international politics: 46 
• a belief in and preoccupation with human rights which extends beyond the 
political, and embracing economic, social and environmental dimensions; 
• a belief that just and lasting solutions to the problems of human life can only 
come through the promotion of democracy worldwide; 
45 See for example: Chapter III (Founding provisions), Chapter 2 (Bill of Rights), Chapter 141 232-
233(General Provision in International Law - on Customary international law and application of 
international law) (The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996: 3,5-17,103). 
46 Foreign policy principles can be described as a set of rules or standards guiding the behaviour of 
a state in relation to other states when pursuing its national interests (essential national goals or 
objectives). 
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• a belief that justice and international law should guide relations between 
nations; 
• a belief that international peace is the goal to which all nations should strive; 
• a belief that South Africa's foreign policy should reflect the interests of 
Africa (Schoeman, 2000 and Vale, 1990:13-14); 
• a belief that South Africa' s economic development depends on growmg 
regional and international economic co-operation (Mills, 1995); and 
• a belief that South Africa's foreign relations must mirror a deep commitment 
to the consolidation of its democracy. 
From the above principles, one can observe that South Africa's foreign policy 
principles under president Mandela were mainly universalist in nature. For example, 
it can be argued that at present, the international community considers the respect 
for human rights and fundamental freedoms, democracy, maintenance of 
international peace and security as 'universal interests/values' of human beings.47 
Thus, by placing emphasis on these universal values by transforming them into its 
foreign policy principles South Africa would necessarily pursue a universalist 
foreign policy. 
3.4. Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to trace the evolution of the new South Africa's foreign 
policy from the times when the ANC was mainly operating abroad/in exile to 1994. 
It has also examined the history of the ANC and its foreign policy, which was highly 
influenced by the domestic situation in South Africa during the apartheid era. 
41 This position is controversial from the point of view of certain cultures/states/societies. However, 
this is the position advocated by developed and non-developed states as well as international 
organizations. 
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In the process of attempting to analyse the above issues, the chapter underscored 
that, while the ANC's foreign policy was concretized in the four-year period from 
1990 to 1994, the making of that foreign policy actually began in the mid-1980s. 
The principles on which the foreign policy of the ANC and later the South African 
foreign policy were based can be traced to the Freedom Charter of 1955. This is 
because the ANC included some elements of its future foreign policy in the Charter. 
According to the Charter, South Africa was committed to respecting the rights and 
sovereignty of all nations and to striving to maintain world peace and settlement of 
all international disputes by negotiation. Since then the ANC has based its ideology 
on being a liberation movement and later, the foreign policy of the new South Africa 
on those very elements in the Freedom Charter. 
Consequently, the ANC seems to have been consistent in advocating its universalist 
policy from the early days of apartheid. This consistency in advocating its 
universalist policy emerged with the adoption of the 1955 Freedom Charter and 
later, opening up the ANC's membership to all races. Furthermore, the ANC's 
persistent struggle for freedom and equality within international organizations (the 
UN, OAU and NAM) and on the diplomatic front was arguably a universalist stance. 
The struggle against apartheid and the promotion of universalist values by the ANC 
finally bore fruits in the late 1980s, when the apartheid regime was ready to 
negotiate. The changing circumstances finally enabled ANC to redefine its mission 
of the international solidarity movement by transforming itself into a political party 
working for a united, non-racial, non-sexist and democratic South Africa in 
February 1993. In the same year, Nelson Mandela put forward the principles that 
would form the basis of South Africa' s future foreign policy. 
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Post-apartheid South Africa, as mentioned previously, based its foreign policy on 
the preservation of the very values the apartheid regime disrespected. It can 
therefore be concluded that the principles of the new South African foreign policy 
were largely informed and influenced by ANe's history as a liberation movement, 
which fought for equality and non-racial society. At the same time they were 
influenced by the ideology of liberal democracy, since the ANC's struggle was also 
the struggle for democracy and respect for human rights. These values were 
universalistic in nature; hence, by committing itself to the respect of such principles 
South Africa would necessarily pursue a 'universalist' foreign policy. 
However, as it will be shown in the next chapter, this was not the case. In 
implementing its foreign policy South Africa deviated from the adopted universalist 
principles to pursue the national interests instead, which resulted in ambiguities in 
South Africa' s foreign policy. The ambiguities were also facilitated by the foreign-
policy decision-making process, in which Mandela played a key role. 
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4. MANAGING THE CONTRADICTIONS: SOUTH AFRICA'S 
FOREIGN POLICY, 1994-1999 
4.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter provided a broad overview of the origins of the ANC's foreign 
policy principles. The research has concluded that, due to the specificity of the 
ANC's history, its policy was based on the universalist values of democracy, respect 
of human rights and peaceful coexistence among states. If one looks at South 
Africa's foreign policy from 1994 to 1999, however, one can observe that these 
principles were compromised on numerous occasions, especially in South Africa' s 
relations with so called 'pariah states'. The result of going against adopted foreign 
policy principles rendered Pretoria's foreign policy contradictory and ambiguous. 
This chapter will attempt to show that these ambiguities ranged from discrepancies 
in foreign policy decision making to having cordial relations with 'pariah states' and 
supporting regimes in those states. The common feature of all the cases in which 
ambiguities arose was that Pretoria found itself compromising its foreign policy 
(universalist foreign policy principles) and the constitution by extension. This 
chapter will attempt to assess how these ambiguities were managed within South 
Africa's foreign relations with different states. 
4.2. Managing the Contradictions 
Right from the onset of the Mandela administration, there were symptoms that South 
Africa's foreign relations would undergo tremendous testing. On one side the post-
apartheid government wanted to change the image of South Africa as a rogue state 
by basing its foreign policy on universalism, which has a missionary orientation. At 
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the same time universalism subscribes to moral ideals and places a high premium on 
human affairs. Some of these 'moral ideals' are democracy, fundamental human 
rights and freedoms, and so on. 
On the other hand, as it will be shown below, Pretoria's foreign policy did not 
reflect the universalist principles that were to guide the new government in relations 
with other states. It seemed that it was carrying out quite a pragmatic and realist 
foreign policy that followed South Africa's national interests. Hence, it can be 
argued that there was 'a tension ' between the official foreign policy principles and 
the foreign policy actually pursued, which compelled the Mandela government to 
eliminate that tension by managing the contradictions in its foreign policy. 
One way of dealing with the contradictions in Pretoria's foreign policy was through 
the decision-making process, which could either help reconciling the official and 
actual foreign policy or tum the scale in favour of either the universalist or realist 
option. As it will be argued in the next section, due to the nature of foreign policy 
decision-making and the special role of President Mandela, the decision-making 
process did not help eliminating the ambiguities in South Africa's foreign policy; it 
rather facilitated and perpetuated them throughout the Mandela administration. 
Even though the foreign policy decision-making process in democratic South Africa 
was meant to be more transparent than it was during the apartheid era and although 
this was the case at the beginning of the Mandela administration, there were 
numerous cases where the proper channels were not followed when it came to 
foreign policy decision-making. 
In view of these preliminary points, this chapter will also examine the decisions 
made during the Mandela administration in order to establish how the decision-
making process contributed to the inconsistencies in South African foreign policy 
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between 1994 and 1999. Since it appears that Mandela and his close circle of 
associates dominated the decision-making process between 1994 and 1999, it can be 
argued that this 'familiarity' consequently enabled certain decisions to be taken 
independently of the formal rules and procedures. Lacking administrative 
experience, and perhaps, 'flying by the seat of one's pants', the standards for many 
policies were most likely relaxed. In this way, the stated policy was not followed 
and the Mandela government was able to pursue the national interest in a way that 
disrespected Pretoria's universalist foreign policy principles. Thus, it can be argued 
that the ambiguities were not only poorly managed through the decision-making 
process under Mandela but they were also facilitated by this process. 
4.3. Managing Foreign Policy Decision-Making under Mandela 
Once the ANC assumed power in Apri11994, it had to deal with two major issues: 
first, there was the need to change ideologically and readjust politically from being a 
liberation movement to becoming the governing political party. Secondly, there was 
the obligation to understand the inherent modifications in the world order, following 
the collapse of the bipolar world and the end of the Cold War. This meant shaping a 
foreign policy that would reflect recognition of the changes in international relations 
as well as adopting a 'pragmatic internationalist stance' in dealing with the world in 
general. 
The liberal principles in South Africa's foreign policy formed a more or less rational 
system of principles. However, when it came to the implementation of the foreign 
policy there seemed to be less consensus among the key decision-makers about the 
substance of policy and its goals, as some authors have observed (Fabricius, 
2000:217-223; Le Pere and Van Nieuwkerk, 1999; Van Wyk, 1997:190-197; 
1999:291-303; 2000:225-234). What has proved to be even more problematic was 
the process by which policy was made. For example, the government officially 
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endorsed a policy that was to be implemented in practice, but the same government 
later made decisions that were not in line with the stated policy. 
PICTURE 1: SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING 
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A range of factors influences every government's decision-making process. Besides 
ideological, organizational and systemic considerations, the domestic and external 
environments substantially influence and determine this process. While domestic 
factors and the domestic environment are crucial elements for foreign policy 
making, a country' s foreign policy has to be communicated, explained and executed 
in its external environment. Thus it is worthwhile illustrating the different 
environments, in which post-apartheid South African foreign policy was made (see 
Picture 1) (Le Pere and Van Nieuwkerk, 1999, Le Pere and Van Nieuwkerk, 2002: 
181-185). 
This picture also illustrates that in post-apartheid South Africa, foreign policy 
principles and priorities have been formulated and planned by actors within the 
executive. As several authors who studied the decision-making process in South 
Africa have observed, the primary locus of expertise in and implementation of 
foreign policy was the executive office - more specifically the President and the 
Deputy President. Hence, the executive office often found itself in competition, if 
not at odds, with a range of other actors within the executive who also shaped 
government's policy, such as the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) (Diescho, 
1996 and Mulier, 1997:70).48 
48 The participation of various actors is understandable in view of the widening scope of 
international relations and the blurring of the customary differentiation lines between domestic and 
foreign affairs, what Keohane and Nye, (1977) have called "complex interdependence." Indeed, the 
world can no longer be understood in the simplistic scheme of the Cold War since it is infinitely 
more complex, driven by impulses that require a range of new and overlapping policy instruments 
and resources. 
Foreign policy agendas now include issues as diverse as investment, migration, energy, inflation, 
food security, human rights, labour standards, environment, and so on. Governments thus "find it 
increasingly difficult to set priorities, avoid contradictory targets, and maintain a sense of national 
interest and direction. Since the alternatives are more numerous and less clear-cut, the task of 
choosing becomes more complex" (Karvonen and Sundelius, 1987:7). In an era that stresses the 
importance of global financial markets, international trade linkages and information technology, the 
management of the foreign policy agenda becomes a task for mUltiple bureaucratic players. 
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Post-apartheid South African foreign policy decision-making during the Mandela 
administration was more transparent than in the apartheid era. The decision-making 
process was slightly decentralized, and there was a level of openness with regard to 
the processes of foreign policy decision-making. There were, however, similarities: 
P.W. Botha depended on three close associates (his Press Secretary, Head of the 
Office of the State President and a personal friend), and the post-apartheid 
government also prepared its foreign policy largely through a combination of close 
associates such as President Mandela, Deputy President Mbeki,49 Deputy Foreign 
Minister Aziz Pahad, Mandela's and Mbeki's Directors-General - Prof. Jakes 
Gerwel and Dr. Frank Chikane respectively (Fabricius, 2000: 217-218; Le Pere and 
Van Nieuwkerk, 2002: 190).50 
Foreign policy decision-making was not the sole reserve of President Mandela and 
his close associates, however. It also included the involvement of the Department of 
Foreign Affairs (DFA), which co-ordinated its operations internally. A top 
management committee constituted of all chief directors, namely Deputy Director-
General, the Director-General, Deputy Foreign Minister and Foreign Minister, met 
once a week, whereas the same group (with the exception of the chief directors) met 
daily. The Minister of Foreign Affairs sat on the Ministers' Security Council with 
the Minister of Safety and Security, Minister of Intelligence and Minister of Defence 
to co-ordinate security matters and on the Cabinet Committee on Security and 
49 The former Deputy-President, Thabo Mbeki, a very skilled diplomat and international statesman 
was, while in exile, the ANC's chief diplomat with a distinctly international outlook. Like President 
Mandela, he had a hand in fashioning the contours of South Africa's foreign relations. He had, for 
example, been the prime architect of re-configuring South Africa's relations with the US and Africa 
(Corrigan, 1999). 
50 Also included in this group was Blade Nzimande - the ANC National Executive Committee 
Chairperson of the sub-committee on International Affairs (Mayibuye, June/July 1997). This group 
did not include, however, the Foreign Minister Alfred Nzo who focused more on domestic matters 
arising from his experience as ANC Secretary-General (Fabricius, 2000: 218). 
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Intelligence. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials sat on the National 
Intelligence Co-ordinating Committee that focused on the broader security agenda. 
Nevertheless, the Cabinet was the primary coordinating body for foreign policy -
bringing together the ministers of all the departments that played a part in foreign 
policy (foreign affairs, [mance, trade, defence, the President and Deputy President). 
Thus the Cabinet coordinated and integrated foreign policy. 
Nelson Mandela had a special role in the decision-making process, not only on 
account of his position as President, but also because of his personality and 
international stature. Consequently, he seemed to dominate a number of major 
foreign policy decisions and he almost overshadowed the role of various 
government departments as well as Parliament. 
This special role of the President and his Office, as well as the lack of coordination 
within the government that was evident at times, influenced the making of foreign 
policy decisions and sometimes even led to embarrassing political and diplomatic 
moments for South Africa. For example, Mandela armounced that Pretoria was to 
continue to sell arms to Rwanda on the very day that the DFA was about to 
announce the termination of that policy in 1996-1997. Another example was 
Mandela's premature announcement of peace negotiations between Zairian president 
Mobutu and the rebels in 1997, which almost shattered the entire peace process. 
In certain cases, it appeared that South Africa's foreign policy reflected the interests 
of the ruling party, which were at odds with the universalist foreign policy 
principles. For some reason, the ruling party maintained close relations with states 
that did not respect the same values South Africa was supposedly trying to promote. 
These contentious relations form the 'logic' (or perhaps lack of logic) that might 
explain how and under which conditions the ambiguities in South Africa's foreign 
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policy became more and more evident. The next section deals with many examples 
in South Africa's foreign policy history, where decisions were not in line with 
foreign policy principles. This, as it will be argued, indicates that the Mandela 
government had problems with the implementation of its stated foreign policy. 
4.4. Managing the Problems of Implementation 
From the beginning of the Mandela presidency his administration faced a problem 
of pursuing a foreign policy that was based on universalist principles. South Africa's 
commercial, political and defence interests competed with the idealistic principles of 
its foreign policy, which consequently led to numerous cases where the principles 
were compromised by the decisions the Mandela government took. Pretoria 
compromised its foreign policy principles in its relations with states in Africa 
(Nigeria, Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) and Lesotho), Asia 
(Indonesia, Burma and China), Cuba and the Arab World (Libya, Iran, Sahrawi 
Arab Democratic Republic), to mention but a few . 
4.4.1. African Continent 
South Africa's relations with African states between 1994 and 1999 provided yet 
more examples of how Pretoria compromised its foreign policy principles. The 
Nigerian crisis of 1993 (where the Nigerian government was responsible for several 
violations of democratic freedom) was a test, which South African foreign policy 
failed to pass. 
The ANC had a long history of relations with Nigeria, since close links had been 
forged between their military and political elites while the ANC was in exile. In 
June 1993, General Ibrahim Babangida annulled Nigeria's presidential elections that 
had supposedly been won by Chief Moshood Abiola. Babangida's successor, 
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General Sani Abacha, later jailed Abiola for treason in June 1994. Although Pretoria 
was under international pressure to lead a political condemnation campaign against 
the Abacha regime, South Africa did not take a pro-active position, but instead 
chose a cautious and quiet approach. Pretoria did not wish to get heavily involved in 
the domestic affairs of other states - perhaps signalling a new foreign policy 
approach entitled, 'quiet diplomacy'. 
Another example of unprincipled foreign policy was South Africa's attempt to 
broker a peace deal between the two sides in the Zairian civil war in April 1997. The 
anarchy and kleptocracy, which had been perpetuated by the Mobutu regime, 
eventually culminated in a civil war. Mandela led the peace talks between Mobutu 
and Laurent Kabila as the rebels' leader on the SAS Outeniqua, a South African 
naval vessel. 
The motives for Mandela's efforts became suspect and open to different 
interpretations. Questions were raised as to whether the talks were to smoothen the 
departure of Mobutu (an American ally), or whether they were aimed at easing 
Laurent Kabila into power (Vale and Maseko, 1998:8). Moreover, Pretoria seemed 
to have been caught unawares by the extent of the conflict when SADC member 
states (Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia) joined in the civil war. Eventually, Pretoria 
sanctioned intervention in these countries to protect regional security, even though it 
was itself initially opposed to foreign military intervention. 
The case of Lesotho is also illustrative of how South Africa's written policies were 
compromised by its economic interests. On 22 September 1998 South African and 
Botswana armed forces intervened in Lesotho under the auspices of the SADC to 
restore law and order in the aftermath of a looming constitutional crisis. Operation 
Boleas was intended to create a level of stability in the country as well as to return 
Lesotho soldiers to their barracks. In the process of attempting to create order in the 
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country, a number of people lost their lives (mainly soldiers) and human rights 
organizations reported on abuses committed by South African soldiers. 
In South Africa, public opinion was divided as to whether the motives for the 
intervention were altruistic. Even within the South African government and military 
there were complaints that the intervention was a failure and inappropriate (Africa 
Confidential, 1998). The intervention did not adhere to the criteria for government 
defence policy on peacekeeping. Instead, the intervention was seen as having little to 
do with democracy. In fact, South Africa's intervention helped to keep in power a 
regime not favoured by the majority of Lesotho citizens. The 'altruistic motive' had 
more to do with security concerns around the Lesotho Highlands Water Project - a 
development project that South Africa was heavily dependent on. Once again, issues 
of economic national interest seemed to have eclipsed fundamental concerns in 
South Africa's foreign policy - human rights, democracy, international peace and 
security. Once again Pretoria defended this intervention in the name of restoring 
democracy and civil order. 
4.4.2. Far East Asia 
Pretoria's relation with Indonesia has raised many questions concerning its use of 
'principled' foreign policy and foreign policy decision-making. Jakarta's human 
rights record has often been questioned, particularly concerning the East Timor 
problem. The ongoing conflict in East Timor revolved around the aspirations of East 
Timor citizens in gaining their independence from Jakarta. 
In July 1997 Mandela made a visit to Indonesia, a member of the Non-Aligned 
Movement. Mandela clearly stated that Pretoria would supply Jakarta with weapons 
for its defence and when South Africa sold arms to Jakarta, the West accused South 
Africa of unethical practices. When the sale was made public, Indonesia was still 
occupying East Timor, and its forces had been committing gross human rights 
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abuses against the local population for many years. Mandela's decision disregarded 
South Africa's foreign policy principles and his verdict was made without any 
consultation with Parliament or the Foreign Ministry. 
South Africa also refrained from voting on resolutions criticizing the Indonesian 
government's human rights violations at the UN Commission on Human Rights. It 
also chose not to criticize Jakarta when Indonesian security forces used excessive 
force during pro-independence protests in East Timor. In addition, President 
Mandela admitted in 1995 that Jakarta had financed the ANC after 1994, raising 
senous questions about the extent to which Pretoria's policy was driven by the 
party's financial interests (Brummer, 1995). Interestingly, in November 1997, 
President Suharto was awarded South Africa's highest honour for non-citizens -
the Order of Good Hope - during his official visit to South Africa (Horta, 1998). 
This act symbolized the good relations between South Africa and Indonesia. 
During his term in office, Mandela continued to maintain ties with other Asian states 
that had poor human rights records. During his tour of the Asian region in 1997, he 
did not use the opportunity to criticize the decision by the Association of South East 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) to admit Burma as a member. Neither did Mandela openly 
support the detained pro-democracy leader and Nobel Peace laureate, Aung San Su 
Kyi (SAPA, 9 March 1997). The head of intelligence in the Burmese military 
regime was later invited to attend Thabo Mbeki's inauguration in June 1999. Burma 
has played a vital role in the anti-apartheid struggle, and this was the reason that has 
been given to justify Pretoria's continued relations with Burma. 
In late 1996, Mande1a announced that South Africa would accord full diplomatic 
recognition to the Peoples' Republic of China and downgrade the relations with 
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Taiwan, which had been established in 1976? even though earlier that year (August 
1996), President Mandela had stated that South Africa had no intention of severing 
its ties with Taiwan (Chhabra, 1997: 177-182). 
Pretoria explained this change of heart by pointing out that the decision created an 
opportunity to discuss human rights issues with Beijing. However, the South African 
government has repeatedly failed to raise human rights issues in meetings with 
Chinese officials. 52 This official statement was not particularly credible because 
firstly, Pretoria's earlier position was that it did not want to get involved in China's 
internal affairs, and secondly, this decision meant the end for Pretoria-Taipei 
relations that had been cordial for over three decades. 
Taiwan had supported the ANC in the run-up to the election of 1994, made 
contributions to the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) and 
substantial investments in South Africa53 (Havenga, 1995: 32-43). When compared 
to China, Taiwan's human rights record was much better, but this point was not 
strong enough to prevent Pretoria choosing China over Taiwan as a 'trading partner' 
in view of the potentially big market. 
51 According 'to Singh, (1997:52-59), three factors encouraged South Africa to make this move. 
Firstly, mainland China's refusal to maintain full diplomatic ties with South Africa while Pretoria 
maintained its relations with Taiwan. Secondly, the impending transfer of Hong Kong to China in 
July 1997, and thirdly, the huge Chinese market represented a significant potential for South 
African exports. 
" Both Deputy President Thabo Mbeki and Nelson Mandela refrained from bringing up human 
rights during their visits to Beijing in April 1998, and May 1999, respectively. South Africa did take 
a stand for human rights in China when, in 1997 and 1999, it voted against China's successful effort 
to avoid any discussion of its human rights record at the United Nations Commission on Human 
Rights in Geneva. 
53 There are about 350 Taiwanese companies in South Africa employing 45 000 people. Taiwan 
also contributed 35 rillllion rands to the ANC's election campaign in 1994 (Bischoff and Southall, 
1999: 165-166). 
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4.4.3. Cuba 
Post-apartheid South Africa's relations with Cuba were also characterised by 
compromise of declared foreign policy principles. Once again, this 'moral void' 
would leave room for opportunities influenced by economic, historical, symbolic 
and political factors. 
Cuba supported the ANC during the liberation struggle and played an important role 
in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). The ANC government, therefore, continued 
to nurture the relations created during the ANC's liberation struggle, and to 
demonstrate its solidarity with the NAM. During Mandela's inauguration in 1994 at 
the lawns of the Union Buildings, the warmest and most rapturous welcome was 
reserved for Fidel Castro. The following day, Cuba became the first country to 
establish formal diplomatic relations with the new government. 
Pretoria's cordial relations with Havana were frequently criticized, since they did 
not follow 'official' foreign policy. Cuba's human rights record was mentioned in 
this regard, as well as its lack of attempt to democratize the political system. As it 
was observed by Chhabra (1997:223), Cuba "clings to repressive state socialism ... 
and makes a mockery of the ANC's proclaimed commitment to human rights." 
In June 1996, South Africa and Cuba signed two bilateral agreements - an 
investment protection agreement and a health cooperation agreement. One of the 
areas for cooperation was the mining of nickel in Cuba and the other was the 
importation of Cuban doctors to alleviate the short supply of doctors in rural South 
Africa (op. cit.: 225). One can argue that these interests (i.e. 'needs'), in tum, led 
Pretoria to continued good relations with Havana despite its undemocratic practices. 
The South African government's response to dealing with Havana, has been that 
Pretoria would not abandon its anti-apartheid allies in their time of need. 
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4.4.4. The Arab World 
Pretoria's relations with states In the Arab world have withstood international 
pressures throughout the years. South Africa's relations with Libya can be explained 
by applying the same argument as in the Cuban case. Mandela had strongly 
supported initiatives of the now defunct Organization of African Unity (OAU) to lift 
UN-imposed sanctions on Libya, and transfer the two Libyans accused in the 
Lockerbie air disaster to a neutral country (Henwood, 1997). In other words, it 
supported its own supporters. 
South Africa even broke ranks with Western states in its efforts to respect relations 
with one of the "most dangerous supporters of terrorism in the world" (Chhabra, 
1997: 227). To the West, this was all the more alarming because Libya had been 
accused of having a chemical weapons programme, repressing human rights at 
home, and developing weapons that have a capability of major destruction. 
In his official statements Mandela made it clear that South Africa's relations with 
Libya would not be determined by the US and its allies (Chhabra, 1997: 227). 
Mandela's arguments for the maintenance of relations with Tripoli were the same as 
for Cuba - based on their past support for the anti-apartheid movement. Despite all 
the accusations levelled against Libya, Pretoria continued to have cordial relations 
with a state that violated the very principles post-apartheid South Africa was 
premised upon. In June 1996, Pretoria announced that steps were being taken to 
accredit a non-resident South African ambassador to Libya and in September of the 
same year, Foreign Minister Alfred Nzo attended Libya's National Day celebrations 
in Pretoria. 
Post-apartheid South Africa also maintained good relations with Iran. Tehran 
supported the ANC during its struggle against apartheid. Pretoria also had economic 
interests in maintaining good relations, since Iran supplied almost 70 percent of 
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South Africa's oil needs (Henwood, 1997). Moreover, there had been talks between 
both countries about the possibility of South Africa storing 15 million barrels of 
Iranian oil at the Central Energy Fund's (CEF) Saldanha Bay storage facility 
(Chhabra, 1997: 236). 
Like Libya, Iran has been condemned by Western states for its alleged support of 
Hezbollah fighters in Southern Lebanon and the radical Muslim organization -
People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD) - who are funded through 
Hezbollah. This has fuelled speculation about the extent of Islamic fundamentalism 
and Iran's possible role in South Africa's domestic politics (Chhabra, 1997: 237). 
According to US intelligence, Iran is alleged to be one of the countries that support 
terrorism. In addition, Amnesty International observed in 1996 that seventy people 
had been executed in Iran (Chhabra, 1997: 234). Despite these allegations President 
Mandela stated that "we must look at relations with a country from the perspective 
of our own national interest", when Iranian President Rafsanjani visited South 
Africa in September 1996 (Chhabra, 1997: 233). Foreign Minister Nzo further 
reiterated Mandela's position on Iran by stating, "South Africa follows its own 
independent policies ... " (Chhabra, 1997: 234). 
Pretoria's policy towards the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic - SADR 
(Western Sahara),54 a former Spanish colony and a full member of the OAU, was 
also criticized by South African domestic and foreign observers. In its foreign policy 
document of 1994, the ANC stated that it would support Western Sahara through the 
54 In 1973. after years of resistance to Spanish rule, the national liberation movement, the 
POLISARIO Front was formed and embarked on an armed struggle. In 1975. Spain announced its 
withdrawal from the territory and in the process signed a secret agreement with Morocco and 
Mauritania giving both states control over the territory. In 1979. Mauritania withdrew from the 
territory. By 1976 the POLISARIO Front had declared the SADR that signalled the beginning of the 
liberation struggle of the territory. 
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OAU and call for the recognition of its independence (Chhabra, 1997: 212). In June 
1995, President Mandela wrote to President Abdel Aziz promising to establish 
diplomatic relations between Pretoria and the Sahrawi Republic (Chhabra, 1997: 
216). 
Later, Pretoria stated that it would delay formal recognition since it was awaiting 
the advice of the UN Secretary-General, Boutros Ghali. This was an uninformed 
decision, because, according to the UN Charter, it is the prerogative of any country 
to choose with whom it wants to establish any relations. It is not for the UN to 
interfere in such decisions. 55 Ultimately, the ANC government failed to recognize 
the SADR, and in this way gave its support to Morocco, which is still occupying 
Western Sahara. 
In February 1996, Foreign Minister Nzo and the Moroccan Prime Minister 
Abdellatif Filali signed an agreement establishing a Joint Commission to strengthen 
cooperation between both countries in all fields . It is worth noting that in March 
1994, Thabo Mbeki made a visit to Morocco, which gave rise to speculations about 
whether Mbeki was fund-raising for the ANC's election campaign, and under which 
conditions Rabat agreed to fund the ANC. 
The above case studies have hopefully provided sufficient evidence of how South 
African foreign policy was compromised by decisions that reflected either economic 
interests, or the interests of the ruling party. It would appear that in each case 
Pretoria resolved to emphasise national interests over its foreign policy principles. 
Greg Mills, Director of the South African Institute for International Affairs (l997b: 
19-34), contends that "South Africa's foreign relations illustrated contradictory 
strains between formulated policy and implemented policy ... South Africa follows a 
55 Article 2(7) of the UN Charter restricts the UN from intervening: 'in matters which are essentially 
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state' . 
86 
'twin-track' foreign policy ... where it pursues the national interest above human 
rights while on the other hand it displays concerns over human rights and 
democratization".56 
Other scholars who concur with Mills are Nkuhlu (1995:53,56) who observes that 
" ... The danger of South Africa's principled foreign policy arises when pragmatic 
considerations become the embodiment of the conduct of foreign policy .. . which 
points to an unresolved identity crisis upon which considerations of national interest 
have to be based," and Suttner (1997:300-303) who also notes that " ... the 
promotion of human rights in foreign policy is easy to state as an aspiration ... but 
difficult to implement...[because of this] South Africa's [national interests] can 
never be a means to promote human rights." 
Pragmatic considerations definitely influenced many important foreign policy 
decisions of the Mandela government. Furthermore, as many observers of South 
African foreign policy have noted, Mandela often took decisions into his own hands 
to the extent that policy often followed his public statements, rather than the other 
way around (Mills, 1997:24). This meant that South Africa's image (and its foreign 
policy) tended largely to be equated with the President's profile. Even though the 
decision-making process during the Mandela administration has not been 
sufficiently researched to provide enough comparative information, one can, 
nevertheless, make a tentative conclusion on the basis of the existing literature that 
the circumstances in which Mandela frequently used his own judgement to make 
important decisions were more conducive to pragmatism and unprincipled foreign 
policy. It should be no surprise that this also led to the inconsistencies in South 
56 Mills, (1999:4-6) further talks about South Africa following a 'four track' foreign policy namely, 
pursuing national interest, focus with human rights and democratization, observing a global role in 
world affairs and redressing the foreign policy imbalances of the past especially its relations with 
the Middle East, Libya and Cuba to mention but a few. 
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Africa's foreign policy, which left many observers wondering about what really 
drives that policy. 
4.5. Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that South Africa's foreign policy between 1994 and 1999 
was based on 'pragmatic', national-interest-seeking decisions that replaced 
'universal' principles in foreign policy. Regrettably, this dynamics was also 
characteristic of decision-making processes used in determining foreign relations 
with so called 'pariah states'. The chapter has also assessed how these ambiguities 
were managed from a decision-making point of view in South Africa's foreign 
relations with 'pariah states' . 
In the sphere of decision-making, there were a few members of the executive who 
influenced Mandela's decisions, since the final decision apparently lay with the 
President. These individuals included Deputy-President Mbeki, Foreign Minister 
Alfred Nzo and his deputy Aziz Pahad, the previous and current Trade and Industry 
Minister Trevor Manuel and Alec Erwin, National Executive Committee's members 
of the ANC, and senior civil servants in the DFA, DTI and other departments within 
the executive. Despite the changes in post-apartheid foreign policy decision-making, 
one can still observe that from 1994 to 1999, the locus of foreign policy decision-
making remained in the President' s Office. 
The cases described in this chapter provide an indication that there were many 
factors influencing foreign policy decisions, and that some of these factors were 
strong enough to induce the decision-maker(s) to deviate from the official or stated 
foreign policy. It should be noted that it was a prerogative of South Africa as a 
sovereign state to engage in relations with any state it wanted. The conundrum is 
that, by exercising its freedom to choose to engage in relations with these states, 
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Pretoria went contrary to its own foreign policy principles. The international 
community saw these states as 'problematic' because of their long history of human 
rights abuses, non-democratic practices or because they were seen as posing a threat 
to international peace and security. By maintaining close or even cordial relations 
with such states, the Mandela government compromised its universalist principles, 
creating a sense of ambiguity in Pretoria's foreign policy. However, the government 
attempted to deal with the criticisms that emerged as a result of the interaction with 
the 'pariah states ' by justifying its actions and decisions. 
Such poor management of the ambiguities in South Africa's foreign policy, 
however, was the most visible when it came to the arms sales policy. Here, the 
tension between the universalistic principles of South African foreign policy and 
South Africa's national interests was especially evident. The next chapter will try to 
analyse the underlying reasons for unprincipled arms sales made by the Mandela 
government between 1994 and 1999. In addition, the chapter will attempt to show 
the economic and strategic importance of the South African defence industry for the 
economic and social developments of the country, which were among the pressing 
concerns of the Mandela government. 
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5. DOMESTIC ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS THAT 
INFLUENCED SOUTH AFRICA'S ARMS SALES 
5.1. Introduction 
One of the issues that the Mandela government had to deal with when it came to 
power was the question of the defence industry, which had a significant role during 
apartheid, not only in strategic but also in economic terms. As this chapter will 
show, defence industry remained important also for the democratic government in 
terms of jobs, exports and foreign exchange earnings. Yet as the research has shown, 
the ANC was soon compelled to change some of these aspects. Why? In order to 
answer some of these questions, this chapter focuses on the domestic economic and 
social factors that influenced Pretoria's foreign policy and national interests with 
regard to the issue of arms sales to the so called 'pariah states' . 
As one of the most prominent realist scholars, Hans Morgenthau, (1951:33-34), has 
noted, " ... a foreign policy guided by moral abstractions, without consideration of 
the national interest, is bound to fail." Since states have a moral objective to gain 
power by pursuing their interests in order to survive, states can support universal 
values and principles only when they are in harmony with its perceived self-
interests. In other words, the universal values have to support or be in line with the 
state's national interest for a universalist foreign policy to be feasible. 
On the basis of the theoretical exposition in chapter two, it can be argued that South 
Africa could only pursue a universalist foreign policy when such a policy was in 
conformity with the pursuance of its more immediate political, economic or other 
concerns. 
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In line with the above-mentioned theoretical conclusions, the chapter will attempt to 
show that the economic and social situation in South Africa did in fact influence the 
foreign policy and national interest of the new government from the onset of the 
Mandela presidency. The government had to deal with many vital concerns apart 
from political ones, such as underdevelopment, high rates of unemployment and 
poverty, inadequate housing and crime. Hence, the changes in Mandela' s foreign 
policy can at best be understood as arising from domestic pressures on the 
government. This situation, which was also a consequence of past apartheid policies, 
apparently influenced the implementation of new South Africa's foreign policy. 
The economic and social realities the Mandela government faced at the time 
compelled it to support industries that were viable and had also the potential for 
growth and development. As this chapter aims to demonstrate, the defence industry 
had such potential despite the problems it encountered in the late 1980s and the 
beginning of the 1990s. This chapter will ultimately attempt to show that the 
defence industry was an asset for the South African economy and furthermore, that 
the sales and export of arms constituted South Africa's national interest, whose 
pursuance ultimately compromised foreign policy principles. 
5.2. The Economic Realities behind South Africa's National Interests 
When Mandela assumed power in April 1994, the economic and social situation in 
South Africa was in need of improvement. The economy was performing dismally 
because of years of trade and economic embargos that had taken their toll on the 
country. There were scarce foreign exchange reserves that Pretoria could use for 
international trade. 
91 
For example, Lewis, (1990: 114, 147) estimates that the trade sanctions and 
embargos, especially the oil embargo imposed on South Africa, cost the country two 
billion US dollars a year, primarily in terms-of-trade effects. 57 As a result, South 
Africa's real GDP grew a total of 4.7 percent between 1981 and 1987, which led to a 
10 percent drop in per capita income (Lewis, 1990: 27-28). Other scholars (Chettle, 
1982: 82; Spandau, 1979: 153-55; Lewis, 1990: 60, 103; Lipton, 1988: 86-87) 
estimate that the total costs of the oil embargo, including price premium on imports, 
costs of stockpiling, construction and operation of oil plants such as the SASOL 
increased considerably and probably ranged from one billion to two billion US 
dollars. 
Van Bergejik (1995: 343-344) has thus observed that the direct costs of the oil 
embargo more than doubled South Africa' s oil import bill and furthermore, that the 
direct costs of the oil embargo in the 1980s equalled South Africa's gross foreign 
debt, which by the end of the decade was estimated at 15 to 20 billion US dollars. 
He added that economic activity in South Africa had also been hampered by the fact 
that fewer new technologies became available to the country during sanctions. 
Pretoria's problems were not limited only to oil imports. When it attempted to make 
up for the shortfall in foreign exchange on account of the oil embargo by selling its 
coal and other raw materials on the international market, this attempt was not fully 
successful, since the embargos imposed by Denmark, France, and other Western 
states reluctant to buy South African coal cut the expected exports by 17 percent in 
1986, putting 40 000 jobs in the mining industry in danger. To maintain exports, 
South Africa had to sell its coal at 10 percent below the world price of 25 to 26 US 
dollars per metric ton for that grade of coal (Washington Post, 25 July 1986, A27; 
Lipton, 1988: 46). 
57 See Annex 8 for a presentation and data on the economic impact of sanctions on the apartheid 
South African economy. 
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In the financial sector, apartheid South Africa suffered severely with the divesting of 
foreign investment. As a result, the South African Finance Minister Barend du 
Plessis estimated that the shortfall in foreign investment capital for 1985 had 
reduced the annual foreign investment growth rate from a possible 5.5 percent to 3.5 
percent (Washington Post, 1 September 1985, A30).58 
To make matters worse, the Investor Responsibility Research Centre (IRRC) 
estimated that of the approximately 350-400 US companies with direct investments 
in South Africa in January 1984, seven withdrew in 1984 and 39 in 1985. During 
1986 the numbers increased; 40 companies left and 13 announced their intention of 
leaving, including some of the biggest (Eastman Kodak, Coca-Cola, Exxon, General 
Motors and IBM). By June 1987, a further 39 companies had left or had announced 
their intention of leaving, including Ford Motor Co., Citicorp and ITT. By mid-
1988, only 136 US companies remained in South Africa (Lipton, 1988: 64; Baker, 
1989:59). 
Moreover, American banks reportedly withdrew one billion US dollars in the first 
half of 1985. They refused to extend new credit, primarily on political grounds, 
which was the catalyst for the short-term debt crisis in August that same year. 
British banks, to which Pretoria owed more than a quarter of the 12 billion US 
58 For example, the American states of Wisconsin, Nebraska and Connecticut adopted legislation in 
1978, 1980 and 1980 respectively calling for divestment of shares held by public institutions in US 
companies with investments in South Africa. In the mid-1980s, other states such as Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, as well as the cities of Philadelphia, Washington, Boston, New York 
passed laws forbidding investment of municipal or state funds in companies operating in South 
Africa. In 1986, California announced that it would gradually divest itself of holdings in companies 
with ties to South Africa; this decision affected about 10 billion US dollars in investments. By end 
of 1988, 23 states, 19 counties, 79 cities in US had adopted various economic measures to distance 
themselves from South Africa (Chettie 106-08; New York Times, 28 October 1984, A18; Los 
Angeles Times, 25 December 1984, AI; Lipton, 1988: 23-24; Baker, 1989: 61). 
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dollars debt falling due in the next 12 months, were also unwilling to make new 
loans to Pretoria (Washington Post, 1 September 1985, AI). 
This had an immense effect on the South African currency resulting in its collapse. 
At end of August 1985, the value of the South African rand fell from 54 cents per 
US dollar to 34 cents. The collapse of the rand that year was linked to the threat of 
additional economic sanctions by the international community, which further 
precipitated the currency crisis (Financial Times-SA, 29 August 1985, 10; 30 August 
1985, 10). Faced with all these economic difficulties, Pretoria was forced to develop 
numerous domestic industries in order to become self-sufficient by producing its 
own goods and providing services that it would not ordinarily produce and provide, 
such as civilian and military machinery and hardware, civilian and military 
automobiles, and so on. In this regard, it is generally conceded that this comparative 
advantage is the key in the military complex. 
Thus in 1994, the Mandela government inherited an economy that was worn out by 
sanctions. Furthermore, there were other pertinent issues afflicting the majority of 
South African citizens that the new government had to address. These issues were 
poverty, unemployment, social unrest, crime, underdevelopment and low 
investment. 
Poverty was a particularly disturbing issue since over 60 percent of South Africans 
lived below the poverty line in 1994. Hence, it was the role of the new government 
to alleviate poverty and in the process, a number of programmes and strategies were 
set up to help deal with the issue. 
Another issue closely related to the problem of poverty was that of unemployment. 
It stood at about 40 percent in 1994 and a further 500 000 jobs were lost between 
1994 and 1996 alone. As a result of the high levels of unemployment and poverty, 
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levels of crime rose steeply, to the extent that in 1994, South Africa had one of the 
highest murder rates in the world with Johannesburg being one of the world's most 
violent cities. 59 
The post -apartheid state was therefore compelled to confront these issues. The 
Mandela administration was obliged to put in place economic strategies that would 
help alleviate poverty, increase investment, accelerate development and create 
employment. 
The initial response was establishment of the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme (RDP) in 1994 to address the injustices of the past regime while 
maintaining the economy on a path of sustained growth (RDP White Paper, 1994). 
Essentially the RDP sought to mobilise South African's and the country's resources 
to completely eradicate the effects of apartheid and to build a democratic, non-racial 
and non-sexist future. The RDP was later succeeded by the Growth, Employment 
and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy, also initiated by the ANC government, in 
response to the country's macro-economic challenges, which translated into an 
active search for increasing direct investment, new markets for exports, development 
aid for infrastructure and human resources development (Le Pere and Van 
Nieuwkerk, 1999: 197). 
The establishment of GEAR was seen as a response to the inadequate performance 
of the RDP to address certain pertinent issues focusing on the human aspects of 
'9 In 1996,57 percent of South Africans were living in poverty. The number of crimes, especially 
rape, carjacking, serious assault, housebreaking and common robbery has been increasing since 
1996 and the trend has been sharply upwards since 1998. South Africa has the second highest 
murder rate in the world after Colombia at 65 murders per 100 000 persons. Johannesburg is the 
most violent city in the world with 110 murders per J 00000 persons. In addition, unemployment in 
South Africa is 36 percent and 500 000 jobs have been lost since J 994 (The Economist, 24th 
February 2001: 4, 7 and 11; Schonteich, 2000). 
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development. As part of the ANC administration's GEAR policy, the role of the new 
government was to increase employment levels, boost economic growth and adopt a 
redistribution of wealth programme that would economically empower more black 
South Africans and raise their standards of living (Grimond, 2001; Le Pere and Van 
Nieuwkerk, 1999). 
In this regard, Pretoria made concerted efforts after 1994 to raise the standards of 
living of South African citizens by ensuring the availability of affordable housing, 
health care, access to clean water, education, free access to all governmental and 
social services, economically empowering black South Africans in various 
industries, creating employment, investing heavily in infrastructure in areas that 
were formerly disadvantaged, and so on. 
The government had to ensure people got decent housing. Concerns included 
building new houses for the citizens around the country while at the same time, 
providing access to health care in the areas where these houses were built. The 
government also had to make a commitment to make services such as health care 
accessible to South Africans, especially in the remote areas of the country, and to 
provide clean water by establishing water projects around the country. 60 
The government was also compelled to play an important role in making education 
accessible to all South Africans. In this regard, hundreds of schools had to be built 
after Mandela took over in 1994 and the existing schools had to be improved, 
especially in the former disadvantaged areas. Education was to be one of the ways 
60 Grimond, (2001 :2) observes that since 1994, black household incomes had risen by nine percent 
in real terms. In addition, nine million people have had access to clean water since 1994, 1.5 million 
households have had access to electricity and over one million new housing structures were built for 
people who had no formal shelter before. The government also introduced basic pensions for the 
poor elderly. Moreover, the government provides a free sandwich a day for every child at primary 
school - ensuring a minimum nutritional diet. 
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the post-apartheid government would attempt to empower the majority of its citizens 
who were formerly disadvantaged. 
Going hand-in-hand with education would be the econOIIllC empowerment 
programme for the formerly disadvantaged. This programme would be aimed at 
'levelling the playing field' as well as making the economic sector accessible to 
formerly disadvantaged people. 
Therefore, from the above overview it is clear that the economic and social situation 
of the country would be and was an important pre-occupation of the Mandela 
government. The economic development and well-being of South African citizens 
was of the utmost importance to the new government. 
In order to implement the programmes and achieve the goals mentioned above, it 
was crucial for the government to have the economic/financial capability to support 
its projects. This capability could come, among other things, from profitable 
domestic industries. One such industry was the defence industry, which had been in 
existence for over seventy years. It grew in importance during the last twenty years 
of apartheid since the country needed to become self-sufficient in the production of 
armaments as a result of the economic embargos imposed during apartheid. In this 
way, the defence industry had long played an important part in South Africa's 
economy. 
In fact, the defence industry was such an important part of the economy, that the 
Mandela government had a vital interest in preserving it. It provided jobs to several 
thousands of people, contributed a noticeable percentage to the country' s GDP and 
represented a significant percentage of government's foreign exchange earnings. For 
example, between 1982 and 1993 the arms exports as a percentage of total exports 
ranged from 0.1 percent to 1.2 percent. Within the same period Pretoria's arms 
97 
exports increased by 300 percent. This amounted to roughly 4 percent of South 
Africa' s GDP (Batchelor, 1996: 103-105). In addition, between 1982 and the early 
1990s, Pretoria's arms exports rose from 20 million to 270 million US dollars 
(Batchelor, 1998) (see 5.4 for a more detailed analysis). In the following sections, 
this chapter will attempt to demonstrate the centrality of the defence industry in the 
period prior to and during the democratic struggle. 
5.3. The Development of the Defence Industry in South Africa 
South Africa's military industrial complex was established during the 1960's. 
During the Cold War, apartheid South Africa fought a battle on two fronts: domestic 
and regional. The military battle was literally to place restrictions on the non-white 
population in view of the potential civil unrest (within South Africa), and also to 
lend support to Rhodesia and the Portuguese colony of Mozambique. To this end, 
the drive to acquire modem weaponry received greater input from the government. 
On the international front, the regime tried to win the understanding and support for 
its domestic policy and from 1975, to destabilize neighbouring African countries to 
lessen the perceived security threats arising from regimes that were installed after 
decolonization. 
Needless to say, a solution to domestic and regional strategies required a regular 
influx of military equipment, including arms. However, this was not easy in the face 
of international criticism and the outcry against the racist regime, accompanied by a 
voluntary arms embargo called for by the UN Security Council in 1963. Hence, 
South Africa could not count on procuring arms through international trade and it 
became necessary that the country ensured a constant supply of arms through its 
own production. As a result, a sophisticated military and defence industry developed 
and became an important part of Pretoria's economy. 
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5.3.1 . Background of the Defence Industry 
The development of defence technology and the production of armaments have been 
part of Soutb Africa's tradition for a long time. It can be argued tbat the foundation 
was set with tbe revolutionary design of the short stabbing spear by the Zulu king 
Shaka, followed by tbe work of tbe Cape gunsmitbs in tbe late 18tb century and tbe 
early 19th century. The fust artillery pieces designed and produced in South Africa 
were two cannons manufactured by a Boer farmer and used in the First Anglo-Boer 
war. Further cannons were locally manufactured during tbe Second Anglo-Boer war, 
the 'Long Cecil' being an example (Hatty, 1996). 
The period between 1912 and 1939 saw both a beginning and a great advancement 
in South Africa' s military industry. The Union Defence Force was established in 
1912 and was modelled on tbe British tradition and depended almost entirely on 
British equipment. Although the last British forces were witbdrawn from South 
Africa in 1921, Pretoria's defence remained closely linked to tbat of Britain 
(Batchelor and Dunne, 1998).61 In tbe 1930s, naval services were temporarily put on 
hold because of military spending cuts. Altbough no indigenous armament 
production took place at tbis time, there was one exception in 1930, when South 
Africa began domestic production of certain types of military aircraft tbough tbis 
effort was curtailed by lack of funds, too. 
Between 1939 and 1945, tbere was a major drive to produce certain types of military 
aircraft and armaments for Soutb African troops who fought on tbe side of tbe 
Allies. This was especially true in East and North Africa, and for the protection of 
the Cape sea route. In 1940, an advisory committee on defence force requirements 
was set up to handle all matters concerning tbe acquisition of armaments. This led to 
61 The Royal Navy retained its bases at Simonstown and Walvis Bay. 
99 
the establishment of six armament factories during the war years. Shells, cartridge 
cases and bombs were manufactured and infantry arms and British designed tanks 
were assembled. 
Other armaments produced during this period were armoured vehicles, howitzers, 
mortars and ammunition, and some electronic equipment such as radar 
components.62 During this period, part of the African Explosives and Chemical 
Industries (AECI), owned by the Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) of Britain, was 
engaged in military production. However, after 1945 all wartime factories were 
closed except two: the Defence and Ordnance Workshop (later became Lytt1eton 
Engineering Works) and the South African Mint .303 Ammunition factory. Both 
these factories operated as state factories. 
Further developments took place between 1945 and 1961. In 1948, a Board of 
Defence Resources was created as a permanent body to direct national armament 
policy. This organization was superseded by the Munitions Production Office (a 
branch of the Department of Defence) in 1951. This establishment led to the creation 
of South Africa' s first rifle factory in 1953. In 1954, military research and 
development was separated as a special field through the creation of the National 
Institute for Defence Research (NIDR) - under the umbrella of the Council for 
Scientific Research (CSIR). 
By the time South Africa underwent its first arms embargo in 1963, it already had 
some basic conditions for arms production (Landgren, 1989). Hence, when it 
became necessary to produce armaments, Pretoria already possessed capable steel 
and explosives industries. Abundant power from accessible coal, and large numbers 
of skilled engineers and scientists further strengthened these pre-conditions for arms 
62 During the Second World War, 5 770 armoured cars, 600 guns of various calibre and more than 
30 000 military vehicles of eighty different types were produced by South Africa (Hatty, \996). 
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production. Subsequently, South Africa established the first defence research 
organization that combined general industrial research with military 
industrialization. 
Between 1962 and 1990, the South African arms industry was characterized by the 
development of an armaments industry designed to support domestic and regional 
policies in the wake of international isolation. The embargos of 1963 and later 1977 
meant that Pretoria had to become self-sufficient in armament production. Batchelor 
and Dunne (1998) observe that these conditions severely hampered South Africa's 
access to international sources of arms and laid the basis for the establishment of a 
self-sufficient defence industry. Pretoria was further isolated in 1967 when the UN 
Security Council passed a resolution calling on all states to cease supplying South 
Africa with arms. South Africa faced new obstacles in 1977 when the UN imposed a 
mandatory arms embargo against Pretoria. 
In addition to producing its own weapons to counteract international embargos, 
Pretoria's increasing involvement in a number of conflicts in the region (for 
example with Angola and Namibia in the 1980s) contributed to considerable 
expansion of the domestic defence industry. Indeed, both of these involvements 
required a guaranteed supply of improved weapons (Batchelor and Dunne, 1998). 
Consequently, by the end of the 1980s, Pretoria had a well-developed defence 
industry that was able to meet the needs of the South African military.63 
The industry's sectors included the production of aircraft, armoured vehicles, 
missiles, warships, infantry weapons and small arms, military electronics and 
communications equipment, chemical and biological weapons, and nuclear 
technology. Modernization developed mainly on the basis of access to Western 
63 For a detailed account of the organization and structure of South Africa's defence industry, see 
chapter 4. 
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technology (Guimaraes, 2000: 153-190).64 For example, aircraft production began 
with Italian and British technology in the 1960s, and was later augmented by more 
sophisticated projects on the basis of French technology in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Production in other sectors was based on French and German technology and that of 
other advanced Western states, and in addition, South Africa acquired production 
licences from Belgium, France, Israel and Britain (Landgren, 1989: 37 and Miller, 
1980). Accompanying the growing production in the defence industry was 
development of military research and development (R&D). 
5.3.2. Organization and Structure of South Africa's Defence Industry 
South Africa's military industrial complex was established during the 1960's. The 
government's response to the prospect of more open civil unrest and external threats 
was to acquire and produce even more modern weaponry. In 1961, for example, 
more than 127 licences for the local manufacture of military equipment were 
negotiated with overseas arms industries (Barber, 1973: 192). 
After 1961 - with the declaration of South Africa as a republic and withdrawal from 
the Commonwealth - there was at the same time fear of a potential arms embargo, 
and military technology was transferred in anticipation of the uncertain future. 
Hence, there was urgent need not only to restructure the military industry but also to 
militarize South African society. In this regard, the Armaments Production Board 
was established in 1964 with the adoption of the Armaments Act. In 1968, its name 
changed to the Armaments Board, and the Development and Production Act No. 17 
of 1968 created a specialized production unit called the Armaments Development 
and Production Corporation (Armscor) (Hatty, 1996).65 
64 For a detailed account of South Africa's weapons industry dependence on foreign military 
technology, see Annex 3. 
65 Armscor's duties were listed as: to take over all manufacturing facilities so far handled by the 
Armaments Board; to expand those facilities and set up new industries; to handle all arms exports 
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In 1976, a major re-organization of Armscor was undertaken because of mounting 
international pressure for an arms embargo on South Africa. The Armaments Board 
was incorporated into Armscor that then took full control of imports and exports of 
arms. In 1978, the bulk of the military research that was done by the National 
Institute for Defence Research (NIDR) was transferred to Armscor. In addition, the 
Defence White Paper of 1979 emphasized that Armscor had to become 
technologically self-sufficient in the presence of the arms embargo. After 1982, 
arms export promotion became the task of Armscor, and a special export department 
called Nimrod was also set up the same year. 
It has been argued that following the UN Security Council Resolution 418 of 
November 1977, which imposed a total arms embargo on South Africa and annulled 
all existing licences and agreements with South Africa, that South Africa was 
compelled to take up foreign licence-supplied technology as its 'innovations'. 
Examples included the production of the French Eland armoured car, the 
development of the Skerpion and Kukri missiles (Landgren, 1989: 45; Shelton, 
1999). 
5.3.3. Military Research and Development 
Military research and development (R&D) began in South Africa in 1961 and was 
undertaken mainly by nine organizations.66 In addition to these organizations 
and imports. Paragraph 4 of the Act stipulates that the organization shall review all matters relating 
to raw materials necessary for the production of armaments. Consequently, Armscor played an 
important role in Pretoria' s defence planning. 
66 The Council for Scientific Research (CSIR) remained the central organization overseeing military 
R&D. But there were other organizations working in this field. They included: 
• The National Institute for Defence Research (NIDR) was the CSIR' s most important 
branch, directing defence research at universities in South Africa. 
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• 
forming the core of military R&D, Armscor had a number of subsidiaries attached to 
it. Most of these subsidiaries (see Annex 1 for details) were gradually incorporated 
into Armscor. For example, Telcast was later incorporated into Atlas and Eloptro 
(incorporated into Kentron). Kentron, formed in 1978, was to bring together V3A 
air-to-air missile production. In addition, this team developed the V3B and 
undertook its export (for more details see Annex 2). 
5.3.4. Sectors of the South African Defence Industry 
The sectors of South Africa's defence industry include aircraft, armoured vehicle, 
missile, warship, infantry weapons and small arms, military electronics and 
communications equipment, chemical and biological weapons, and nuclear 
technology industries. 
• The National Institute for Aeronautics and Systems Technology (NIAST) performed 
strategic R&D in the field of aeronautics for South Africa' s aviation industry, which almost 
exclusively produced military aircraft for the air force. 
• 
• 
The National Research Institute for Mathematical Sciences (NRIMS) provided consulting 
services to government agencies and performed contract research as well. 
The National Mechanical Engineering Research Institute (NMERI) developed new designs 
for explosive shells as well as new glass fibre helicopter blades to replace imports. They 
also undertook aerodynamic testing. 
• The National Chemical Research Laboratory. 
• The National Electrical Engineering Research Institute (NEERI) performed R&D for the 
electronics industry. 
• The National Institute for Telecommunications Research (NITR) performed long term 
R&D in radio communications. 
• The National Physical Research Lab (NPRL) operated a radar facility with NITR and 
applied research in optical sciences, high-pressure physics and acoustics. 
Three institutes that carried out nuclear research were National Accelerator Centre (NAC), the 
Pretoria Cyclotron Group and the Independent Atomic Energy Board (AEB). The AEB was set up 
in 1957 to oversee nuclear research. 
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5.3.4.1. The Aircraft Industry 
French, Italian and Israeli participation and technology created the South African 
aircraft industry.67 Products of this industry sector were: 
A. the counter-insurgency fighter Impala. This fighter plane was of Italian origin 
possessing a British engine; 
B. the Kudu and Bosbok light planes. These were of American and Italian 
ongm; 
C. the assembly of the 48 Mirage F-l fighters from France; 
D. the incorporation of the Mirage-3 fighter Israeli technology into the Cheetah; 
E. the development of the Alpha XH-l prototype helicopter gunship that was 
considered a genuine South African design.68 
All these were projects undertaken by the Atlas Aircraft Corporation.69 
5.3.4.2. The Armoured Vehicle Industry 
This industry had been producing and developing a variety of vehicles for army 
needs, making maximum use of foreign motor industry technology. Vehicles were 
imported from Europe as 'civilian' goods and engines, and electronic components 
continued to be imported after the 1963 and 1977 embargos. By 1980, before the 
embargos began having an effect, South Africa's auto industry consisted of seven 
major companies namely: 
Ford and General Motors from the US supplying the South African Police 
(SAP) and SADF, Chrysler also from the US, Toyota and Datsun-Nissan from 
Japan, British Leyland from Britain, Volkswagen from West Germany and Alfa 
Romeo from Italy. 
67 American technology was acquired through Italy. 
68 Landgren (1989:63) notes that this was are-designed Aloutte-3 Helicopter of French design. 
69 In 1964 the South African government contributed in the formation of an aircraft industry based 
on private initiative. Hence the government transferred 40% of its peacetime maintenance service to 
private companies. The Bonuskor Group was asked to form the companies for this undertaking. One 
of the registered companies that year was Atlas Aircraft Corporation of South Africa with an initial 
capital of25.5 million British Pounds Sterling in November 1964 (Landgren, 1989: 65). 
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The list of military projects included the Eland armoured car that had been produced 
under French licence since 1966; the Ratel armoured car of 1976 was developed 
with German technology; the Oliphant upgraded tank of 1982 was a new version of 
the old British Centurion tank; the G-5 and G-6 self-propelled howitzer of 1982 and 
1985 were developed with technology from the US, Canada, Belgium and Sweden; 
and the mobile Valkiri 127mm artillery rocket of 1980. Other high-wheeled vehicles 
also built were the Hippo, Buffel and Casspir armoured transport cars. The Hippo 
was designed and from 1976 jointly produced with the Rhodesian arms industry. 
The Zebra transporter succeeded the Hippo. The Casspir armoured transport car led 
to the development of the Gemsbok Mountain armoured car, the Bosbok transporter 
and the Duiker water tanker. 
5.3.4.3. The Missile Industry 
This was the most secretive branch of the defence industry. The development history 
of the South African-produced air-to-air missiles took place between the test 
shooting in 1968 and the presentation of the V3B Kukri at the arms exhibition in 
Piraeus, Greece in 1982. Ship-to-ship missile (SSM) technology was acquired with 
the licensed production of the Israeli fast attack boats from 1978 onwards. The only 
successful missile project of the 1960s was the Cactus surface-to-air (SAM) system 
that was produced jointly by the French and South Africans. The foreign technology 
needed for the missile industry was thus acquired from West Germany, France, 
Israel and the US. 
The establishment of the Rocket Research Institute (RRI) in 1964, which undertook 
research and development in this industry, was indicative of Pretoria's realization 
that it needed missile systems. The RRI worked under the CSIR and was established 
under the auspices of the University of Pretoria with additional expertise from the 
Max Planck Institute of Aeronomy for Stratospheric Physics in Lindau/Harz, West 
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Germany. Two West German organizations were responsible for early rocket 
construction in South Africa - the Herman Oberth Gesellshaft of Bremen and the 
Waffen Uhel Luftrustung. The latter was an umbrella organization for about thirty 
German firms involved in the rocket industry. 
The first major duty of the RRl was to organize the Cactus/Crotaie SAM programme 
with the French. According to Professor Le Roux (Landgren, 1989: 103), Vice-
President of the CSIR at the time, Pretoria wanted a place in space and weather 
research. Moreover, South Africa had been forced by events in Africa to enter the 
missile field at the same time. The German company of Bolkaw AG was tasked with 
the first test-firing of missiles at the St. Lucia test range in Natal. The French 
company Sodetag that built the St. Lucia test range was involved in building satellite 
tracking stations in Paardfontein near Pretoria as well as funding the French 
Crotaie/Cactus SAM programme in 1964. It has been observed that French 
participation was necessary for South Africa's missile technology. 
Other projects that South African scientists were involved in and that were financed 
by Pretoria, were the Milan anti-tank missiles, the Matra R-530 and R-550 Magic 
air-to-air (AAM) and the Exocet SAM (Schissel, 1977). Additionally, the French 
developed the AS-20 and AS-30 air-to-surface missiles (ASM) and exported them to 
South Africa, where they were made to local specifications and requirements 
(Jane's, 1983: 513). 
Research & Development in missile technology was also undertaken at the Kentron 
Missiles (part of Armscor) that was formed in 1978 to handle Kukri and Valkiri 
projects. In 1973, a new missile research institute was established under NIDR -
the propulsion division with the task of conducting development up to the 
production stage of missiles, their warheads, propellants and propulsion systems. 
Landgren (1989:104) has observed that the Tsumeb research centre was linked to 
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nuclear research, the RRI concentrated on space research, whereas the NIDR 
division focused on conventional missile technology. 
Apart from the above developments, South Africa also imported a large number of 
missiles that included the French Matra R-530 and R-550 Magic AAM for the 
Mirage fleet; the AS-20 and AS-30 ASM for the Buccaneer bombers; the SS-11 
anti-tank missiles, the Franco-German Milan and Entac anti-tank missiles (ATMs) 
for Eland armoured car, the Gabriel SSM from Israel for the Skerpion fighters and 
the AIM-9 Sidewinder ASM from the US to arm the Sabre fighters. 
5.3.4.4. The Warship Industry 
The Dutch East India Company built the first berthing facilities in Simons Bay in 
1768. The British naval base in Simonstown was created in 1808, which later 
became known as the most modern naval dockyard in the southern hemisphere. 
Repair, maintenance and manufacturing support for the South African Navy (SAN) 
were undertaken at the naval dockyard in Simons town. The consequent expansion of 
the Simons town dockyard became important after the 1977 embargo especially for 
the purpose of upgrading and refitting existent ships. For example, one of the 
programmes for upgrading and modernizing the fleet that existed before the 1977 
embargo was the modernization programme of four British president-class frigates. 
By 1986, only one of these remained in service. 
The second state-owned dockyard managed by the navy was the Naval Dockyard 
Durban on Salisbury Islands. Since 1980, it has been expanded to provide 
maintenance for the new strike craft flotilla. 
The first expansion of the Simonstown Naval Dockyard occurred with the purchase 
of three Daphne-class submarines from France in 1971. By 1990, they remained the 
only submarines of the SAN. The idea of a South African submarine dates back to 
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1961 whereas the planning of 'Project Daphne' began in 1964. Although it was clear 
that no submarines would be coming from the British, in 1964, the first Daphne 
submarine was commissioned in France and in 1967, contracts were completed with 
the French Navy as well as the training and education of the first South African 
submariners. In 1970, trials began on the first vessel - the SAS Maria Van 
Riebeeck. 
The Simonstown yard, a new submarine base complex was completed by 1971 and 
was built by a Danish company (approved by the Danish government in 1969). 
According to the 1969 South African Defence White Paper, this base cost 20.3 
million US dollars. The submarine headquarters were completed in 1971 and the 
flotilla was commissioned as SAS Drommedaris and renamed SAS Hugo Biermann 
in 1974. 
In 1980, the P.W. Botha Tidal Basin with berths for fifty ships was opened. In 1982, 
a new building project began in Simonstown, which concentrated on electronic, 
mechanical and structural maintenance facilities in two buildings close to the 
refitting berth; this greatly enhanced Pretoria' s capacity to support the new 
sophisticated electronic and mechanical equipment of the 1980s. However, the 
warship building in South Africa began in 1978, when the Israeli Reshef-class 
missile boats began being built. 
5.3.4.5. The Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW) Industry 
This was one of the most secretive industries in South Africa during apartheid, 
because one of the methods of establishing the existence of production facilities is 
by observing their actual use in warfare. Such use has reportedly occurred in several 
regional wars since 1945. For example, the Angolan government had accused 
Pretoria of using chemical gases during its invasions into the country (Landgren, 
1989:149). 
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In the chemical weapons industry, the African Explosives and Chemical Industries 
(AECI) (owned by Britain's ICI and De Beers of South Africa) dominated the 
market. Other firms were Sentrachem and Hoechst (both South African). AECI was 
connected with the chemical products used by the military and police. It produced 
tear gas, nerve gas and defoliants. Between 1912 and 1962 Britain supplied tear gas 
to South Africa until the 1963 embargo; by that time, however, Pretoria was already 
producing its own tear gas at AECI factories in Modderfontein. In 1963, the CSIR 
disclosed that work was being carried out on developing tabun, somen and sarin 
gases (all poisonous). 
It has been noted that the SADF used chemical agents in 1978 against 600 Namibian 
refugees at Kasinga camp in Angola. Furthermore, in 1981, SW APO president Sam 
Nujoma accused Pretoria of using napalm and chemical warfare in Angola (The 
Star, 3 April 1981). 
The use of defoliants by South Africa on the Angolan/Namibian border at Kavango 
in 1983 was confirmed by the South African government (Rand Daily Mail, 19 
October 1983). During 1983, an international journal confumed that South Africa 
was doing research on improving nerve gases that could have the effect of an atom 
bomb (Kosova, 1983: 157). 
Concerning South Africa's bacteriological weapons, it has been alleged (although 
never proven) that prior to 1990, the SADF had began testing special types of 
viruses and bacteria, harmless to whites but lethal to non-whites. The testing was 
allegedly conducted on political prisoners in South Africa. The centre for 
bacteriological weapons research was allegedly the secret biological lab at the 
SAAF base at Louis Trichardt in Transvaal. According to reports, active research 
had been carried out by the SANs school for chemical, biological and radiological 
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defence near the Simonstown Naval Base. Although there were numerous 
allegations about Pretoria's CBW programmes during apartheid, none of them were 
ever proven or verified. There was also a lack of corroboration from other 
independent sources . 
5.3.4.6. Infantry Weapons and Small Arms 
During the apartheid era, when most of southern Africa was under colonization, the 
South African government supported white regimes in Southern Africa by making 
incursions into Angola and Mozambique. This was done in the form of an infantry 
war that required infantry weapons such as rifles, machine guns, grenades and 
mines. The small arms industry is the oldest branch of South African military 
production, the most comprehensive and well developed. Of the 127 foreign licences 
acquired in 1961, nearly all were for the local production of ammunition, small arms 
and bombs. For example, the Israeli Uzi sub-machine gun was licensed from 
Belgium to South Africa and the FN 7.62mm standard NATO gun supplied by 
Belgium (Landgren, 1989: 125). Both licences were revoked in 1963 but their 
production in South Africa continued since it was possible for Pretoria to use freely 
licence-supplied technology after formal cancellation of such licences. In other 
words, once technology had been supplied there was no way for the supplier 
reclaiming the know-how, or force the buyer to forget the knowledge. 
The main companies involved in this industry were the Lyttleton Engineering Works 
(machine gun, rapid-fire ammunition and rifle manufacture), Pretoria Metal 
Pressings and Naschem (manufacture of high calibre ammunition and grenades); 
and Somchem, originally part of the AECI. 
5.3.4.7. Military Electronics and Communications Equipment 
The electronic industry was crucial to the development of sophisticated weaponry 
and was established by the South African branches of multinationals. Hence, 
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Pretoria's access to the US, UK, German and Israeli technology laid the foundation 
for local industries. For example, companies involved in production for Armscor 
were Britain's Plessey and Racal Electronics, General Electric Corporation (GEC), 
Marconi, Decca and EMI Electronics. Sectors of military electronics included: 
A. military semi-conductor and integrated circuits industry; 
B. C3 I (Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence); and 
C. microwave industry. 
The products of these industries included electronic warfare (EW) systems such as 
avionics, radar and telecom, lasers and navigated optronics or electro-optics, and 
systems for training and simulation. EW equipment was integrated into every 
existing or planned weapon system whereas passive EW techniques were used to 
obtain intelligence communication links. Radars, infrared detectors, lasers, TV 
cameras and sighting devices all used some portion of the electro-magnetic spectrum 
for their respective operations. Active EW techniques were used to prevent enemy 
use of this spectrum for example, by noise or deception jamming that disrupted 
enemy C3 networks and radar systems. Some examples of military electronic 
applications were the helmet-guided Kukri ATA missile and the G-5 howitzer and 
its A580 fire-control system based on a 16-bit computer with a 64kb memory. 
The following companies produced military electronics and communication 
equipment: 
1. AL TECH was the first electronic company created and its full name was 
Allied Technologies. It was based on British and French technology.7o 
2. GRlNEL was the name of Grinaker Electronics that was formed after the 
takeover of British owned Racal (South Africa) in 1978.71 
70 In order to avoid the mandatory arms embargo, lIT - the British division of the US giant 
(Electronic and Communication Corporation) sold its 33% share in Altech to Altron (Altech's 
holding company) in 1977. In order to compete globally, Altech also bought the South African 
subsidiary of the French STC Company. 
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3. TACTEL was one of the major South African communications compames 
that came about as a result of mergers.72 
4. BARLOW ELECTRONICSIREUNERT (Belgium) was owned by Barlow 
Rand Corporation that gained access to foreign technology by acquiring 
" • • 73 lorelgn companies. 
5. ELOPTRO was established in 1974 as the Armscor subsidiary to undertake 
the manufacture of optical components for various weapon systems, 
including involvement in optronics.74 
6. TRIVETTSNEC - The company drew on French technology and expertise 
in servicing Daphne submarines.75 
71 At the time, Racal Electronics (UK) was the leading supplier of radio packs and tank radios. Over 
half of Racal ' s South African production went directly to the armed forces. Grinel was based partly 
on British and French technology and it specialized in the design and manufacture of advanced 
military communications and electronic equipment (Paratus, November 1979: 53). Grinel's 
development engineers worked closely with the SADF, in the process gearing production to the 
needs brought by actual combat. 
72 It re-equipped the South African army with locally manufactured Thomson-CSFTRC-3000 radios 
(based on French technology) and produced the Danish designed Very High Frequency (VHF) 
equipment for the army (Janes Defence Review Vol 4(9) 1983: 830). It also produced high 
frequency hopping radios, which became one of Pretoria' s main exports by 1982. 
73 In 1977, it acquired 50% of Marconi (South Africa) and French owned Fuchs Electronics. In 
1983, Barlow Rand set up an electronic and power engineering group by restructuring its subsidiary 
- Reunert Electronics. It then focused more on electronics rather than engineering. 
74 Its task was also to reduce Pretoria's dependence on importation of optical and electro-optical 
devices. In 1979, Eloptro became an independent unit of Kentron and all its work was done for the 
SADF involving R&D, manufacturing, maintenance, re-building and modification of existing 
equipment and consulting. Production of optical devices began in 1976, including work on the 
vision for the 155mm G-5 howitzer. In 1977, the licenced production of night-vision equipment 
began using ITT technology or Israeli licences. In 1981 , Eloptro developed the mini-night sight-
Gogga, including a compact laser range finder. The Gogga was applied to the 7.62mm Rl and the 
5.56mm R4 rifles, but could also be mounted on the AKA7, M16, G-3 rifles and the Bren and 
Vickers machine guns. Eloptro provided all optical devices for Ratel and the Eland armoured cars, 
and contributed to the helmet-sight system in the Kukri missile. Although between 1974-1977 
Eloptro's production was nearly exclusively based on foreign licences, by 1986, 99% of its 
production originated from its own designs (Timmerman, 1986: 47). 
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7. PROTEA TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRIES (PTI) was a major 
supplier of electronics to Armscor. It supplied field telephones to the SADF 
and by 1975, it was supplying transformers and power supplies to the armed 
forces. In 1977, PTI introduced new field switchboards in the SADF.76 
5.4. The Centrality of the Defence Industry to the South African Economy 
The relevance of the defence industry for a country can be both politicaVstrategic 
and economic. When it comes to the strategic and political relevance, the defence 
industry can provide security and self-reliance for a country. This is because no 
country wants to be dependent on weapons from abroad. Furthermore, a domestic 
defence industrial base can be used as a tool in foreign policy since it supports the 
pursuit of power and influence, and provides means for acquiring allies and friends 
(Buzan, 2002; Andersson, 2001). 
Regarding the relevance and role of a defence industry for the economic 
development of a country, various views can be observed. For example, a number of 
scholars argue that the development of the defence industry and the economy in 
general are intertwined, at least with regards to the complex relationship between 
economics and militarization.77 This complex relationship can be placed into two 
schools of thought: those who claim that militarization has a negative impact in the 
75 It updated the sonar electronics for the submarines included in the addition of computer-aided 
target motion analysis. Apart from sonar electronics, Tri vetts-VEe was engaged in areas such as 
semi-automatic analysis of low frequency noise, transducer and array design, and anti-torpedo 
counter-measures. It specialized in electronic and electronic engineering. 
76 For a detailed account of the electronic products the above seven organizations produced see 
Annex 2. 
77 Militarization refers to a growing armaments capacity and allocations of societal resources for 
military ends (Wolpin, 1986: 2). 
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economy and those who assert that it has a positive influence on the development of 
a country. 
On one side there are authors who claim that defence production diverts critically 
scarce inputs, such as capital, technical skills, labour, raw materials, and foreign 
exchange from the economy to produce arms. The defence industry is seen as being 
unproductive, yielding few spin-offs to the civilian sector, absorbing limited 
resources. In this way, it is perceived as a drain on the economy and an obstruction 
to social and economic development (Mushkat, 1982: 104, 181; Neuman, 1994: 
102). 
On the other side there are those who believe that the defence industry brings 
anticipated beneficial socio-economic spin-offs to the economy. In this regard, 
infrastructure built for military purposes is used by the civilian population and the 
economic viability of the arms trade makes it a beneficial and stable macroeconomic 
enterprise for the state and the government (Batchelor, 1996: 102-106).78 In 
addition, transfers of technology from military to civilian industries are considered a 
spur to industrialization.79 A country can also benefit through import substitution 
since there are more foreign exchange savings earned as a result (Mushkat, 1982: 
183; Neuman, 1994: 104). Thus, the military industry can create employment 
opportunities and assist in human capital formation through training and skills 
development (Batchelor, 1996:113). All these factors are seen as significant 
preconditions for development. 
The aim of this section, however, is not to discuss the above opposing views relating 
to the benefits of defence industry for the economy, but to show the importance of 
South Africa's defence industry for its economy to the extent that the available data 
78 For a detailed study of the economic benefits of militarization, see Smith, (1983). 
79 For the examples of the technology developed and produced by the defence industry see Annex 5. 
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allows us. It is assumed, nevertheless, that the defence industry does have at least 
some spin-off effects for other industries in the economy, especially manufacturing. 
We have already established the security and political rationale for the development 
of the defence industry during apartheid, now we will focus on the economic 
benefits of this industry. During apartheid the defence industry was a major 
contributor to the South African economy. It is important to observe that since there 
had always been considerable input by the state and private sector in this industry, 
by the late 1980s the defence industry was one of the most significant sectors of 
South Africa's industrial base (in terms of resources) (Batchelor and Dunne, 1998). 
Throughout the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s the defence industry was a major creator of 
jobs, and by 1989 it employed directly and indirectly around 160 000 people in 
domestic arms production, which constituted about 10 percent of total jobs in the 
South Africa's manufacturing industry (Batchelor, 1996:99 and Shelton, 1999). The 
arms exports sector supported 21 % of jobs in the defence industry in 1994 of whom 
a similar percentage were technically highly trained workers (Batchelor, 1996:103, 
114). 
The defence industry has also had its share of highly capitalized and skill-intensive 
jobs in South Africa. For example, in 1989 there were more than 2 000 scientists and 
engineers employed by Armscor, which represented 11 percent of the total R&D 
personnel in the South African economy (Batchelor and Dunne, 1998). 
Furthermore, the available figures show that in 1993 the domestic defence industry 
was contributing 4.4 percent of the manufacturing output in South Africa, which 
represented 1.1 percent of the country's GDP (Batchelor, 1996a: 104). 
116 
TABLE 1: South Africa's arms exports as percentages of manufactured exports and 
total exports 1982-1993 
ARMS EXPORTS ARMS EXPORTS! ARMS E CURRENT PRICES (in MANUFACTURED EXPORTSITOTAL '. ---- --- -. - mil.lion rands) .. 1 EXPORTS(%) EXPORTS(%) 
1982 22 1 0.2 0.1 
1983 27 I 0.3 0.1 
'I 
.. 
I 
1984 48 0.4 0.2 
1985 I 282 1.8 0.7 
1986 I 331 1.7 0.7 
I 1987 454 2.1 0.9 
1 1988 269 1.1 ~ 0.5 
;1 1989 205 0.7 I 0.3 
l 1990 163 I 0.5 I 0.2 
1991 794 I 2.4 I 1.2 'I 
1982 I 488 1.9 0.7 
1993 886 J 3.1 l.l 
Source: Batchelor, Peter, (1996) "The Economics of South Africa's Arms Trade". 1. Harker, 
Aurora Papers 28. Collaborati ve Security in South Africa. Ottawa: Canadian Council for 
International Peace and Security, p.104 
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the defence industry was also a major 
contributor of foreign exchange earnings for the government. Between 1982 and 
1993 the arms exports as a percentage of total exports ranged from 0.1 percent to 1.2 
percent (see Table 1). Within the same period Pretoria's arms exports increased by 
300 percent. This amounted to roughly 4 percent of South Africa's GDP (Batchelor, 
1996: 103-105). Between 1982 and the early 1990s, Pretoria's arms exports rose 
from 20 million to 270 million US dollars (Batchelor, 1998) (see Table 2). 
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According to the data provided by Singh and Wezeman, (1995), Pretoria exported 
arms worth 640 million US dollars in 1993 and was ranked 59th in the world in 
terms of arms exporting countries. In addition, in 1995 defence exports represented 
21 percent of all exports or 1,25 billion rands in foreign exchange earnings (Hatty, 
1996). 
TABLE 2: South Africa's arms exports in relation to current prices in US dollars and 
values in 1990 rand terms. 
ARMS EXPORTS ARMS EXPORTS! ARMS EXPORTS 
YEAR CURRENT PRICES CURRENT PRICES (in million rands) 
(in million rands) (in million US dollars) , (1990) 
1982 l 22 I 20 ··········· r 61 
1983 ~ 27 I 24 68 
1984 I 48 32 112 
1985 I 282 126 561 
1986 331 144 551 
1987 454 223 663 
1988 269 118 347 
1989 ! 205 78 I 230 
1990 163 62 163 
1991 794 288 713 
. . .... 
1982 488 171 405 
.. .. ........ . ........ .. , ..... , ... L .. , I I 689 1993 
Sources: Batchelor, Peter, (1996) ''The Economics of South Africa' s Arms Trade". J. Harker, 
Aurora Papers 28. Collaborative Security in South Africa. Ottawa: Canadian Council for 
International Peace and Security, p.100; 
Armscor; South African Reserve Bank - Quarterly Bulletin. 
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Hatty, (1996) further observes that in 1992, 90 percent of all exports were defence 
industry equipment, however, by 1995 defence exports had gone down to 84 percent 
because of the increase in civilian exports as well as defence budget cuts. 
In post-apartheid South Africa, the influence of the defence industry has continued 
although the magnitude of the industry has been reduced considerably. There have 
been further cuts in the defence budget (see Table 3), which has resulted in loss of 
jobs and a brain drain. 
TABLE 3: Defence Budget Trends, 1989 -1996 
Figures are in million rands in constant 1990 prices. 
* Defence spending as a share of total government expenditure. 
YEAR 1989 1990 1991 1992 
, 
1993 1994 1995 1996 
Defence budget 11,435 I 07 1 8094 7605 6589 7 153 6249 59895 
I Change 5,5% -11,9% -19,6% -6,0% -13,4% 8,6% -12,6% -5,7% 
Dcfence/GDP 4,1% 3,6% 3,0% 2,8% 2,4% 2,6% 2,2% 1,9% 
I Defence/government 
Expenditure* 13,0% 12,4% 9,8% 8,4% 6,8% 8,1 % 6,8% 5,0%* 
Sources: Batchelor and Dunne, 1998; 
000, Budget review 1998, Government Printer, Pretoria, 1998. 
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This, however, does not mean that the impact of the defence industry has been non-
existent. On the contrary, according to Batchelor (1996:99) and Shelton (1999), the 
defence industry's contribution to the South African economy at the time was still 
impressive in the sense that 40 00080 people were employed by this industry in 1998 
and that jobs were still being created, whilst there were some 800 companies 
involved in the arms industry, and the technical potential of the industry was still 
remarkable. 
TABLE 4: Defence Industry Employment, 1989 -1996 
1989 1990 1:1 1992 r-:93 1994 1995 1996 
YEAR 
ArmscorlDenel 26348 23630 21 387 16580 14914 14847 15209 15218 
Total defence industry 131750 118750 106935 82900 74570 74235 76045 76090 
Defence 8,6 7,7 7,2 5,8 5,3 5,3 5,4 5,3 
industry/manufacturing 
employment (%) 
Arms industry/total 2,3 2,1 1,9 1,5 1,4 1,4 1,4 1,3 Employment (%) 
Sources: Armscor; 
South African Reserve Bank, Quarterly Bulletin (1989-1997). 
80 According to Hatty, (1996) there were 50 000 people employed in the defence industry in 1996. 
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According to the data of the South African Defence Industry Association (SADIA) 
the defence industry employed over 70 000 people in 1994, of which an average of 
over 17 000 worked directly on defence products (Hatty, 1996). 
Other data, such as those in Table 5, indicate that employment in the defence 
industry as a percentage of total manufacturing employment was much higher than 
previously thought. For example, average employment figures in post-apartheid 
South Africa for industry are around 75 000. This is arguably evidence of the 
considerable employment capacity of the defence industry in present-day South 
Africa. 
TABLE 5: Defence Industry Employment as a Percentage of Manufacturing 
Employment and Total Employment, 1989 - 1997 
DEFENCE DEFENCE/ DEFENCE/TOTAL YEAR MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY' EMPLOYMENT (%) EMPLOYMENT (%) 
1989 ! 131 750 t 8.3 2.3 
1990 I I 18 150 7.5 2.1 
L 1991 106935 6.8 1.9 
I 1992 82900 5.4 1.5 
1993 74570 I 5.0 1.4 
1994 74235 4.9 1.4 
1995 76270 5.0 1.4 
.. .................. -.. .. . . 
1996 76700 5.3 1.5 
1997 73 995 I 5.3 1.4 ~ 
1 
AVERAGE 90612 6.0 1.7 j 
* Es11mate, mcludes Arrnscor, Dene! and pn vate sector defence mdustry 
Sources: Arrnscor Annual Report (various years), Denel Annual Report; South African Reserve 
Bank, Quarterly Bulletin. 
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Table 6 below indicates that the production of arms engaged considerable levels of 
direct employment in 1996, numbering around 20 000.81 
TABLE 6: Statistics on the value of output and the number of people employed in 
arms production in South Africa 1994 - 1999. 
'Data are in million rands at current prices, unless otherwise stated. 
YEAR DIRECT VALUE OF MILITARY SALES I PRODUCTION I CONTRACTS TOTAL 
EMPLOYMENT DOMESTIC EXPORT 
DEFENCE (B) ARMS EXPORTS (A) (C) CONSTANT ARMS SALES (A) RELATED CONSTANT 1990 CONSTANT 1990 CONSTANT 1990 
EMPWYMENT (A) PRICES PRICES 1990 PRICES PRICES 
1996 20234 j 1 707 I 
559 
I I 
3742 
1995 I 1808 843 721 6638 
1994 
.1 I 2093 I 789 I 3390 
A. South African Aerospace, Maritime and Defence Industry Association (AMD), Defence Industry 
Statistics[On-line] www.amd.org.za. 
B. Domestic Acquisition Spending; National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC), 
White Paper on the South African Defence Related industries, December 1999 [On-line] 
www.polity.org.zalgovdocs/whitepapers/defenceidefenceprocureJ.htm!(Table 2.2) 
C. National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC), White Paper on the South African 
Defence Related industries, 
[On-line] www.polity.org.zalgovdocs/whitepapers/defence/defenceprocureI.html 
D. National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC). South African Export Statistics for 
Conventional arms 2000-2001 [On-line] www.pmg.org.za/billsl02073Incaac.htm 
Source: [On-line] http://projects.sipri.se/milexiaprodinationaldatalsouthafrica.OOf 
81 This figure includes employees from Armscor, Denel and other companies directly involved in 
the armaments manufacturing industry. 
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TABLE 7: Defence Industry Sales 1992-1995 
I - in million rands 
2 - % of total exports 
YEAR 1992 1993 1994 1995 
:1 I 1 I 2 I 1 2 1 I 2 1 1 I 2 
Defence Sales 3452 76 3422 70 3390 67 3 63H 60 
Civilian Sales 621 14 833 17 1 051 21 1 11 7 19 
Non-related 480 11 630 13 604 12 1297 21 
Sales I TO~AL SALES . I 4554 I f4885 r-r-Cr-r-
Source: Hatty, Paul, (1996) "Defence Industry Overview - Today and the Future" In African 
Security Review 5 (3). lOu-line] http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/ASR/S.3IDefence%20industry.html 
As the Table 8 shows, the value of arms exports grew at an average of 40 percent 
per year between 1989 and 1998 and averaged over half a billion rands between 
1989 and 1998. However, when compared with merchandise exports, arms exports 
grew at a lower rate in comparison, and formed a small percentage of the exported 
merchandise, one percent on average. 
TABLE 8: South African Arms Exports, 1989 -1998 
% CHANGE % CHANGE ARMS ~ 
ARl\1S FROM THE MERCHANDISE FROM THE EXPORTS as a % YEAR EXPORTS' PREVIOUS EXPORTS' PREVIOUS of 
YEAR YEAR MERCHANDISE EXPORTS 
I I I 1989 236 44170 0.5 L 1990 163 -30.9 42 735 -3.2 r 0.4 
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% CHANGE 
YEAR ARMS FROM THE MERCHANDISE EXPORTS' PREVIOUS EXPORTS· 
I YEAR 
i 
1991 i 686 320.7 46 147 
1 
1992 411 -40.0 I 42516 
1993 I 712 I -73.2 I 46974 
I I 
.. ~
1994 659 -7.6 1 53 M73 
I I • 1995 721 9.5 I 60419 
1996 I 1330 I -54.2 I 66401 
1997 1--~·;2 I 142.8 I 71487 
1998 I 380 I -52.6 1 80005 1 
AVERAGE I 510 I 40.1 I 55472.1 
* (in million rands, constant 1995 prices) 
Sources: Armscor Annual Report (1989-1998); 
National Conventional Arms Control Committee, 1999; 
South African Reserve Bank, Quarterly Bulletin. 
-
% CHANGE ARMS EXPORTS as a % FROM THE 
of PREVIOUS MERCHANDISE YEAR EXPORTS 
I I 8.0 lo7 I 
I I I -7.9 loU I 
1 10.5 m l lo5 _ 
1 
.. 
14.7 R=--I 12.2 . lo2 
I 9.9 ~ 0.5 I 7.7 I.l 
I 11.9 I 0.5 
I 7.1 I 1.0 
Defence exports as percentage of total exports increased steadily from 18 percent in 
1992 (614 million rands) to 29 percent (1,05 billion rands) in 1995 (see Table 9). 
Hence, it can be argued that the export of defence products still played an important 
part in Pretoria's exports. With regards to defence industry exports, in 1994 and 
1995, around 85 percent of total exports were defence equipment while civilian 
exports made up only around fifteen percent. 
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TABLE 9: Defence Industry Exports 1992-1995 
1 - in million rands 
2 - % of total SA sales 
YEAR 1992 1993 1994 ..1 , 1995 
~j'----2--'--+-1 ~1 ,'-------1 2--'--+-1-1 '"P=r----------l2 
755 l 22 789 ~ 1049 ' Defence 
exports 
Civilian 
exports 
Non-related 
Exports 
1 TOTAL 
EXPORTS 
614 l R 
35 6 
35 7 
77 9 
89 14 
29 
133 13 187 17 
13 2 18 
19 1254 21 
Source: Hatty, Paul, (1996) "Defence Industry Overview - Today and the Future" In African 
Security Review 5 (3). [On-line] http://www.iss.co.zaJPuhs/ASR/5.3/Defence%20industrv.html 
In 1994, the value of arms exports was 918 million rands and by 1997, this value 
had increased by 30 percent to 1166 million rands. Between April 1994 and August 
1999, Pretoria sold arms worth more than 3.3 billion rands (600 million US dollars) 
to 91 countries (Batchelor, 1999). 
In 1997, weapons had become South Africa's second largest manufactured export 
worth 370 million US dollars (SIPRI, 2001). These sales accounted for five percent 
of total manufactured output, 1.2 percent of South Africa's GDP and one percent of 
all manufacturing jobs (Shelton, 1998). In 1995, South Africa was placed twelfth on 
the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency's list of top twenty international 
arms exporters (South Africa, 1997: 20). 
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TABLE 10: South Africa's Arms Exports and Sales of Surplus Arms, 1992 -1998 
SURPLUS! 
YEAR TOTAL CHANGE FROM SURPLUS CHANGE FROM TOTAL 
EXPORTS· PREVIOUS . SALES* PREVIOUS EXPORTS YEAR(%) YEAR(%) (%) 
.. . 
1992 645 1 I 101 1 1 15.7 
1993 1054 j 63.5 I 87 I -13.4 8.3 
1994 
1 
92H I -12.0 1 72 I - 17.9 7.7 
I ! ! ~ 1995 1 1033 11.3 64 -10.5 6.2 I 
-
1996 I 502 I -51.4 , R3 1 29.7 I 16.6 
1997 1 135 I 126.3 'I 7 1 I 
-14.4 I 6.3 
1997 I 512 I -54.9 I 49 -32.0 9.5 
AVERAGE 1 829.8 L 13.8 ] 75.2 I -9.7 10.0 
.. 
• In million rands, constant 1995 pnces. 
Sources: 
Annscor Annual Report (1992-1998); 
National Conventional Anns Control Committee, 1999. 
As Table 10 demonstrates, between 1992 and 1998 the value of South Africa's total 
exports fluctuated quite widely with an increase of almost 14 percent per year over 
the period. In addition, South Africa's arms exports averaged over 800 million rands 
per year in sales. These arms sales represented a considerable source of foreign 
exchange for the South African government. 
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In addition to acquiring foreign exchange earnings, the South African economy has 
indeed benefited considerably from having a domestic defence industry.82 The 
research refers to foreign exchange savings, which were made as a result of 
domestic production of armaments. Table 11 below shows the data on savings for 
the years 1994 and 1995. 
TABLE 11: Foreign Exchange Savings Due to Local Defence Industry 
1199411995 MILLION RANDS 
Local Purchases 2919 
Less Imported Content of Local Purchases 802 
Counter trade Credits against Imports 380 
Exports 982 
Foreign Exchange Savings 3479 
Source: Hatty, Paul, (1996) "Defence Industry Overview - Today and the Future" In African 
Security Review 5 (3). [On-line] hltp:llwww.iss.co.zalPubs/ASRl5.3IDefence%20industry.html 
In addition to foreign exchange earnings and savings the government benefited from 
all companies involved in the sale of armaments since they had to pay a certain 
percentage to the government out of every sale they made. South Africa's arms 
exports are dominated by Denel (a state owned corporation), which controlled 80 
percent of total arms exports in the period 1992-1998 (Batchelor and Dunne, 1998). 
Denel together with the three major private sector companies (Reunert, Grintek and 
Altech) is also the dominant player in the domestic defence market, accounting for 
over 80 percent of the defence industry sales on domestic market. 
82 See Annex 4 for data on the companies that constitute the South African Defence Industry 
Association. 
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Defence companies pay 18 cents out of every rand in sales to the government. In 
1995, for example, the government received 225 million rands in revenue from 
defence firms. Moreover, Denel's financial contributions in 1994/1995 amounted to 
590 million rands (Hatty, 1996).83 
TABLE 12: Composition of Turnover, Denel, 1992-1998 
DEFENCE CIVILIAN 
" " 
~ .. ~ =:~ , .. ~ DEFENCE ~§~ .. 0 YEAR -lP' Domestic Exports Domestic Exports TOTAL " ~ o"'~ G.I r..~ ~'§o1 g ""- (in %) (in %) (in %) (in %) (%) ~ e ; i::JS'::"i: Q~ ~ E-ot:-caQ, 
1992 3660 I 63 16 20 1 79 
1993 3382 -7 .6 1 53 20 24 3 73 
1994 3274 -3.2 48 23 25 4 71 
1995 3401 3.9 45 24 I 25 6 69 
1996 2805 -17.5 50 14 30 6 64 
1997 2725 -2.9 41 20 30 I 9 61 
AVERAGE 3207.8 -5.5 50 20 26 5 70 
Source: Denel Annual Reports. 
83 Singh and Wezeman, (1995:576) observe that in 1995, Denel had 14000 employees. Denel is a 
public company with all its equity owned by the state, employing about 13 800 people (down from 
28 000 persons in 1992). A Board of Directors, responsible to the Minister for Public Enterprises, 
manages the company. Denel receives no government subsidy, unlike many of its foreign 
competitors, such as French state-owned defence industrial companies that receive government 
support. It is presently structured as a single company with divisions and subsidiary companies. 
These companies include Atlas (aircraft), Eloptro (optronics), Kentron (anti-aircraft systems, 
missiles, RPVs, avionics), LIW (artillery, turrets, infantry weapons), Mechem (mine-protected 
vehicles, special equipment) and four ammunition producers - Naschem, PMP, Somchem and 
Swartklip. Denel also controls several research and development facilities and test ranges. 
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The defence industry's contribution to South Africa's industrial sector is also 
important, since it has always played a strategic role in the development of 
Pretoria's industrial structure, especially in the manufacturing sector. It is widely 
recognized that countries experiencing sustainable growth and improving their 
standards of living have achieved that mainly through growth and development in 
the manufacturing sectors. 
In South Africa, the manufacturing sector contributes 25 percent of the GDP, which 
is more than any other sector. Military production represents an important part of 
this sector, since it is essential for economic spin-offs as well as for the transfer of 
technology from military to civilian industries, a trend that is crucial to 
industrialization . Table 13 below provides a list of examples of commercial 
application of defence industry technology. 
TABLE 13: Examples of Commercial Application of Defence Industry Technology 
1 Environmental control systems for mining applications 
2 Sporting rifles and ammunition 
3 Cricket bats 
4 Civilian aircraft engine gearboxes 
5 Composite material filament wound pipes 
6 Mobile hydraulic test bench 
7 Walk through metal detectors 
8 Electronic encryption for commercial facsimile transmission 
9 Wide format monochrome inkjet plotter 
10 Electronic head turnstile 
11 Liquid flow metering systems 
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12 Industrial microwave ovens 
13 Protected 4 x 4 vehicle 
14 Light commercial tractor 
15 Baggage handling and check-in facilities 
16 Marine distress flares 
17 Intensive care monitors 
18 Rural telephone system 
19 Composite racing bicycles 
20 Composite aircraft seats for Concorde 
Source: Hatty, Paul, (1996) "Defence Industry Overview - Today and the Future" In African 
Security Review 5 (3). [On-line) http://www.iss.co.zalPubs/ASRJ5.3IDefence%20industry.html 
5.5. Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to show that the defence industry was central to the 
South African economy. By the time apartheid was effectively implemented, 
Pretoria had a fully operational defence industry that involved innovation, assembly 
and modifications of defence products. South Africa managed to obtain a 
considerable amount of assistance from Western countries in the form of direct 
funding, importation of spare parts, and acquisition of production licences, all of 
which facilitated the development of its defence industry. This kind of assistance 
helped Pretoria becoming a major arms producer in the world. 84 Prior to the 1990s, 
South Africa not only produced weapons, it also exported a substantial volume of 
arms to countries in Africa, Latin America, Europe, the Middle East and Asia. 
84 In Africa, Pretoria was one of the largest weapons producers and subsequently also the largest 
arms exporter. 
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After the UN embargo had been put into place, Pretoria's arms industry had to 
become more self-sufficient than before to be able to supply the military and in 
cases where Pretoria did not have the technology to build or develop equipment, it 
modified or improved current models to give them a longer shelf life. 
This chapter has also shown that by the time apartheid came to an end in the early 
1990s, Pretoria had established a huge defence industry that became quite central to 
the South African economy. Despite the embargoes and budget cuts, the defence 
industry was still an economic asset to the apartheid regime and remains so today. 
After the early 1990s, the defence budget was considerably reduced, as the internal 
and external security situations of the new government were significantly different 
from those of the previous government. In other words, with the democratization of 
South African society, many reasons for spending on defence equipment 
disappeared. As a result, with the decreased defence budget, the defence industry 
saw a considerable loss of jobs in a country that was already dealing with high levels 
of unemployment. 
However, even with this reduced number of employed people, the defence industry 
still provides jobs for tens of thousands of people in a country that faces high levels 
of unemployment. In addition, the approximately 800 companies involved in the 
arms industry are still creating jobs. 
With the decreased domestic demand for defence industry'S products, the 
government was forced to look for foreign buyers. In a shrinking post-Cold War 
arms global market the competition was harsh, but if we look at the available data, 
we can observe that arms exports increased during the Mandela administration. 
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It is understandable that the government had a great interest in exporting arms since 
Denel, the large state-owned defence conglomerate, controls 80 percent of all 
defence exports and together with three other local firms, controls 80 percent of the 
domestic defence industry. At the same time it employs on average 15 000 people 
and has an annual turnover of over three billion rands every year. 
The data in this chapter has shown that in the 1990s the defence industry still formed 
an important part of South Africa's economy, especially since any crisis in this 
industry and its effects could spill over to those (civil) sectors of economy that 
depended on the defence industry, such as other manufacturing sectors. However, 
the Mandela government could not afford to have a crisis in a major sector of its 
economy in the face of many economic and social problems such as 
underdevelopment, inadequate housing, high rates of unemployment, crime and 
poverty. Therefore, the preservation of the defence industry as well as the selling of 
the defence industry's products to interested clients was in South Africa's national 
interest - economically speaking. 
If one applies the innenpolitik approach to foreign policy analysis, one can argue 
that South Africa's foreign policy under Mandela was mainly influenced by its 
domestic factors. In this regard we can argue that a country's domestic political and 
economic environment can greatly influence a country's foreign policy. 
The sale and export of arms constituted post-apartheid South Africa's national 
interest, whose pursuance ultimately compromised its foreign policy principles. In 
exporting arms, however, the government faced a problem of its foreign policy 
implementation. The states that were in need of arms and other defence equipment 
violated the very laws Pretoria sought to preserve. Since the government had a great 
interest in selling arms in order to sustain the South African defence industry and 
solve domestic economic and social problems, it had to create an arms sales policy 
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that would promote South Africa's economic/commercial national interests and be 
in line with its foreign policy principles at the same time. The next chapter will 
therefore discuss the arms sales policy that was adopted to guide the government 
when selling weapons to ensure that it would behave as a responsible arms dealer. 
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6. CRAFTING AN ARMS SALES POLICY 
6.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter attempted to show that the defence industry was central to the 
South Africa economy. By the time apartheid was effectively implemented, the 
defence industry came to secure a central position in the economy of South Africa. 
The chapter also demonstrated that by the early 1990s, Pretoria had established a 
huge defence industry whose exportation of arms contributed significantly to the 
GDP and ultimately continues to play a major part in the creation of foreign 
exchange for the economy. Despite the embargoes and budget cuts, the defence 
industry was still an economic asset to the apartheid regime and remains so today. 
This was evident from the fact that even after the demise of apartheid and with the 
emergence of the new South Africa, the defence industry still provides jobs for tens 
of thousands of people in the country as well as brings in the much-needed foreign 
exchange. 
Thus it would seem that the democratic regime was not about to abandon the 
defence sector because of its centrality to the economy. The Mandela government 
would continue to rely on the proceeds of the defence industry in order to solve or 
deal with domestic pressures. In this regard, it would have to introduce a viable arms 
sales policy. This policy would have to be enacted in order to make arms trafficking 
more transparent and legitimate with the demise of apartheid. 
This chapter therefore proposes to look at South Africa's arms sales policy. It begins 
with an analysis of the two major markets where the arms trade takes place and 
which Pretoria took part in, during and after the apartheid era. A review of the 
apartheid arms sales policy will be undertaken with a view to show the development 
of South Africa's arms sales policies. The chapter will then proceed to discuss how 
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post-apartheid arms sales policy came in to being by discussing some of the 
recommendations and submissions that were made to a committee entrusted with the 
creation of a new arms sales policy. The chapter will then proceed to analyse post-
apartheid arms sales policy in detail before concluding the debate on South African 
arms sales policy. The major purpose of the new post-apartheid arms sales policy 
was to enable the country to have a transparent and legitimate arms sales policy that 
was a move from the secrecy that shrouded past policies. 
Given the sensitive and, in most cases, the political nature of the arms trade and its 
importance for the promotion of national interests, including the preservation of a 
state's security, the arms trade or arms transfers are frequently clouded with secrecy 
where deals are brokered in concealment. The covert nature of these transactions, 
however, means that they are frequently done in 'grey' and 'black markets.' South 
Africa in this regard has been actively involved in both types of markets both during 
and after the apartheid period. Hence it is important for us to discuss both markets to 
get an idea of the arena in which the arms trade takes place. 
6.2. Black and Grey Markets 
Since the mid-1980s, the black and grey arms markets have emerged as major 
factors in the arms trade. The illegal black market arises as a reaction to embargos as 
states try to acquire weapons in spite of them. The state-sponsored grey market, 
though receiving less attention, is much larger and more destabilizing. One can say 
that the grey market is evidence of a government' s alignment as states experiment 
with new and risky relationships. 
During the Cold War, the black and grey markets were trivial in comparison to the 
post-Cold War era. They did not have a big impact on the international system since 
in the bipolar world states aligned themselves to one of two powers and in the 
135 
process got the necessary assistance from their powerful ally. Since the end of the 
Cold War, as the international system has become more chaotic, and ethnic conflict 
has replaced inter-state wars as the most immediate danger to international peace 
and security, the black and grey markets have grown and cannot be overlooked 
(Karp, 1994: 175-l76). 
The effects of black and grey transactions can be felt much more quickly and with 
greater certainty than with ordinary open transactions. Both types of markets 
contribute to the degree to which weapons will be used to threaten or kill . Their 
greatest effect is felt at the extremes of international conflict, in small-scale arming 
of sub-state actors, and in the drive by 'pariah states' to acquire weapons that can 
cause significant damage to human life as well as physical infrastructure (Karp, 
1994: 180-186). 
In comparison to the black market, the grey market is more obscure and resembles 
the covert nature of the black market. In reality, however, it is much different. 
Unlike the black market, grey transactions are usually neither entirely legal nor 
illegal. Some of the characteristics of the grey market include, among other things, 
the transfer of non-standard weapons, and the reliance on intermediary suppliers to 
further disassociate suppliers and recipient governments . By using covert channels, 
officials on the supplier's and recipient's side can take greater risks while 
minimizing potential embarrassment or danger (Karp, 1994: 177-l78). Therefore, 
this way of selling arms would appeal to both sides making the transaction. 
The grey market on the supply side is the domain of those who use arms exports as 
the tools of their foreign policy. If the black market is seen as the violation of 
national or intemationallaw, then any action counter to stated policy and customary 
rules indicates operations on the grey market. And while the black market is illegal, 
the grey market can be considered illegitimate. The reason for selling weapons on 
136 
the grey market is to avoid political problems at home and abroad after engaging in 
open transfers (Catrina, 1994: 197). 
The market In which a country will trade in arms depends largely on the 
international as well as domestic, political, and economic contexts. Analysis of 
apartheid South Africa's arms trade policy can shed some light on how the 
illegitimate or even illegal arms transfers work in practice. 
6.3. Apartheid South Africa's Arms Sales Policy 
During apartheid, South Africa's arms sales policy was ambiguous, unpredictable 
and lacked adherence to international norms and regulations (National Assembly, 
1997:3019). Arms exports were determined by the Armaments Development and 
Production Act 57 of 1968 (Arms cor Act) . The major problem with this act was that 
it was both unclear and misleading at the same time. Armscor was responsible for 
the manufacture, sale and acquisition of arms. Although it was originally intended to 
operate under a ministry, it was constituted as a separate and autonomous entity that 
functioned as a company. However, the Minister of Defence could, on the basis of 
the Act, approve corporate loans and appoint and dismiss directors. 
Since Pretoria was determined to enter into the international arms export market, it 
adopted certain rules, regulations and classifications, which formed its arms sales 
policy, to guide Pretoria in the arms trade in the face of international embargos.85 
Since 1983, potential buyers were classified according to recommendations made by 
the Defence Foreign Policy Committee (DFPC)86 and these categories were: 
85 South Africa first showcased its weapons at an arms exhibition in Piraeus, Greece in 1982. This 
event signalled Pretoria's entrance into the export market. 
86 The DFPC comprised members of Armscor and the former South African Defence Force. It was 
chaired alternately by the SADF's Chief of Staff, Intelligence and Armscor's General Manager 
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Group I: no restriction on the marketing and/or export of armaments which had 
been released for marketing; 
Group 2: only non-sensitive armaments could be exported to such countries; 
Group 3: no armaments could be exported to these countries. 
In addition, weapons, ammunition and military equipment were divided into three 
broad categories (Cameron Commission, 1995): 
Category A: all armaments released for marketing; 
Category B: all non-sensitive items such as vehicles, radios, anti-riot equipment 
and weapons and ammunition not exceeding 12.7mm; 
Category C: all products not released for marketing. 
There were always inconsistencies and a disregard for principled policy in Pretoria's 
arms sales, which were exposed in the Smith Report of 26 September 1983 (Cited in 
Cameron Commission, 1995).87 Moreover, considerations about the lethal nature of 
the armaments, ethics, human rights and international norms were evidently lacking 
in South Africa's sales policy at the time. 
Before 1982, South Africa's arms export industry was a protected territory because 
the government did not make information readily available for public knowledge. 
After 1982 with Armscor's entrance into the export market, this situation changed, 
with better access to information regarding this industry because Pretoria needed to 
sell individual weapons on the international market. Still, the data on its customers 
and orders was a well-kept secret. 
(import and export Control). In 1991, the DFPC was joined by the Department of Foreign Affairs 
and National Intelligence Service, and Department of Trade and Industry from 1994. 
87 For example, the South African government classified the Lebanese government as belonging to 
Group I, and the main opposition group, Christian Militia, as Group 2. In 1987, the Lebanese 
government became a Group 2 market, while the Christian Militia was upgraded to Group 1 status. 
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Since the 1960s, Pretoria had exported certain types of military equipment through 
middlemen/intermediaries in order to go around the UN arms embargo and the 
boycott of South African goods. At the same time Britain, France, West Germany 
and Israel provided Pretoria with opportunities to export South African equipment. 
For example, a subsidiary of a foreign company in South Africa would export diesel 
engines to West Germany and from there they were re-exported to other foreign 
countries.88 
In all these cases, the buyers remained anonymous and furthermore, they were kept 
in the dark about the origin of the goods. In some instances, countries such as France 
literally sold missiles on behalf of South Africa, for example, the sale of the Crotale 
missile through France, and the importation of South African-made equipment by 
the US (Landgren, 1989: 174). 
Amongst other weapons and ammunition that Armscor offered for export were: 
a. pyrotechnics for the army, navy and air force. These included thunder 
flashes, smoke canisters, rocket flares, trip-wire flares and coloured 
signals, anti-missile decoys and 81mm smoke generators for combat 
vehicles; 
b. a comprehensive range of hand grenades including offensive, 
defensive smokers and riot control; 
c. 5.56mm and 7.62mm rifle grenades of high explosive red phosphorous 
smoke types; 
d. non-metallic, anti-personnel and anti-tank mines; 
e. demolition equipment (International Defence Review, 12, 1984: 
1809). 
88 Most of the military technology Pretoria used during apartheid was received through Western 
countries. See Annex 3 for data on the use of foreign military technology in the aircraft, missile, 
annoured vehicle, warship and other military industries. 
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Ultimately, the volume of South African arms exports prior to 1982 cannot be 
established. The same could be said for South Africa's export of small arms, 
ammunition and other military equipment, which was possible to conceal. With 
regards to major weapons the question as to who the buyer was and the origin of the 
goods remain the main area of contention. 
It can be argued, therefore, that during this period Pretoria undertook to sell arms 
through the black or grey markets in order to circumvent the arms embargo imposed 
by the UN. At the same time, after the embargo was imposed South Africa could 
only use the black market to sell and procure armaments and earn much-needed hard 
currency for its economy. However, after 1982 and with Armscor's entrance into the 
regular export market, Pretoria openly engaged in export and trade despite the 
embargos placed on it. 
The Mandela government did not have the same problems as the apartheid regime 
when it came to the export of arms. The embargos were lifted in 1994 and the 
products of the defence industry were eligible to be sold on the international market. 
However, the new government faced other issues in relation to the arms sales right 
from the beginning. To avoid future problems and embarrassments an elaborate 
arms sales policy was formed, which is discussed in the next section. 
6.4. Post Apartheid South Africa's Arms Sales Policy 
In September 1994, the discovery that a consignment of South African National 
Defence Force (SANDF) weapons supposedly destined for Lebanon had apparently 
been sold to Yemen, soon led to the appointment of a commission of inquiry by 
President Mandela on 14 October 1994 (Government Notice R 1801 of 1994). The 
Cameron Commission of Inquiry into alleged arms transactions between Armscor 
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and Eli Wazan and other related matters was to investigate illegal arms dealings and 
particularly the sale of weapons to Yemen, a country to which South Africa was not 
allowed to sell arms under government policy (this event became known as the 
Yemen debacle.) The Commission was headed by Judge Edwin Cameron and 
became known as the Cameron Commission. The specific task of the commission 
was to: 
"Comment In the context of South Africa's national and international 
obligations and responsibilities on the appropriateness of South Africa's current 
trade policy with regard to weapons and components with reference to weapons 
and related materials, and decision-making processes with regard to such 
trade". 
The Commission published the first of its two reports (Cameron Reports) on the 
Yemen transaction in June 1995. The Commission also invited interested parties and 
members of the public to submit written presentations on adequate policies that may 
be used in the future. Among the presentations that were submitted concerning 
adequate policies that may be used in the future were the South African 
Conventional Arms Transfer Policy and Practice and recommendations for the 
improvement of those measures (Cilliers, 1994, 1995). 
Among the recommendations made were those initiated by the Institute for Defence 
Policy (IDP) (Cilliers, 1994 and 1995). It was their argument and recommendation 
that in creating an arms policy South Africa should take into consideration the issue 
of global arms control among other things. According to IDPs recommendations, it 
was vital that Pretoria ensures that its arms export policy is in line with the wider 
security concept (human and economic security) as well as the UN Charter. 
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As a result Pretoria needed to commit itself to a policy of transparency in non-
proliferation and arms control that covered weapons with major destructive 
capabilities and the general proliferation of conventional weapons. 
Cilliers (1994) further argues that Pretoria's primary goal would be to establish and 
reinforce South Africa's reputation as a responsible arms producer, possessor and 
trader of defence-related products and advanced technologies. In its endeavours, 
South Africa should attempt to balance the interests of the domestic defence 
industry with trade in defence-related products to provide for future defence needs. 
It should also contribute to socio-economic development through export earnings; 
and at the same time such trade should be in accordance with international 
conventions and other control regimes of which South Africa is a signatory. 
In this regard, the IDP (Cilliers, 1994) proposed a draft conventional arms transfer 
policy that would be debated. The conventional arms transfer policy of the South 
African Government would serve the security interests of the country in two 
important ways: 
• Pretoria would support arms transfers that met its own continuing security 
needs, and those of its friends and allies. 
• The Government would not participate in arms transfers that may destabilise 
or threaten regional peace, or undermine global and regional security. 
In addition to the new conventional policy serving South Africa's security interests, 
this new policy would also set out certain goals that it would strive to achieve. The 
goals of this conventional arms sales policy would serve: 
• to ensure that South African military forces can continue to enJoy 
technological advantages over potential adversaries; 
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• to help allies and friends in the region deter or defend themselves against 
aggression, while promoting interoperability with South African forces when 
combined operations are required; 
• to promote regional stability, while preventing the proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction and their missile delivery systems; 
• to promote peaceful conflict resolution and arms control, human rights, 
democratisation, and other foreign policy objectives; and 
• to enhance the ability of South Africa to develop its industrial base to meet 
South African defence requirements and maintain a long term military 
technological capacity at lower costs (CiUiers, 1994). 
IDP (ibid), however, noted that a vital element of South African policy on arms 
sales should be the promotion of control, restraint, and transparency of arms 
transfers. The core of Pretoria's efforts should be to promote multilateral restraint, to 
put in place a successful regime of effective international controls on arms sales and 
the transfer of sensitive technologies, particularly to regions of tension and to states 
that pose a threat to international peace and security. In line with pursuing 
multilateral restraint through this and other mechanisms, the Government should 
exercise unilateral restraint in cases where overriding national security and foreign 
policy interests require it to do so. 
The South African Government should also: 
• support regional initiatives to enhance transparency III conventional arms 
trade, such as those being examined by the OAU, SADC/ASAS and possibly 
soon the ISDSC; 
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• support efforts to establish an international export control regime to increase 
transparency of transfers of conventional arms and related technology, to 
establish effective international controls of these transfers, and to promote 
restraint - particularly to regions of tension and to states that are likely to pose 
a threat to international peace and security; 
• support current arms control and confidence building efforts to constrain the 
demand for destabilising weapons and related technology; 
• act unilaterally to restrain the flow of arms in cases where unilateral action is 
effective or necessitated by overriding national interests. Such restraint 
should be considered on a case-by-case basis in instances where South Africa 
has a substantial lead on weapons technology, where South Africa has no 
fielded countermeasures, and where the transfer raises human rights issues or 
indiscriminate casualties, already the case with landmines; and 
• assist and support other suppliers to develop effective export control 
mechanisms to support responsible export policies. 
Consequently, the IDP proposed that once a transfer was approved, the Government 
had to provide support for the proposed export. This would include: tasking overseas 
mission personnel to support overseas marketing efforts of South African companies 
bidding on defence contracts, actively involving senior Government officials in 
promoting sales of particular importance to South Africa, and supporting official 
Department of Defence participation in international defence and trade exhibitions. 
All these measures also add credibility, transparency and government control and 
would depend heavily on the effectiveness of the decision-making process. 
A critical area in the field of arms transfers is arms transfer decision-making. 
Because the transfer of arms is usually of a complex nature, Pretoria's decisions 
should, in future, be guided by a set of general criteria that draw the appropriate 
balance between legitimate arms sales to support the national security of friends and 
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allies, and the need for multilateral restraint in the transfer of arms that would 
enhance the military capabilities of hostile states or that would undermine the 
stability of certain regions of the world (Cilliers, 1994). 
According to Cilliers (1995), arms transfer decisions should therefore be guided by 
the following general criteria: 
• consistency with international agreements and arms control initiatives; 
• appropriateness of the transfer in responding to legitimate security needs in 
South Africa and the recipient country; 
• consistency with South African regional stability interests, especially when 
considering transfers involving power projection capability or the 
introduction of a system that may foster increased tension or contribute to an 
arms race in the region; 
• the degree to which the transfer supports South African strategic and foreign 
policy interests through increased access and influence, burden sharing, and 
interoperability; 
• The impact of the proposed transfer on South African capabilities and 
technological advances particularly in protecting sensitive software and 
hardware design, development, manufacturing, and integration knowledge; 
• the impact on the South African industry and the defence industry base 
whether the sale is approved or not; 
• the degree of protection afforded to sensitive technology and the potential for 
unauthorised third-party transfer, as well as in-country diversion to 
unauthorised users; 
• the risk of revealing system vulnerabilities and adversely impacting upon 
South African operational capabilities in the event of a compromise; 
• the risk of adverse economic, political or social impact within the recipient 
nation and the degree to which that country's security needs can be addressed 
by other means; 
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• the human rights, terrorism and proliferation record of the recipient and the 
potential for misuse of the export in question; 
• the availability of comparable systems from foreign suppliers; 
• the ability of the recipient to effectively field, support, and appropriately 
employ the requested system in accordance with its intended end use 
(Cilliers, 1994, 1995). 
Additionally, South African arms export policy should also adhere to the following 
specific requirements: 
• armaments are sold only to internationally recognised governments, i.e. not to 
guerrilla or other movements; 
• armaments offered for sale must be released for export by the South African 
National Defence Force; 
• the sale or transfer of weapons of mass destruction (Nuclear, Biological and 
Chemical weapons and associated delivery systems) or the technology 
associated with them, is prohibited in terms of the Non-Proliferation Act of 
1993; 
• specified (supplier, product and recipient country) Armaments Marketing 
Permits must be issued by the Minister of Defence or a person/organisation 
authorised by him in terms of the Armaments Development and Production 
Act regulations (Act no. 57 of 1968); 
• end-user certificates must be required in all cases and the validity of these 
certificates confumed (Cilliers, 1994, 1995). 
All the above recommendations made up part of the submissions to the Cameron 
Commission that was entrusted to search for a new and transparent arms sales policy 
after the Yemen case. 
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The Yemen case, therefore, demonstrated the need for a new arms sales policy, 
accountable to the government, and the Cabinet in particular, which would regulate 
the entire arm sales process to avoid future irregularities. Consequently, the 
Commission proposed a new arms sales policy and regulation system. A Cabinet 
memorandum of August 1995 set up a new four-level arms control system 
consisting of: 
• a processing unit (Directorate for Conventional Arms Control) based at the 
Defence Secretariat; 
• a review of any proposed arms sales by various government departments 
(defence, foreign affairs, trade and industry, safety and security, transport, 
intelligence); 
• a scrutiny committee consisting of the Secretary for Defence and the 
Directors-General of the Departments of Foreign Affairs and Trade and 
Industry; and 
• a cabinet committee (the National Conventional Arms Control Committee -
NCACC) chaired by Kader Asmal, the Minister for Water Affairs and 
Forestry.89 
This structure is reproduced in Picture 2 below. 
Accompanying the new arms control system was a new acquisition management 
structure that would ensure proper acquisition of arms and materials used in the 
manufacture of armaments. This structure was a three-tier system that was to ensure 
transparency and accountability in the acquisition of armaments. Once a user-
requirement was identified, the Armaments Acquisition Control Board (AACB) 
screened all the projects and programmes. After the AACB's approval, the next step 
in the monitoring hierarchy was the Armaments Acquisition Steering Board (AASB) 
89 Other members of the NCACC include the ministers of defence (and deputy), trade and industry; 
arts, culture, science and technology, constitutional affairs, public enterprises, intelligence services 
(and deputy), foreign affairs (and deputy), and safety and security (and deputy). 
147 
that screened and approved cardinal projects. At the top end of the management 
acquisition structure was the Armaments Acquisition Council (AAC), whose sole 
responsibility was the final approval of defence and armament projects. This 
structure is reproduced in Picture 3 below. 
In terms of this arms control system, any arms export application had to pass all four 
stages successfully and be assessed on a case-by-case basis, thereby eliminating the 
pre-1994 'Yes List and No List' approach (countries to which weapons could be 
sold and those that no weapons were to be sold). In the White Paper on Defence, 
adopted by government in May 1996, all potential sales had to be channelled 
through the NCACC. According to official policy as laid out in the Guide to the 
Tenns of Reference of Conventional Anns Control in South Africa, decision-makers 
are required to consider the following criteria for each arms export application 
(Secretary for Defence, 1996): 
a. the recipient country's record on human rights and fundamental freedoms; 
b. existing tensions or armed conflicts and the internal and regional security 
situation of the recipient country; 
c. the recipient's record of compliance with regard to international arms control 
agreements and treaties; 
d. the nature and cost of the arms to be transferred in relation to the 
circumstances of the recipient country, including its legitimate security and 
defence needs and the objective of least diversion of human and economic 
resources for arms procurement; and 
e. the degree to which arms sales are supportive to South Africa's national and 
foreign interests. 
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PICTURE 2: ARMS SALES DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 
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PICTURE 3: ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT STRUCTURES 
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When considering applications for arms export permits, the guidelines suggest the 
avoidance of arms sales that are likely to: 
• violate or suppress human rights and fundamental freedoms; 
• contravene South Africa's obligations; 
• endanger regional and international peace by introducing destabilizing 
military capabilities; 
• be diverted by the recipient country or re-exported to third countries; 
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• negatively impact on South Africa's diplomatic and trade relations with other 
states; 
• contribute to the escalation of regional conflict. 
The approval procedure is further complicated by the classification of armaments in 
five separate categories: 
Category A: Sensitive M~or Significant Equipment (SMSE) - any weapon 
system that can cause high casualties, or major damage; 
Category B: Sensitive Significant Equipment (SSE) - hand carried assault 
weapons; 
Category C: Non-Sensitive Equipment (NSE) - equipment used in support of 
combat operations with no inherent lethal capacity; 
Category D: Non-Lethal Equipment (NLE) protective equipment, or 
defensive equipment such as de-mining systems; 
Category E: Not-for-Sale (NFS) - defence related items, which cannot be sold, 
such as anti-personnel land mines. 
In July 1995, the Mail & Guardian published country categories with respect to the 
above regulations (The Economist 1995:31-32). These categories were as follows: 
Category 1 (no arms restrictions): Namibia, Botswana, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, 
Zambia, Malawi, Tanzania, Mauritius, Seychelles, Benin, Cape Verde, Senegal, 
Togo, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ghana, Burkina Faso, Gabon, 
Eritrea, Bahrain, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Mauritania, Morocco and the 
Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (but all sales on hold pending peace 
referendum in Western Sahara), Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, United 
Arab Emirates, Australia, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei, Cambodia, People's 
Republic of China, Fiji, Hong Kong, Indonesia (since put on hold), Japan, 
Laos, Malaysia, Macao, Mongolia, Nepal, New Zealand, Pacific Ocean Islands, 
Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka (since put 
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on hold), Republic of China, Thailand, Vietnam, United States of America, 
Canada, Venezuela, Guyana, Surinam, French Guyana, Brazil, Paraguay, 
Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, Panama, Costa 
Rica, Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, Bahamas, Bermuda, Belize, Bolivia, 
Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Mexico, Grenada, Puerto Rico, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Jamaica, Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Norway, Sweden, Finland, 
Denmark, Iceland, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Luxembourg, United Kingdom, Vatican, San Marino, Malta, Portugal, Spain, 
France, Italy, Cyprus, Greece, Andorra, Albania, Hungary, Turkey (since 
changed to IV), Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Russian Federation, Belarus. 
Category 11 (some arms restrictions); Comoros, Madagascar, Mali, Cameroon, 
Congo, Sao Tome and Principe, Chad, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Palestinian 
National Authority, India, Pakistan, Bulgaria, Romania. 
Category III (non-lethal equipment); Angola, Mozambique, Equatorial Guinea, 
Niger, Zaire, Djibouti, Algeria, Lebanon, Moldavia. 
Category IV (no arms sales); Lesotho, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Gambia, 
Burundi, Rwanda, Somalia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanese Christian Militia, Libya, 
Sudan, Syria, Yemen, Afghanistan, Burma (Myanmar), North Korea, Cuba, 
Haiti, Tadjikistan, Kirghistan, Uzbekistan, Croatia, Slovenia, Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, 
Turkmenistan.90 
All the regulations that were a part of official policy on arms sales provided 
assurance that universalist foreign policy principles were put into practice at the very 
time when South Africa would pursue its economic interests by exporting arms to 
90 The National Conventional Arms Committee first provided this information on 26 August 1996 
in Pretoria. 
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various countries. Furthermore, the Cameron Commission specifically suggested 
that such arms transfers be compatible with the values of South Africa's interim 
(and now also, the new) constitution respecting human rights: 
"The new criteria [for detennining which categories of weapons may be 
exported, and to which countries], should be based above all, on South Africa's 
commitment to democracy, human rights and international peace and security. 
More specifically, the criteria should seek to avoid the export of arms to 
repressive and authoritarian regimes and to illegitimate rebel movements. 
Attention should also be paid to the political and economic stability of the 
prospective recipient state and the surrounding region ... ,,8 
6.5. Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to analyse how post-apartheid South Africa's arms sales 
policy was crafted. A review of the apartheid arms sales policy has shown that the 
development of South Africa's arms sales policy, ultimately led to the creation of a 
post-apartheid South Africa' s arms sales policy. It would appear that this 
development occurred in order to address the demands of a particular period during 
that very busy post-apartheid phase. But the arms sales policy would have to take 
into account the different arenas where the arms trade took place, namely the black 
and grey markets. 
This chapter has demonstrated that the black and grey markets are important in the 
arms trade and that states such as South Africa took part in such markets during and 
after the apartheid era. On account of the sensitive nature of defence industry 
products, sale and export of these products would also be considered sensitive - or 
even controversial. Thus states frequently use grey or black markets to avoid 
8 Commission of Inquiry into alleged arms transactions between Armscor and one Eli Wazan and 
other related matters. First Report. Johannesburg. 15 June 1995, p. 4. 
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potential controversy and public censure. In this way, the apartheid regime was able 
to sell its defence industry's products in spite of a UN arms embargo. The 
transactions were done in secrecy and often conducted through middlemen and/or 
third-party countries at least until 1982, when Armscor entered the global market. 
Hence, a viable and more transparent arms sales policy was needed for 
accountability purposes. 
Unlike the apartheid regime, the South African government under Mandela was able 
to trade weapons produced by the South African defence industry quite openly. 
However, the Yemen debacle, which involved illegal arms dealings, demonstrated 
that South Africa needed a more transparent arms sales policy as well as formal 
procedures for approving individual arms deals. This led to the appointment of the 
Cameron Commission, which investigated the Yemen incident and made 
recommendations concerning post-apartheid South Africa's arms sales policy. 
This chapter also demonstrated that the purpose of Pretoria initiating a new viable 
arms sales policy was of utmost importance since it determined how transparent its 
arms trade would be. The result was a policy based on consideration for human 
rights, international/regional peace and security, South African interests, recipient 
country defence needs, and so on. In addition, a four-level arms control system was 
put in place to ensure the observance of the adopted rules or guidelines on a case-by-
case basis to avoid irregularities. It should be noted that this arms sales policy was 
completely in conformity with universalist foreign policy principles. 
Based on the government's arms sales policy, this thesis can argue that the Mandela 
government had honest intentions of respecting its foreign policy principles, and 
understood that any initial ambiguities would need to be addressed through 
introduction of procedures that needed to be followed when selling sensitive 
products of the defence industry. In this way, the government would prevent future 
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deals with states that disregarded the upright principles that the foreign policy of the 
new South Africa was based upon. It can be argued that this statement is true 
because the Mandela administration was aware of the effect that the sale of arms 
would have on its foreign policy and constitution by extension. 
This point IS connected to the observation that production and selling of arms 
products differs in a number of important ways from the sale of other commodities 
of the manufacturing industry. First! y, the products of the defence industry are 
'sensitive' in that they are used for taking human lives in great numbers. Secondly, 
military equipment provides political, security and strategic significance for a state 
since it can be used for deterring an internal or external threat or eventually for the 
legitimate defence of a country and illegitimate attack on or intervention into 
another country. Knowing that arms products have the power to cause much 
damage, the Mandela administration needed to introduce 'moral' standards - in the 
form of new procedures - when selling arms products to other states. 
The numerous case studies in the next chapter will, however, attempt to demonstrate 
that the government did not take those guidelines into consideration as a rule, but 
rather as an exception. In this way, the government's arms sales practice earned 
much criticism at home as well as abroad. 
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7. SOUTH AFRICA'S ARMS SALES 1994 - 1999 
7.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter discussed the post-apartheid South African arms sales policy 
that emerged as a result of the Yemen affair. The chapter also presented the different 
markets in which the arms trade takes place, such as the black and grey markets. The 
chapter showed that the apartheid arms sales policies could no longer be applied by 
the democratic government, hence, a new policy had to be enacted that would reflect 
the ideals and vision of the new government. This new policy had to be in 
conformity with the official universalist foreign policy of the Mandela government 
and constitution by extension. 
As demonstrated in chapter 4, the Mandela government ran into problems when 
trying to implement its official foreign policy. The same was true for the arms sales 
policy since the actions of the government were continuously in breach of its foreign 
policy principles. Arms were sold to countries that were on Pretoria's list of 
censured states, which meant that the arms exports to those countries should not 
have taken place. In addition, arms that were sold fell into the restricted categories 
of arms that could not be sold at all.91 This chapter thus analyses South Africa's 
91 In this regard, South African government's classification of armaments falls into five separate 
categories: Category A comprises Sensitive Major Significant Equipment (SMSE), which include 
conventional weapon systems such as artillery, bombs, and grenades and armoured fighting 
vehicles. Category B comprises Sensitive Significant Equipment (SSE); all assault rifles, machine 
guns, pistols and other related small arms and ammunition would fall in this category. Category C 
comprises Non-Sensitive Equipment (NSE), which is used in support of combat operations. These 
include meteorological stations, radio equipment, support vehicles, radars and recovery equipment. 
Category D comprises Non-Lethal Equipment (NLE) that is limited to mine-detecting equipment, 
and all non-lethal pyrotechnical and riot control products. The last Category E comprises the Not-
for-Sale (NFS) defence related items, such as anti-personnel land mines. The SMSE, SSE and NFS 
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arms sales in practice with a view to examining the extent to which they conformed 
to the stated policy of the government. 
7.2 Post Apartheid South Africa's Arms Sales 
After the Yemen debacle, which brought about a new South African arms sales 
policy, South Africa refused to sell weaponry on human rights grounds on several 
occasions. For example, it imposed an arms embargo on Nigeria with effect from the 
2 November 1995, following embargos put in place by the European Union (EU) 
and United States.92 
In line with its own policy but provoking protests from the Kenyan government, 
South Africa refused to supply riot equipment to the Kenyan police (Onyango, 
1997). South Africa's position was in line with its foreign policy of promoting 
democracy and transparency in Africa - a major issue at the time in Kenya. Pretoria 
also claimed to have resisted pressure from Sudan to provide maintenance for South 
African helicopters previously supplied to that country's abusive government by the 
apartheid regime.9) Sudan at the time was known to be a perennial abuser of human 
rights and non-democratic performer, and Pretoria's acceptance to sell arms to 
Khartoum would be seen as supporting the Sudanese regime. 
types of armaments thus possess lethal capabilities because of their ability to destroy human life 
while the rest are non-lethal armaments. 
92 According to NCACC chair Kader Asmal, interviewed on SAFM 15 November 1995, as reported 
by BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 17 November 1995. The EU and US had already imposed 
restrictions on arms sales to Nigeria, following the November 1993 coup that put General Abacha in 
power; these restrictions were strengthened following the 30 October 1995, sentencing and 10 
November 1995 execution of Ken Saro Wiwa and eight other members of the Movement for the 
Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP). 
93 Human Rights Watch interview with Ronnie Kasrils, Pretoria, January 31, 1999. 
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In addition, following the October 1999 military coup in Pakistan, and the country's 
subsequent suspension from the Commonwealth, South Africa announced that it 
would suspend arms sales in order to put pressure on the military regime in Pakistan 
to democratise and uphold fundamental human rights. Despite these efforts, South 
Africa later allowed delivery of arms sold under previously-negotiated contracts. 
Zimbabwe complained in mid-2000 that it had not been able to purchase tear-gas 
from South Africa earlier that year, and South African officials reportedly attributed 
the denial for export to civil unrest in Zimbabwe at the time (SAPA, 2000). This 
position was rightly taken by Pretoria in defending its policy of promoting and 
defending democracy. 
Despite these instances in which human rights in arms sales policy were observed, 
there have been numerous controversial decisions to allow the official export of 
South African arms to governments engaging in repression against their own people, 
or to countries involved in civil wars. In December 1999, the non-governmental 
Commonwealth Ruman Rights Initiative (CRRI) reported that five of the top ten 
destinations for South African arms exports between 1996 and 1998 included 
Algeria, Colombia, Congo-Brazzaville, India and Pakistan, countries that had 
experienced some form of conflict (both inter-state and intra-state), undemocratic 
and authoritarian regimes, and poor human rights records (Stoppard, 1999). Some 
analysts have observed that such controversial arms deals made Pretoria an 
irresponsible arms trader (Batchelor, 1999 and Economists for Arms Reduction). 
For example, Pretoria's plan to sell arms to Syria in 1997 (The Economist, 1997: 44) 
was in contravention of its arms sales policy. Firstly, this contravened South 
Africa's arms sales policy to states not upholding human rights; secondly, selling 
arms to Damascus meant escalating the arms race and contributing to the already 
potent instability in the Middle East. As one analyst has noted, "Syria is the country 
most likely to go to war with Israel" (Battersby, 1999:253). Furthermore, the regime 
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in Syria is a dictatorship that has operated under a state of emergency since 1963 
(Nathan, 1997). Even though it can be argued that Pretoria was creating a type of 
balance of power in the region, counteracting Israel's enormous arms supplies from 
the United States, this sale was nevertheless illegitimate. In order to understand why 
South Africa went ahead with the sale and violated its foreign and arms sales policy 
in the process, one has to observe the ANC's past relationship with Damascus. Syria 
had supported the ANC during the apartheid era and this South Africa's decision to 
sell arms can be viewed as returning a favour to a friend in need. In addition, the 
threat faced by Syria in relation to Israel compelled Pretoria to sell arms to 
Damascus. 
South Africa's arms deals with abusive governments and countries in conflict have 
fed the perception, domestically and internationally, that the ANC government's 
foreign policy is haphazard and that South Africa has failed to become a restrained 
and responsible arms trader. In addition, it appears that the Mandela administration 
decided that maintaining jobs in the arms industry and other economic 
considerations were more important than the government's stated commitment to 
human rights principles (Human Rights Watch, 2000). 
To illustrate to what extent South Africa violated its arms sales policy, foreign 
policy and constitution by extension, several case studies are presented below. 
7.2.1. Algeria 
In December 1991 the Armed Forces annulled the democratic elections in this 
country and took control of the government. As a result, political violence soared. 
The Islamic Salvation Front (FrS), the winners of the elections, resorted to an armed 
struggle to pursue their grievances. Consequently, this low intensity civil war 
escalated with the mass killings of civilians. Thus, all opposition groups, the Islamic 
Salvation Army (AIS) - armed wing of the FrS, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) , 
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the Islamic Front for Armed Jihad (Fida) and the Movement for an Islamic State 
(MEl) have been accused of attacking civilian populations. The government has also 
been accused of employing small militia groups to carry out attacks on civilians in 
order to discredit the Islamist opposition. 
There have been suggestions that the Algerian armed forces allowed atrocities to 
take place in order to turn the population against the Islamist opposition (Shelton, 
1998). Observers estimate that roughly 100 000 people were killed between 1992 
and 1998 (Lambrechts, 1998:7). In other words the Algerian armed forces did not 
take into consideration or care about the lives and wellbeing of Algerian citizens but 
were more concerned about getting domestic support over the Islamist opposition 
who enjoyed the popularity of the masses and had seemingly won the elections that 
had been nullified by the army. 
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute - SIPRI (2001), 
South Africa supplied Algeria with 10 Seeker Unmanned Air Vehicle systems in 
1997. The 1997 deal reportedly concerned 'Seeker remote-piloted vehicles,'94 a 
pilotless plane with state-of-the-art surveillance equipment, and possibly Rooivalk 
attack helicopters (Kirby, 1998).95 Minister Asmal stated in Parliament that the 
weapons included sensitive, major-significant equipment and non-sensitive 
equipment, and that Cabinet had stipulated that the weapons should be used only for 
external self-defence and not for internal repression. The Algerian government 
declared that the Seekers would be used only to patrol its borders and oil pipeline 
network. 
94 According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), South Africa sold 10 
Seeker vehicles to Algeria in 1998 (SIPRI, 2001). 
95 Denel was invited to demonstrate the Rooivalk helicopter to the Algerian government in October 
1997 (Denel (Pty) Ltd media statement, October 17,1997). 
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• The total weapons sold to Algeria by Pretoria in 1998 alone were worth 84.9 
million rands (15.2 million US dollars). 
• A further 173 million rand arms package followed in 1999. 
• By 1999, Algeria had purchased 1 584000 rands (288 000 US dollars) worth 
of non-sensitive equipment from South Africa (included upgrade packages 
for Mi-17 military helicopters and Mi-24 attack helicopters in Algeria's 
arsenals) (Batchelor, 1999 and Directorate of Conventional Arms Control, 
1999). 
It is important to note that the above sales went ahead despite the international 
outcry and inquiry about human rights abuses in Algeria. (Human Rights Watch, 
2000). The announcement of the 1999 sale came on the day the Algerian 
government rejected calls from several human rights organizations for an 
international inquiry on the human rights abuses in Algeria. The South African 
government's endorsement of the NCACC decision was on condition that the 
weapons would be used only for self-defence from external influences and not for 
internal law enforcement (The Star, March 18, 1998:5). However, the weapons 
package sold to Algeria included Seeker Unmanned Air Vehicle Systems, which 
were ideal for domestic surveillance and policing and unsuited for external 
reconnaissance because their use across borders would violate the sovereignty of 
neighbouring countries. 
7.2.2. Rwanda 
The conflict in Rwanda in the 1990s originates partly in the violence and destruction 
that occurred from 1959 to 1966, when the Hutu overthrew the Tutsi monarchy, 
which had ruled for centuries. At the time, between 20 000 and 100000 Tutsi were 
killed. This violence drove about 150000 Tutsi (Banyarwanda) to Uganda, Burundi, 
Tanzania and Zaire. Similarly, in Uganda, the Banyarwanda and their descendants 
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suffered under Milton Obote and Idi Amin. In the early 1980s around 2 000 of them 
joined a guerrilla movement led by a former Defence Minister, Y oweri Museveni. 96 
Rwanda's tremendous turmoil over the last decade - the most memorable being the 
genocide in 1994 - was preceded by a war launched in October 1990 by Tutsi 
guerrillas of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) against the Hutu-Ied government. 
Although both the government and guerrillas had few resources to purchase 
weapons, their combined 45 000 combatants represented a potential market and 
arms suppliers saw an opportunity in Rwanda (Goose and Smyth, 1994:88).97 
The proliferation of weapons in Rwanda evidently extended the war, displacing over 
one million people. At the same time the flow of arms facilitated the violations of 
international law (where both the army and the RPF were engaged in direct attacks 
on civilians and civilian areas) and human rights abuses. Relief organizations 
estimated that 500 000 people perished in the genocide carnage that began in April 
1994. 
Following a storm of protest over a decision to approve arms sales to Rwanda in 
September 1996 (Block and Swart, 1996),98 the South African government 
suspended the sale of weapons to that country in November 1996 over fears that 
Rwandan forces committing abuses might use South African arms (Williams, 
96 In 1986, Museveni and his men took over the Ugandan government and in 1990, when the 
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) invaded Rwanda from its northern border with Uganda, more than 
half of its forces and most of its officers were drawn from the Ugandan army. 
97 By this time an arms race was under way, where more than a dozen states helped fuel the war. At 
the same time, both sides seem to have purchased a colossal volume of weapons, to the extent that 
the Rwandan government admitted to having been bankrupted in striving to pay for these weapons 
(Goose and Smyth, 1994: 89). 
98 According to SIPRI (2001), South Africa sold to Rwanda 20 RG-31 Nyala anti-personnel carriers 
in 1996 in a deal that was worth 18 million US dollars and included small arms. 
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1996)99 both within Rwanda and in cross-border raids into the Democratic Republic 
of Congo (DRC) (formerly Zaire). In July 1997, the NCACC did a volte-face and 
gave the go-ahead for arms transfers despite eruption of fighting in western Rwanda 
and the involvement of Rwandan troops in a series of atrocities within Rwanda and 
in the former Zaire, in which Rwanda intervened in late 1996 (Human Rights 
Watch,2000). 
In response to the increased attacks by armed opposition groups believed to have 
been allied to the former Rwandan army and the interahamwe militia, the Rwandan 
Patriotic Army (RPA) mounted large-scale military operations, especially in the 
north-west part of the country, where many unarmed civilians lost their lives. Many 
of the victims were refugees who had returned to Rwanda at the end of 1996 after 
fleeing attacks on refugee camps in the eastern parts of the Democratic Republic of 
Congo. 100 
Despite Rwanda being involved in both intra-state and inter-state conflict, Pretoria 
went ahead with the sale of arms to Rwanda. Amnesty International has asserted that 
South Africa was Rwanda's largest arms supplier (Edmunds, 1997). And since the 
Rwandan army had been reportedly involved in 6 000 deaths in 1997 alone 
(Amnesty International, 1998),101 the Human Rights Watch in its October 2000 
report (IRIN, 2000) suggested that: 
99 The Deputy Foreign Minister Aziz Pahad had declared that South Africa would refrain from 
selling arms to Rwanda until peace and stability returned to the region. At that time this deal worth 
18.5 million US dollars was suspended, a number of armoured vehicles had already been provided 
to the Rwandan government. The UN arms embargo against Rwanda had been lifted on I 
September 1996. 
100 See Amnesty International Report of, 1997 for more details. 
101 Kader Asmal, head of the NCACC, described the equipment to be exported as "non-lethal" and 
"non-sensiti ve," but added that, "in the future, South Africa will be prepared to consider supplies 
which fall in the higher, lethal categories subject to the observance of assurances such as those 
publicly given by the Vice-President of Rwanda that " ... South African-supplied weapons would 
not be used outside Rwandan territory" (Zavis, 1997). 
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" ... South Africa's choice of some of its arms customers has revealed a gap 
between the principles professed by the NCACC and the practice which appears 
to be based more on considerations of realpolitik and economics" ." 
The report added that in 1998, South Africa again furnished arms to Rwanda and 
Uganda, this time worth over 21 million rands (3.8 million US dollars).102 
Huge protests from national and international human rights organizations, including 
Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, accompanied this reversal of 
policy. Faced with mounting criticism, the government justified the sale by 
declaring that a void would have been more dangerous to security in the region, that 
Rwanda was a legitimate and internationally recognized government, and that South 
Africa's ultimate goal in the Great Lakes region was complete demilitarization. 103 
However, it remains to be explained why South Africa decided to provide weapons 
not only to Rwanda, but also to Uganda and the Republic of Congo in 1997 in the 
face of compelling evidence of grave human rights abuses and persistent instability. 
In 1997, the value of sales to all three countries totalled over 56 million rands (12.2 
million US dollars) . 104 
102 Directorate of Conventional Arms Control, "South African Export Statistics for Conventional 
Arms: 1997-1999." In 1998 South Africa sold weapons worth nearly 19.6 million rands (3.6 million 
US dollars) to Rwanda and worth 1.5 million rands (273,000 US dollars) to Uganda. 
103 Human Rights Watch interviews with Kader Asmal, Pretoria, October 28, 1996, and Cape Town, 
February 3, 1999. 
104 Directorate of Conventional Arms Control, "South African Export Statistics for Conventional 
Arms: 1997-1999." Asma1 stated in April 1997 that South Africa had a guarantee from Uganda that 
the weapons sold would not be channelled across the border to rebels in Zaire (SAPA, April 24, 
1997). 
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7.2.3. Kuwait 
Human rights abuses in Kuwait, especially in the post-liberation period have been 
rampant and mostly perpetuated by the Kuwaiti regime. For example, Kuwait has 
laws that discriminate against women both in public and private life. This is evident 
in the so-called 'honour crimes' where men kill female relatives for infidelity or 
indecency and get a three year jail sentence. In addition, women are banned from 
voting or standing for elections and they cannot contract their own marriage or get a 
divorce. To make matters more serious, in November 1999, the National Assembly 
voted against women's suffrage. 
Following the liberation of Kuwait from Iraqi occupation III 1991, the drive to 
avenge the horrors of the Iraqi occupation ushered in a new wave of human rights 
abuses by the Kuwaiti regime. Despite calls to defend human rights in rallying 
support for the war against Iraq, the reinstated Kuwaiti government did not change 
its position on the question of human rights and continued to use violence. 
Some of the methods used in this retaliation were murder, torture, arbitrary 
detention, and unlawful deportation. The ploy was a government-inspired pursuit to 
root out those who had collaborated with the Iraqi occupiers and to restructure 
Kuwaiti society in a fashion that was deemed more reliable politically. The victims, 
almost uniformly long-term residents of Kuwait, were principally Palestinians, 
Iraqis, and the stateless Arabs known as 'Bedoons', who have been victims of 
human rights abuses as a result of their statelessness (Human Rights Watch, 
1995).105 
105 Kuwait also practises institutionalized discrimination against its residents known as 'Bedoons', 
forming about one third of Kuwait's population. Even though they have been long-time inhabitants 
of Kuwait, they have been denied Kuwaiti citizenship and are now being rendered stateless. Barred 
from employment, denied education for their children, restricted in their movements, and living 
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In addition to the human rights question in Kuwait, there is a tension between 
Kuwait and Iran, which is based on Kuwait's nervousness about Iran's naval 
defence build-up in the region. In this way, Iran perceives Kuwait's co-operation 
with the West as a way of interfering with the objectives of Islam in the Middle 
East. 106 
Despite these many internal and external problems facing Kuwait, South Africa sold 
arms to the Kuwaiti government that contributed to the escalation of regional 
conflict. In 1997, South Africa sold armaments to Kuwait worth 5.9 million rands of 
which 95 percent were weapons having major destructive capabilities (weapon 
systems that can cause high casualties or major damage). This was clearly a 
violation of Pretoria's arms sales policy. The resultant sale would arguably tend to 
heighten the tension and hostility already existing in the Middle East. In this case, 
South Africa did not take Kuwait's poor record of human rights and regional 
relations into consideration when agreeing to the sale. 
7.2.4. Colombia 
On 8 November 1992, Colombian President Cesar Gaviria Trujillo adopted a string 
of emergency decrees limiting civil liberties, granting additional powers to the 
military, and punishing any contact or dialogue with insurgent groups. The 
declaration marked a reversion to authoritarian rule supposedly left behind with the 
under the constant threat of arbitrary arrest and deportation, Bedoons are a community of have-nots 
in one of the wealthiest countries of the world. At the same time, tens of thousands of Bedoons, 
who fled Kuwait during the Iraqi occupation, have been barred from returning to their country 
(HRW, 1995). 
106 Tension has been an exacerbated, especially since 1994, when Kuwait signed an agreement with 
the US to build an American army base 40 Ian south of Kuwait City, which included the positioning 
of military equipment in northern Kuwait. Under this agreement, the US would defend Kuwait from 
external aggression as well as provide military and technical assistance in the event of an attack. 
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passage of the 1991 Constitution. And despite the adoption of emergency measures, 
the government failed to win a decisive upper hand in the thirty-year war against 
Colombia's 7 000 guerrillas. 
Colombia is Latin America' s leading recipient of US military aid, and in the past has 
appeared to provide counter-narcotics measures. However, the armed forces' 
priorities still remain centred around counter-insurgency tactics. Here, the focus of 
the military has been on the establishment of three Mobile Brigades, and 
deployment of elite units of trained soldiers who operate in areas of great insurgent 
activity. In the process of instilling peace and stability, however, these units have 
reportedly been implicated in a shocking number of abuses, including extra-judicial 
executions, disappearances, rapes, torture, the wanton burning of houses, crops, and 
food, arbitrary bombings, beatings and death threats. 
For their part, guerrilla forces have engaged in an alarming number of violations of 
international humanitarian law, including the killing and torture of captured security 
force officers, attacks on civilian targets, and the destruction of the environment by 
repeated bombings of oil pipelines, which have put the civilian population in grave 
danger. The determination of the guerrillas to demonstrate their strength and the 
government's equal determination to incapacitate the insurgents is believed to 
prolong the stalemate characterizing Latin America's longest-running war and 
increase the suffering of those civilians caught in the cross-fire (Human Rights 
Watch, 1993). 
According to the NCACC, Colombia has no arms restrictions. In other words, South 
Africa can sell arms to Columbia, but doing so brings serious implications. 
Colombia's history of intra-state conflict over the past few decades both with rebel 
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groups in the highland forests of Colombia as well as the drug cartels 107 would call 
for an opposite stand. 
In 1997, South Africa sold 71.2 million rands worth of armaments to Colombia, 90 
percent of which were from Category A: Sensitive Major Significant Equipment 
(SMSE). Further, between 1996 and 1998 Pretoria sold arms to Colombia worth 
144.6 million rands (Khanyile, 2000:28-30 and Mills, 1997).108 South Africa's 
agreement to sell arms to Colombia - a country undergoing intra-state conflict and 
committing human rights abuses - was a clear violation of Pretoria's arms sales 
policy. 
7.2.5. Israel 
Israel is a country situated in an extremely complex and hostile region. Currently, 
Israel is undergoing a ten year defence modernization programme, which includes 
new fighter aircraft, attack and transport helicopters, the upgrading of naval forces 
and the provision of a variety of US armaments and high tech sub-systems. The 
modernization plan called Israel Defence Forces Beyond 2000 is based on an annual 
US aid grant of 1.8 billion US dollars.I09 
107 Colombia is the world's largest producer of cocaine. The Medellin and Cali cartels are the 
biggest and most powerful and pose an enormous threat to peace in Colombia. 
108 According to SIPRI, South Africa sold to Colombia 4 Anti-Personnel Carriers in 1996. These 
were the RG-31 Nya1a type (SIPRI, 2001). South Africa's arms sales to Colombia in 1997 included 
approximately 60 million rands (13 million US dollars) in sensitive major significant equipment, 10 
million rands (2.2 million US dollars) in sensitive significant equipment, and 2 million rands 
(434,000 US dollars) in non-lethal equipment. In 1998, these categories represented 21 million 
rands (3.8 million US dollars), 14 million rands (2.6 million US dollars), and 10 million rands (1.8 
million US dollars) in sales respectively, in addition to 14,000 rands (2550 US dollars) in non-
sensitive equipment. The year 1999 saw South Africa sell Colombia nearly 22 million rands (3.6 
million US dollars) in sensitive major significant equipment, 7 million rands (I.I million US 
dollars) in sensitive significant equipment, and 160,000 rands (26,000 US dollars) in non-lethal 
equipment. Directorate of Conventional Arms Control, "South African Export Statistics for 
Conventional Arms: 1997-1999." 
109 This figure has been constant since 1979, when Israel signed a peace treaty with Egypt. 
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It is known that the Middle East is an extremely volatile region, prone to conflicts 
and instability. Since Israel is a non-Muslim state with very close ties with the West, 
there is surrounding tension between Israel and its Muslim neighbours. For example, 
from 1998 the US, Israel and Turkey have held joint exercises in the eastern 
Mediterranean. Iran and Syria subsequently became very uncomfortable with this 
alliance and believed that this partnership was an attempt by the US to encircle them 
(Shelton, 1998). Egypt also warned that the growing co-operation between Turkey 
and Israel would promote the establishment of a counter-alliance. 
Furthermore, following the 1996 election of a right-wing government under 
Benjamin Netanyahu and its rejection of the land-for-peace principle (the foundation 
of the Middle East peace process), tension in the region increased significantly. The 
continued regional diplomatic stalemate and tension in Arab-Israeli relations has led 
some observers to predict the emergence of a new regional war (Shelton, 1998). In 
addition Israel-Syrian relations have suffered severely to the extent that Syria may 
be planning to go into a 'limited war' for changes to occur in the Golan Heights and 
Lebanon (Shelton, 1998). 
Accordingly, national security remains at the top of Israel ' s political agenda. 
Protection of Israeli citizens from suicide bombers and attacks by extremists 
continue to be observed keenly by the Israeli government, whereas the long-term 
threat is perceived to emanate from Iran, Iraq and possibly Algeria. In response, 
Israel has sought ways to neutralize Iran, which is believed to be attempting the 
manufacture of nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic weapons. Israel has 
threatened pre-emptive strikes if Iran or Syria deploys missiles capable of attacking 
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targets in Israel. According to Israeli intelligence, in 1998, Iran was less than two 
years away from developing a ballistic missile capable of reaching Israel. 110 
According to NCACC regulations, Israel has no arms restrictions (category I). With 
these problems and complex arrangements in the Middle East, and in view of the 
'arms race' in the region, Israel is not a country that should be receiving any kind of 
weapons from South Africa. This is because Jerusalem is in a state of war with its 
neighbours and domestically with Palestinians who want an autonomous homeland 
within Israel's territory. In 1997, however, Pretoria violated its arms sales policy by 
selling arms worth 30 million rands to Israel (consisting of category B equipment 
worth 26.1 million rands) 11 I (Battersby, 1999: 253). 
7.2.6. India/Pakistan 
The case of arms sales to India 112 is another example showing how Pretoria violated 
its own laws in the search for profit. In 1997, India was South Africa's largest 
recipient of major conventional weapons worth 600 million rands of which 572 
million rands were weapons that could cause significant damage to human life as 
well as physical infrastructure. (Khanyile, 2000: 29). Shelton (1998) has observed 
that the equipment sent to India consisted of G6 artillery systems. India has been 
involved in an inter-state conflict with Pakistan for over half a century over the 
disputed Kashmir region. 
liO According to Shelton, (1998), Syria has deployed a significant missile capability, which poses a 
major threat to Israel. These missiles have ranges that easily reach Israeli territory. 
III South Africa's sale of arms to this country clearly contradicted government arms sales policy 
and the undertaking to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms in the recipient country, 
since it ignores Israel's oppression of the Palestinian people 
(http://www.igd.org.zalProgrammemes/sa_fpalarmstrade.html). 
112 According to SIPRI, in 1998 and 1999, South Africa sold 90 Casspir anti-personnel carriers to 
India. This deal was worth 12 million US dollars and the equipment was destined for army and 
police units in Kashmir (SIPRI, 200 I). 
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Pakistan also purchased conventional arms worth 33.7 million rands from South 
Africa in 1997, of which 26.7 million rands were weapons that cause significant 
damage to human life as well as physical infrastructure (Battersby, 1999:252). Apart 
from the war and ongoing tension with India, Pakistan is not considered a 
democracy because of its failure to undertake democratic reform in spite of 
international pressure. 
Until 2002, before the crisis in Afghanistan and the war on terrorism, General 
Musharaff was considered a political outcast in the eyes of the international 
community because he ran the country dictatorially. For a number of years after he 
had come into power, he refused to call for new elections. Despite Islamabad's 
horrendous human rights and democracy record, between 1996 and 1998 South 
Africa sold 95.2 million rands worth of armaments to Pakistan (Battersby, 
1999:252). 
India and Pakistan were involved in an arms race, which led both states to defy 
international norms and conduct nuclear tests in May 1998, hence raising the spectre 
of a new nuclear arms race. Both states purchased weapons from South Africa that 
the NCACC categorized as consisting of conventional implements of war that cause 
heavy personnel casualties, major damage and destruction to material, structures, 
objects and facilities . These include artillery, bombs and grenades, and armoured 
fighting vehicles (Secretary for Defence, 1996:1-12). 
7.2.7. Saudi Arabia 
In 1997, Saudi Arabia undertook a five-year development plan to modernize its 
armed forces and purchase new weapon systems. In the same year the total Saudi 
defence budget was 40 billion US dollars (33% of the government budget). Analysts 
had predicted that Saudi Arabia' s acquisition of a modernized missile system would 
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set off a new arms race in the Middle East and intensify Iran's resolve to match or 
exceed Saudi capabilities (Shelton, 1998). Saudi officials reiterated in 1998 that the 
missile modernization was intended to deter Iran, which possessed missiles as well 
as chemical and biological weapons. 
In its domestic affairs, the government has been accused of being authoritarian and 
oppressIve on numerous occasions. For example, women were especially 
discriminated against, and may not expose any parts of their bodies in public. 
Likewise, women are not permitted to drive cars and punishments carried out on 
them for adultery or breaches of the laws are particularly severe. At the same time, 
the government and royal family do not allow dissent or opposing views from the 
citizens and therefore, democracy does not exist. 
In 1997, Pretoria, in full knowledge of the above, went ahead with the sale to 
Riyadh of 140,000 rands worth of weaponry classified as Non-Lethal Equipment 
(NLE). These included riot control products, baton rounds and tear gas among other 
equipment. This equipment was to be used within the country - most likely to quell 
dissent and keep a tighter control on Saudi Arabia' s citizens. 
In addition, it has been observed that in July of the same year, South Africa was 
planning to sell R7 billion worth of G6 artillery cannons to Saudi Arabia (Battersby, 
1999:254). This deal was astonishing in light of the fact that Riyadh had an 
appalling human rights record and existed in a highly volatile region that did not 
require further impetus to escalate the existing tensions. 
7.2.8. Republic of Congo 
An Amnesty International Report of 1998 condemned the deliberate and arbitrary 
killing of unarmed civilians and cited other abuses, including indiscriminate shelling 
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of civilian targets, which were perpetrated by government forces and armed 
opposition groups in and around the Congo's capital Brazzaville. 
The organization also received reports that government forces, including President 
Denis Sassou Nguesso's own militia known as Cobras, were deliberately killing 
unarmed civilians suspected of supporting the armed opposition group known as 
Ninjas loyal to former Prime Minister Bernard Kolelas. 
Government forces were also reported to have been using heavy weapons such as 
multiple rocket launchers to shell heavily populated areas believed to be strongholds 
of the Ninjas. There were also reports that the Ninjas targeted unarmed civilians 
suspected to be government supporters. In addition, combatants on both sides were 
allegedly raping women and deliberately wounding civilians. 
Since late August 1998 hundreds of defenceless civilians have been killed in the 
context of fighting between the Ninjas and government forces in the Pool region of 
southern Congo, as well as in Brazzaville. Thousands of people have been forced to 
flee their homes into forests in the Pool region and as many as 15 000 are reported to 
have fled to neighbouring DRC. 
It has been observed that Congo was one of the countries that purchased arms from 
South Africa in the past years since the crisis both within the Congo and the Great 
Lakes began (Batchelor, 1999). 
• Between 1996 and 1997 when the crisis in Congo grew, South Africa sold 
more than 93 million rands worth of weapons to Congo (Batchelor, 1999). 113 
I II In 1996, Congo took delivery of 18 Mamba MK-2 Anti-Personnel Carriers from South Africa 
(SIPRI). 
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• In 1997, Pretoria sold 31.9 million rands worth of armaments to Congo, of 
which 24.5 million rands were weapons Category A as described to by the 
NCACe. 
• The above figures do not include the 107mm multiple rocket launchers sold 
to Congo Brazzaville (worth 61 million rands) shortly before the outbreak of 
hostilities in that country (The Star, 1998: 9). 
• The supply of weapons by Pretoria to Congo continued even after the civil 
war broke out in 1997 (Pech, 1997).114 
7.2.9. Oman 
Oman is an autocratic state where the Sultan retains the ultimate authority on all 
important foreign and domestic issues. The law prohibits criticism of the Sultan in 
any form through the media. The country has no formal democratic political 
institutions, and its citizens do not have freedom to ensure the peaceful change of 
their leaders or their political system. 
Oman has had a poor record with regards to human rights. Human rights abuses 
have included mistreatment of detainees, arbitrary arrest, prolonged detention 
without charge, and the denial of due process of law. The government restricts 
freedom of expression and association and does not ensure full rights for women and 
workers. Oman is one of the countries that still have not ratified the International 
lJ 4 In 1996, South Africa approved the sale of 60 million rands (14 million US dollars) in weapons 
to Congo-Brazzaville. In 1997, after civil war had broken out, it sold a further 32 million rands (7 
million US dollars) of arms, including sensitive major significant equipment valued at 25 million 
rands (5.4 million US dollars). Directorate of Conventional Arms Control, "South African Export 
Statistics for Conventional Arms: 1997-1999." 
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Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) that includes Article 19 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. lIS 
Most women live within the confines of their homes. They continue to face many 
forms of discrimination. Illiteracy among older women hampers their ability to own 
property, participate in the modem sector of the economy, or even inform 
themselves of their rights. Government officials frequently deny women land grants 
or housing loans and prefer to conduct business with a woman's husband or other 
male relative. Women require permission from a male relative to leave the country. 
Prior to 1999, women in Oman could not stand for election and women did not 
participate in public affairs. 
In addition to the above, citizens must obtain permission from the Ministry of the 
Interior to marry foreigners, except nationals of the Gulf Co-operation Council 
(GCC) countries. Marriages in foreign countries, concluded without permission, can 
lead to denial of entry into Oman of the foreign spouse and prevent a legitimate 
child from claiming citizenship rights (Arabic News Com, 2001). 
In addition to all of the above violations of human rights by the Omani regime, 
appropriate government authorities, such as the Sultan Qaboos University, the 
police, or the relevant ministry, must approve public cultural events, including plays, 
concerts, lectures, and seminars. Academic freedom is restricted, particularly 
regarding controversial matters, and politics. 
Despite this situation, Denel concluded a major contract to supply Oman with G6 
artillery systems (Brummer and Morrise, 1995) worth lOA million rands in 1995. 
115 Article 19 states that everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right 
includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information 
and ideas through any media regardless of frontiers. 
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This was clearly a contravention of Pretoria's laws as regards the sale of armaments 
and its foreign policy principles. 
7.2.10. Cameroon/Nigeria 
Cameroon has had an ongoing conflict with Nigeria over the oil fields at their 
borders . Tensions have risen and many have lost lives in this area. Both Cameroon 
and Nigeria have laid claims to the Bakassi Peninsula - a 1000 square kilometre 
(400 sq miles) area located in the Gulf of Guinea that is believed to contain 
significant oil reserves. 1 16 
This dispute was subsequently taken before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
in The Hague. In February 1994, Cameroon took up this issue with the ICJ and 
formal hearings began in March 1998. Even though the matter was presented before 
the ICJ, there were several armed confrontations and clashes between Nigerian and 
Cameroonian forces between 1994 and 1996. Each country also maintained a 
significant army force in the area leading to increased tensions and unnecessary 
deaths. 
According to Khanyile (2000:28), South Africa sold 13.7 million rands worth of 
lethal weapons to Cameroon and a further five million US dollars worth of 
armaments in 1998 (SIPRI, 2001). At about the same time, Cameroon received 
delivery of two MB-326 Impala ground attack fighter planes and one Impala jet 
trainer aircraft (SIPRI, 2001), which means that Pretoria again dishonoured its arms 
sales policy and by extension its foreign policy. 
116 Proven oil reserves are about 400 million barrels 
[ www.aberdeenchamber.co.uklinternati onalJpage.cfm ?pageid=335] . 
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7.2.11. Sierra Leone 
Since 1990 Sierra Leone has undergone a major civil war, which has resulted in 
thousands of deaths. In early February 1999, troops of the Economic Community of 
West African States Cease-fire Monitoring Group CECOMOG) ousted the 
government of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council CAFRC) and the 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) from Freetown. This ended their nine-month 
rule, which was characterized by widespread human rights abuses and a complete 
breakdown of the rule of law. For the past several years a vicious civil war has 
engulfed Sierra Leone, characterized by atrocities against civilians, often committed 
by the RUF, a rebel group formed in 1991 with support from the National Patriotic 
Front of Liberia (NPFL). 
Upon taking power on 25 May 1997, the AFRC suspended the constitution, banned 
political parties and public meetings, and announced rule by military decree. The 
ARFC, created by a group of senior military officers, soon joined forces with the 
RUF. During their joint rule, many judges, lawyers, and police fled the country, 
causing a total collapse of the judicial system. The AFRCIRUF government 
arbitrarily arrested and detained its suspected opponents and critics, including 
students, journalists and human rights advocates, causing thousands to seek asylum 
abroad. 
On 10 March 1998, the Nigerian-led ECOMOG reinstated President Tejan Kabbah-
initially elected in March of 1996 - who subsequently declared a state of emergency. 
After losing political power, the AFRCIRUF alliance engaged in a war of terror 
against civilians, committing widespread and egregious atrocities in an attempt to 
regain power. Between February and June 1998 alone, its members raped, 
deliberately mutilated, or killed thousands of Sierra Leonean civilians. The 
AFRCIRUF abducted men, women and children, probably numbering the thousands, 
for use as combatants, forced labourers, or sexual slaves. In addition to the various 
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forms of physical abuse, innumerable civilians suffered psychological trauma from 
the rebels' choice of tactics and extreme cruelty like the severing of limbs to 
compound the horror of their attacks. 
Furthermore, the Civilian Defense Forces (CDFs), civilian militias who supported 
the Kabbah government, also committed numerous abuses, including indiscriminate 
killings and torture, but on a significantly smaller scale than those carried out by the 
AFRCIRUF. The largest and most powerful of the CDFs, the Kamajors, were 
responsible for the majority of abuses committed by those fighting on behalf of the 
Kabbah government. In addition to killings and torture, Kamajors also obstructed 
humanitarian assistance and extorted money or other payment at roadblocks (Human 
Rights Watch, 1998). 
Despite these and other crimes against humanity taking place in Sierra Leone, South 
Africa sold to Sierra Leone 6 million US dollars worth of lethal weapons at a time 
when the conflict in this country was at its peak in 1995. This sale included the 
delivery of two Mi-17 Hip-H helicopters during the same year (SIPRI, 2001). 
7.2.12. Other Recipients 
After 1994, South African arms were also sold to a number of countries, amongst 
them Indonesia, China, Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Taiwan, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Uganda. None of these 
countries met the requirements to be legitimate recipients of South Africa's weapons 
(Khanyile, 2000). 
In July 1997, Nelson Mandela visited Indonesia, a fellow-member of the Non-
Aligned Movement. We have already described the situation in Indonesia in chapter 
4 and the good relations that Mandela government had with this country. Therefore, 
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it is not surprising that during the visit, the South African president declared that: "If 
it becomes necessary for us to supply arms for external defence to Indonesia, we 
will do so without hesitation" (SAP A, 1997). Responding to questions about the 
human rights record of Indonesia in East Timor, Mandela added that South Africa 
would not take advantage of the two countries' friendship "to say what should be 
done" (Mail & Guardian, 1997; Horta, 1998; Brummer, 1995 and Davis, 1996). 
Subsequently, in 1998 South Africa provided Indonesia with military support 
equipment worth 2,597,000 rands (473,000 US dollars). 
Pretoria also sold arms to the People's Republic of China during the Mandela 
presidency. For example, in 1996 and 1997, South Africa sold 284,000 rands 
(66,500 US dollars) and 8,629,000 rands (1.9 million US dollars) worth of non-
sensitive military equipment to China, a country still under a European Union arms 
embargo imposed after the bloody 1989 crackdown on pro-democracy activists. 117 
These controversial arms sales have not been isolated cases. On the contrary, South 
Africa repeatedly opted to approve arms deals that might have been rejected on 
human rights grounds. Angola's long and brutal war, for example, has been fed in 
part by South African arms purchases by the Angolan government,118 whose forces 
have been responsible for gross and persistent human rights abuses and violations of 
international humanitarian law. 
117 In 1997, it was reported that South Africa was negotiating to sell advanced military technology 
to China in a deal worth about one billion rand (220 million US dollars) (ANC, 1997). 
118 According to SIPRI, South Africa sold three Casspir Anti-Personnel Carriers to Angola in 1995 
(SIPRI, 200 1). Angola was the recipient of South African non-lethal support for 43,000 rands 
(10,000 US dollars) in 1996: sensitive major significant, and sensitive significant equipment 
3,151,000 rands (573,000 US dollars), and 5,794,000 rands (1.1 million US dollars) respectively in 
1998. As noted above, a 1999 sale of sensitive significant equipment worth one million rands 
(163,500 US dollars) comprised armoured vehicles sold to a private mining company. Directorate 
of Conventional Arms Control, "South African Export Statistics for Conventional Arms: 1996-
1998," and "South African Export Statistics for Conventional Arms: 1997-1999." 
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Angola is a country that has been embroiled in civil war since it attained 
independence in 1975. The government under the Movement for the Popular 
Liberation of Angola (MPLA) has been at war with the National Union for the Total 
Independence of Angola (UNITA) rebels since 1975, vying for control of Angola. 
Consequently, millions of Angolans have been killed over the past 28 years and 
millions more displaced or maimed. 
In 1995, South Africa delivered 3 Casspir armoured personnel carriers (APCs) to 
Luanda, and between 1997 and 1998 Pretoria exported seven million US dollars 
worth of weapons to Angola according to the Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute (SIPRI, 2001). By selling this equipment to Angola, Pretoria once 
again was in direct breach of its arms sales policy - selling weapons to a country 
involved in intra-state conflict and with a history of human rights abuse. 
Namibia, Zimbabwe and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), all partners 
of South Africa in the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), were 
involved in the DRC war, as was Burundi. South Africa armed several of the 
participants in the war: Namibia and Zimbabwe, for example, bought South African 
weapons between 1996 and 1998; and Zimbabwe continued to receive 'non-lethal' 
military equipment in 1999. 119 The DRC itself also received South African military 
support equipment weapomy in 1998 worth 1,778,000 rands (324,000 US dollars). 
The deal with the DRC allegedly included five Casspir armoured personnel carriers 
sold in September 1998. 120 The DRC government has been responsible for gross and 
119 Directorate of Conventional Arms Control, "South African Export Statistics for Conventional 
Arms: 1997-1999." 
120 Human Rights Watch interview with an arms trade analyst, Johannesburg, January 30, 1999. 
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widespread violations of human rights and international humanitarian law resulting 
in numerous civilian deaths. 121 
The Republic of China (Taiwan) has been in a state of war with Mainland China 
from 1948, when the communists under Mao Tse Tsung drove away the nationalists 
led by Chiang Kai-Shek. China considers Taiwan a rebel province that should rejoin 
the mainland. Provocation in the guise of military exercises by both sides as well as 
weapon purchases has only heightened tensions. Taiwan on the other hand considers 
itself an independent sovereign state recognized by almost two dozen states around 
the world. In 1997, South Africa sold Taiwan 38.6 million rands worth of arms, of 
which the majority were weapons systems capable of major damage to infrastructure 
and human life. 
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is situated in the heart of the Middle East, which 
means that, like other states in the region, it has also experienced tense relations 
with its neighbours. The UAE has accused Iran of threatening Arab states in the 
Gulf through its rearmament programme (Blanch, 1997:1-2). In 1997, the UAE's 
foreign minister Rashid Abdullah suggested that Iran was stockpiling weapons on its 
land bordering UAE, and in the occupied islands of Abu Musa and the Greater and 
Lesser Tunbs that form part of UAE's territory. The ownership of these islands has 
been under dispute by Iran and the UAE. The UAE foreign minister added that these 
weapons were not 'defensive' but 'offensive' directed against the Emirates and other 
countries in the region (UAE Interact, 2002). 
121 While the total number of civilians killed will never be known, the total for Kinshasa alone was 
probably several hundred. This estimate is based on mUltiple interviews and reports from local and 
international organizations based in Kinshasa. No comprehensive report or breakdowns of the 
number of combatants and civilians killed were available from these organizations (Human Rights 
Watch, "Casualties of War," p. 11). 
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Following the 1991 Gulf War, the UAE launched an extensive defence 
modernization programme. According to the central bank in Abu Dhabi, the UAE 
spends nearly half of total government expenditure on defence. Between 1993 and 
1996, defence spending accounted for 48 percent of Abu Dhabi's total spending (8.7 
billion US dollars on defence preparedness and military system upgrading). As a 
result, Pretoria also sold arms to the UAE in 1997, and in the process, violated its 
own arms sales policy. The arms, worth 16.5 million rands, contained military 
hardware that could cause major significant damage to both human life as well as to 
physical infrastructure (Khanyile, 2000:28). In total, from 1996 to 1998 South 
Africa sold more than 62 million rands worth of weaponry to the UAE (Batchelor, 
1999). 
Uganda has been involved in an ongoing civil war with rebels in the northern part 
of Uganda. The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) led by Joseph Kony has been trying 
to destabilize the Museveni administration for over a decade. The LRA have located 
their bases located mainly in southern Sudan (a strategic position which has also led 
to numerous breaks in relations with Khartoum). They will often conduct cross-
border raids into Uganda and later retreat. This conflict has resulted in mass 
slaughter by both the government and the rebels. For example, the rebels have taken 
to kidnappings, raping women, planned destruction of whole villages as well as 
uncontrolled, rampant killings. The government on the other hand has been accused 
of being heavy-handed when attempting to keep the peace in the northern region, 
and this has led to indiscriminate deaths. 
Furthermore, Uganda was involved in the conflict in the DRC and in Rwanda, when 
its own political house was not in order. Domestically, Uganda does not allow party 
plurality to exist l22 yet it calls itself a democracy. Political parties are in fact illegal, 
122 The ruling National Revolutionary Party, the government and leadership assert it is not a party 
but rather a 'movement' . 
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although individuals may run for a post if he or she desires. Notwithstanding 
Uganda's lack of political integrity, in 1995, Uganda bought two million US dollars 
worth of arms from Pretoria and purchased nine million rands worth of weapons 
categorized as 'Significant Major Sensitive Equipment' in 1997. In 1998, Pretoria 
sold an additional one million US dollars worth of weapons to Kampala. 
7.3. Analysis of the Arms Sales Data 
So what can one make of the above evidence? It appears - quite clearly - that South 
Africa sold arms to states that were not supposed to be recipients of the armaments. 
The recipients of Pretoria's arms were states that were non-democratic, conflict-
ridden or conflict-prone, including those involved in arms races. Yet again, these 
sales suggest, that in the process of approving them, the South African government 
violated its arms sales policy, foreign policy and its constitution by extension. 
To further prove the argument one must examine the issue of weapons sold to 
Algeria. These weapons were classified as sensitive, major-significant equipment, 
however, the arms sales policy criterion stipulates that only non-lethal equipment 
may be sold to Algeria. In addition, Algeria has undergone severe domestic 
upheavals in the last decade. It would seem logical that the sale of such weapons 
would likely heighten the conflict that existed in this already volatile state. 
Still ignoring its policy criterion, South Africa sold arms to Rwanda, Uganda and the 
Republic of Congo between 1997 and 1998 worth over 20 million US dollars. In 
total, Uganda bought nearly four million US dollars worth of arms from Pretoria -
all categorized as 'Significant Major Sensitive Equipment'. These sales were made 
despite compelling evidence of grave human rights abuses and persistent instability 
in the entire Great Lakes region. The war in the region included other states such as 
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Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) as they 
fought over the riches of the DRC. 
In West Africa, Pretoria proceeded to sell over 30 million rands worth of lethal 
weapons to Cameroon that included MB-326 Impala ground attack fighter planes 
and Impala jet trainer aircraft. Similarly, Pretoria sold Sierra Leone 6 million US 
dollars worth of lethal weapons at a time when the conflict in this country was at its 
peak in 1995. This sale included the delivery of two Mi-17 Hip-H helicopters during 
the same year. Both Cameroon and Sierra Leone are in very volatile and unstable 
region that have undergone severe conflicts or are involved in tensions with other 
states. 
In Latin America one can again witness the flawed thinking when forming Pretoria's 
arms sales policy since a country like Colombia had no arms restrictions. Between 
1996 and 1998 South Africa sold 217 million rands worth of armaments to 
Colombia, 90 percent of which were Sensitive Major Significant Equipment 
(SMSE). These sales went ahead despite the civil war and abolition of civil rights in 
Colombia. 
In the Middle East, the Israeli case further underscores the extent to which South 
Africa's arms sales policy was flawed. Moreover, despite the tension, conflict and 
competitive behaviour of the arms race that Israel is involved in, Pretoria violated its 
arms sales policy by selling arms worth 30 million rands to Israel in 1997 even 
though, according to NCACC regulations, Israel was to have no arms restrictions. 
Similarly, Saudi Arabia and Oman - states that have terrible human rights records 
and are oppressive to their citizens - are classified as having no arms restrictions. 
For example it was observed in the press that, in July 1997, South Africa was 
planning to sell R 7 billion worth of G6 artillery cannons to Saudi Arabia and nearly 
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a quarter of that amount to Oman (Battersby, 1999: 251-256; Khanyile, 2000: 24-31 
and Nathan, 1997). 
In that same year, South Africa sold armaments to Kuwait worth 5.9 million rands 
of which 95 percent had major destructive capabilities. Yet the governments 
rendered it fit to have no restrictions placed on Kuwait - all this despite its domestic 
oppression, atrocious human rights record, curbing of information and freedoms 'of 
associations and existence in a highly unstable region. 
Between 1996 and 1998, The United Arab Emirates (UAE) received arms worth 62 
million rands. These were weapons that could cause major significant damage to 
both human life and physical infrastructure. News of this announcement was 
startling because the UAE has a territorial dispute with Iran and moreover, the 
Middle East is still a very volatile region. The last thing to do would be to escalate 
the existing tensions. 
In Asia, although India and Pakistan were restricted to certain arms, in 1997 India 
was South Africa's largest recipient of major conventional weapons worth 600 
million rands of which 572 million rands were weapons that could cause significant 
damage to human life as well as physical infrastructure. Pakistan also purchased 
conventional arms worth 33.7 million rands from South Africa in 1997, of which 
26.7 million rands were weapons that cause significant damage to human life as well 
as physical infrastructure. 
South Africa provided Indonesia with military support equipment worth 2.6 million 
rands in 1998 despite the fact that Suharto' s oppressive regime was in power. 
Likewise, the People's Republic of China took delivery of 2.1 million US dollars 
worth of non-sensitive military equipment between 1997 and 1998. However it is 
important to note that South Africa sold Taiwan 38.6 million rands worth of arms, 
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and the majority were weapons systems capable of major damage to infrastructure 
and human life. Taiwan is in a state of war with Mainland China. 
One of the problems encountered with conducting this 'questionable' business with 
the above-mentioned states was that Pretoria did not take into account the changing 
dynamics in the respective countries. Hence, the government did not modify its 
policies accordingly to suit situations of conflict. 
As the examples of arms sales in this chapter have shown, weapons were sold to 
countries censured by the international community - even though they engaged in 
undemocratic practices, that included massive violations of human rights and 
liberties, killing or persecuting certain parts of the population, involvement in or 
contribution to armed conflicts, and otherwise bringing much suffering to the 
nationals of their countries. It is strange that South African government officials, 
who had been at the receiving end of undemocratic practices for decades, did not 
choose to join the international community in censuring these human-rights abusers. 
Sales to states that are unstable or otherwise involved in armed conflict, obviously 
contravene the very principles featured in South Africa's foreign policy documents, 
which permit sales of weapons for legitimate defence and security purposes - not to 
exacerbate tensions and expand conflict. The case studies clearly document that a 
number of South Africa's arms sales - including those to Algeria, Colombia and 
Congo-Brazzaville - were made to countries with very poor human rights records. It 
must be repeated that this set of arms deals stands in sharp contrast to the clearly 
stated pledge that South Africa would not transfer arms to countries that 
systematically violate or suppress human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
Why then did South Africa sell arms to these states and violated its arms sale policy, 
foreign policy and constitution by extension? We have already discussed the South 
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Africa's economic motivation for the export of arms in chapter 5, but it should be 
noted that in several cases the decisions of the Mandela government could be 
attributed to the historical relationship between these states and the ANC as a 
liberation movement during the apartheid era. 
During that time they have provided political and financial support to the ANC, 
hosted ANC offices and military bases within their territories or supported the ANC 
within multilateral institutions such as the NAM. Moreover, these countries 
constitute some of Pretoria's ardent supporters in the post-apartheid era by providing 
moral and/or financial support. These countries include Algeria, Kuwait, India, 
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Indonesia, Angola, Namibia, 
Zimbabwe, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the Republic of China (Taiwan) 
and Uganda. 
It is obvious, however, that profit-making was the main motivation for the post-
apartheid government since the Mandela government made the arms sales to the 
countries, which did not necessarily have a good historical relationship with the 
ANC during the apartheid era. The Mandela government, despite of its official 
agenda of supporting democratic elected governments, sold arms to these countries, 
most of whom were afflicted by internal strife and bordered by hostile neighbours. 
Amongst the countries that fall within this category are Colombia, Rwanda, Israel, 
Republic of Congo, Oman, Cameroon, People's Republic of China and the United 
Arab Emirates (UAE). 
7.4. Conclusion 
This chapter provided a senes of short case studies, which illustrated the 
discrepancy between South Africa's official policy and actual decisions made in 
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relation to arms sales. These decisions (to sell arms to 'pariah states ') were seen as 
controversial abroad as well as at home since they were made to countries with poor 
human rights records, involved in regional wars or arms races, contributing to 
international instability and endangering world peace and security. It can be argued 
that in the search for new markets to sell its arms, Pretoria contributed to increased 
international insecurity and warfare. 
Thus, the same government that was aligning itself with the promotion of 
democracy, human rights and international peace and security made decisions on a 
case-by-case basis that would indicate an opposite stance. As this chapter has shown 
such decisions were the rule rather than exception. 
In addition to the problems of implementation of South Africa's arms sales policy, 
there is the argument that the policy itself was flawed. At the time the policy list was 
published, some of the countries to which South Africa could sell armaments 
without restriction were the same countries that engaged in human rights violations, 
non-democratic practices, and arms races. These countries included Israel, Kuwait, 
Oman, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, People's Republic of China, Republic 
of China (Taiwan), Colombia and Cyprus. Hence, one can argue that the arms sales 
policy itself contained inherent ambiguities. 
South Africa's new arms sales policy was meant to prevent sales to specific 
countries involved in wars, engaged in human rights abuses, states not complying 
with international arms control agreements and treaties, and contravening South 
Africa's foreign policy objectives as well as endangering regional and international 
peace by increasing their military capabilities, amongst other things. In line with this 
policy, the government also instituted a cabinet committee - the National 
Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC) - that was to regulate the sale of 
arms. This placed considerable constraints on Armscor (initially the sole merchant 
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of weapons), in determining to whom arms could be sold. As already noted in the 
thesis, this new arms sales policy was generally in line with South Africa's new 
foreign policy principles. 
Despite these regulations, South Africa exported armaments to countries restricted 
under NCAAC regulations. For example, it was clear that Pretoria's sale of arms to 
Algeria, Colombia, People's Republic of China, Republic of China (Taiwan), 
Indonesia, Israel, India, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, (to mention just a few 
countries), contravened South Africa's arms sales policy. The result of this 
'decision' was most unfortunate: it has been noted that 57 of the 83 South African 
arms recipients between 1996 and 1999 did not satisfy NCACC criteria (Ceasefue 
Campaign, 2000). 
Had the South African government fully complied with its arms sales policy, its 
decision would probably have created considerable negative impact on the South 
African economy, for example, losses in revenue, increased unemployment, shutting 
down of companies, non-development of technology, not to mention the decrease in 
foreign exchange earnings derived from the export of armaments. In looking at these 
very large cost-benefits, the ANC government perhaps saw an opportunity. Such 
rationalization might, therefore, explain post-apartheid Pretoria' s drive to export 
weapons even though that meant the contravention of its arms sales policy of 1995. 
In reviewing the available figures on the volume of arms sold to 'non-pariah states ' 
between 1994 and 1999 (see Annex 6), one can see that arms were also sold to 
'good' states and that altogether the sales brought in a considerable amount of 
revenue to Pretoria (62 million US dollars). However, this revenue was much less 
compared to the sales made to 'pariah states '. Statistical evidence on both types of 
arms sales thus shows the viability and importance of the defence industry to the 
South African economy. 
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From the exposition in this chapter it becomes obvious"that the Mandela government 
was not implementing its foreign policy when it made decisions on the export of 
South African defence industry's products. However, the Mandela government 
attempted to resolve the tension between its foreign policy principles and national 
interests and manage the apparent ambiguities in its foreign policy in a number of 
ways. For example, Pretoria ceased selling arms to particular states that did not fit 
the bill to be recipients of arms or cancelled contracts to supply weapons. This was 
the case with Turkey after damning reports that Ankara was raiding Kurdish villages 
and killing civilians at random. 
In other cases, the government attempted to convince the public that the sales were 
justified. For example, Rwanda, Congo, India, and Taiwan were described as states 
that needed to defend their territories and sovereignty. This was obviously not true 
since these countries were experiencing severe tensions with their neighbours or 
were already at war. 
In all cases of arms sales to 'pariah states', however, the South African government 
learnt that when it was 'forced' to choose between its national interests and 
universalist principles, it was not possible for the government to uphold these 
universal principles because altruistic, moral behaviour is incompatible with 
following one's national economic interests when selling arms to 'pariah states', as 
the analysis in this thesis has shown. It can be concluded, therefore, that the findings 
in South Africa' s case study of arms sales to 'pariah states' supports the argument 
that economic interests are more crucial for a country than interests rooted in 
ideology and history. 
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8. CONCLUSION 
This thesis set out to discuss the apparent contradiction between universalism and 
realism in South Africa's foreign policy from 1994 to 1999. The basic problem 
appeared to be that a foreign policy based on universalist principles was not viable 
when domestic concerns and the reality of international relations compelled states to 
put their national interests ahead of any other policies that may exist. In this regard, 
the study proposed to argue that the irreconcilability of universalist principles with 
economic national interests gave rise to the ambiguities and contradictions seen in 
South Africa's foreign policy in relation to 'pariah states' . 
In attempting to address the above argument, the study sought to explain the 'logic' 
behind these contradictions. In this regard, the research has attempted to address the 
limitations of prior research by providing rigorous theoretical expositions that had 
been lacking in the literature - with special focus on the issue of pursuing 
universalist principles and economic national interests concurrently in post-
apartheid South African foreign policy. 
In order to provide 'a piece of the puzzle', chapter two looked at possible theoretical 
background, which might explain why these contradictions emerged. The chapter 
examined debates around the three classical theoretical perspectives in international 
relations - realism, rationalism and universalism. The debate showed that realism 
provides a gloomy view of human nature where conflict and power are the rule 
rather than the exception and are inevitable. Rationalism, on the other hand, is 
premised on the assumption that 'reason' is a source of know ledge in itself and that 
the rational side of man always proves stronger than the irrational one in making 
decisions. Universalists, on the other hand, appeal to international morality, in that 
revolutionary consequences require all individuals to work for global harmony with 
other people. They believe in the moral unity of the international society. This unity 
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has a missionary character, which also describes a universalist's desire or duty to 
assimilate international politics into domestic politics. 
The chapter further concluded that even though each perspective has its own more 
or less elaborate explanation as to the essence of international politics, the reality of 
international politics could never be explained by one perspective only. It can also 
be argued that the truth about international politics lies in the debate amongst the 
three perspectives. 
The second chapter also provided an in-depth analysis of the two concepts: 'foreign 
policy' and 'national interest' . The purpose of this analysis was to show how these 
two concepts were closely linked, especially since national interest ultimately leads 
to foreign policy action. In other words, foreign policy action is described as an 
extension and a product of a state's national interest. 
The conclusion of the second chapter was that ' international relations' and 'state 
foreign policy' cannot be explained by one perspective only and that the concept of 
national interest was an elusive one. This reasoning is that the term 'national 
interest' does not refer or confine itself to one particular objective or goal, since 
states pursue a multiplicity of goals. Hence, the chapter laid a firm foundation for 
the analysis of the origins of post-apartheid South African foreign policy. 
Chapter three's investigation of the origins of the new South Africa's foreign policy 
began with a background on the history of the ruling party and its foreign policy. 
The chapter attempted to show that, while the ANC's foreign policy was concretized 
in the four-year period from 1990 to 1994, the creation of that foreign policy began 
as early as the mid-1980s. Since this process was based on universalist ideology of a 
liberation movement, the foreign policy of the new South Africa also reflected that 
ideology. The chapter then proceeded to capture the evolution of the new South 
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Africa's foreign policy from the period when the ANC was mainly operating 
abroad/in exile to 1994. It also examined the history of the ANC and its foreign 
policy, which, as the research pointed out, was highly influenced by the domestic 
situation in South Africa during the apartheid era. 
Chapter three concluded that the principles of the new South African foreign policy 
- which was largely based on universalism - was also largely informed and 
influenced by ANC's history as the liberation movement, which fought for equality 
and non-racial society. At the same time, however, the ANC government was 
influenced by the ideology of liberal democracy - especially since the ANC's 
struggle for legitimacy was also the struggle for democracy and respect for human 
rights. 
Chapter four attempted to show that the Mandela government faced problems in 
implementing its foreign policy based on universalist principles with apparent 
ambiguities emerging in its foreign policy, which encompassed discrepancies in 
foreign policy decision making, having cordial relations with 'pariah states' as well 
as supporting regimes in those states. The government tried to manage these 
ambiguities not by resolving the tension between the official universalist foreign 
policy and national interest (e.g. by the realignment of its foreign policy actions) but 
by defending its 'illegitimate' actions. 
All cases described in this chapter have a common feature - Pretoria found itself 
compromising its foreign policy (universalist foreign policy principles) and the 
constitution by extension. These cases also give us some indication of the many 
factors that influence foreign policy decisions, some of them strong enough to 
induce the decision-maker(s) to deviate from the official or stated foreign policy. 
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Chapter five sought to explain some of the reasons for the ambiguities in South 
Africa's foreign policy. After it came to power, the ANC was compelled to review 
some of the aspects of its universalist foreign policy in order to address South 
Africa's pressing domestic, economic and social concerns. In this regard, the 
government had to focus on some of its vital industries that could create the 
necessary foreign exchange and employment among other things. One such industry 
was the defence industry, which was a crucial part of Pretoria's national interest that 
further influenced South Africa's foreign policy with regards to the issue of arms 
sales to the so called 'pariah states' . 
Therefore, the aim of chapter five was to show that the defence industry was central 
to the South African economy. By the time apartheid was effectively implemented, 
Pretoria had a fully operational defence industry that involved innovation, assembly 
and modifications of defence products. This was possible due to the fact that South 
Africa managed to get a considerable amount of assistance from Western countries 
in the form of direct funding, importation of spare parts, and acquisition of 
production licences, all of which facilitated the development of its defence industry. 
The chapter also demonstrated that by the early 1990s, Pretoria had established a 
huge defence industry whose exportation of arms contributed significantly to the 
GDP and ultimately continues to play a major part in the creation of foreign 
exchange for the economy 
However, despite the embargoes and budget cuts during the apartheid period and 
after 1994 respectively, the defence industry was still an economic asset and remains 
so today - both in terms of the creation of foreign exchange for the economy and for 
creating employment. For example, the defence industry employed 70 000 people in 
1994, 15 000 of whom depended on exports, and this number was reduced to 50 000 
by 1996. Despite the slight drop in the number of employees, the importance of the 
defence industry for the South African economy remained high. Moreover, there are 
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some 700-800 companies involved in the defence industry, which still employ a 
considerable number of people. In addition, the data on defence industry sales and 
exports shows that from 1992 to 1998 sales increased. By 1997, weapons had 
become South Africa's second largest manufactured export. 
A country that, in 1996, had 57% of its population living in poverty and a 36% rate 
of unemployment could only benefit from a developing and well-functioning 
industry that showed constant growth in production, sales and exports. 
Thus, the chapter was able to conclude that, in considering the economic and social 
concerns faced by the government, concern for domestic factors constituted at least 
some of the basic tenets that would determine the new South Africa's foreign policy. 
Accordingly, one can argue that South Africa's foreign policy under Mandela was 
mainly influenced by its domestic factors; and further, that a country's domestic 
political and economic environment can greatly influence a country's foreign policy. 
It would seem, therefore, that the democratic regime was not about to abandon the 
defence sector because of its centrality to the economy. And since the Mandela 
government would continue to rely on the proceeds of the defence industry in order 
to solve or deal with domestic pressures. In this way, the government would have to 
introduce a viable arms sales policy. Such a policy would have to be enacted in 
order to make arms trafficking more transparent and legitimate with the demise of 
apartheid. 
In view of the above, chapter six looked at South Africa's arms sales policy. It 
began with an analysis of the two major markets where arms trading took place, 
during and after the apartheid era. In addition, a review of the apartheid arms sales 
policy was conducted in order to show the development of South Africa's arms sales 
policies. The chapter then proceeded to discuss how post-apartheid arms sales policy 
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came into being, by sharing some of the recommendations and submissions that 
were made to a committee entrusted with the creation of a new arms sales policy in 
post-apartheid South Africa. 
This chapter demonstrated that the black and grey markets played a crucial role in 
the procurement of arms - which states such as South Africa took part in, both 
during and after the apartheid era. Because of the sensitive nature of the defence 
industry' s line of work, the sale and export of defence industry products are often 
secretive - and in many cases, even controversial. Thus states frequently use grey or 
black markets to avoid potential controversy or public censure. In this way, the 
apartheid regime was able to sell its defence industry's products in the face of a 
prominent UN arms embargo. The transactions were done in secrecy and often 
conducted through middlemen and/or third-party countries at least until 1982, when 
Armscor entered the global market. Hence, a viable and more transparent arms sales 
policy was needed for accountability purposes. 
Chapter six also attempted to discuss how post-apartheid South Africa's arms sales 
policy was to be crafted. A review of the apartheid arms sales policy showed that the 
development of South Africa's arms sales policy ultimately led to the creation of 
post-apartheid South Africa's arms sales policy. The major purpose of the new post-
apartheid arms sales policy was to enable the country to have a transparent and 
legitimate arms sales policy. This was quite a move from the secrecy that 
enshrouded past policies. The need for transparency was especially acute following 
the case of the Yemeni debacle, which raised questions about 'good' governance, 
and the effectiveness of Pretoria's past arms sales policies. Hence the conclusion of 
this chapter was that the purpose of Pretoria - in initiating a new viable arms sales 
policy - was to create a transparent arms sales policy based on consideration for 
human rights, international/regional peace and security, South Africa's interests, a 
recipient country's legitimate defence needs, and so on. 
196 
After 1994, the past arms sales policies (of the apartheid regime) could no longer be 
applied, hence, a policy had to be enacted especially after the Yemen affair that 
would reflect the ideals and vision of the new government. This new policy had to 
be one that would be in conformity with the official universalist foreign policy of 
the Mandela government and constitution by extension. 
The policy actions of the government, however, appeared to suggest that the 
decisions taken to sell weapons to countries that had earned Pretoria's censure, were 
not in conformity with the universalist foreign policy of the Mandela government. 
Chapter seven thus looked at practical issues around the arms sales in order to 
examine the extent to which the sales conformed to the stated policy of the 
government. This chapter provided a series of short case studies, which consistently 
illustrated the discrepancy between South Africa's official policy and actual 
decisions made in relation to arms sales. These decisions (i.e., to sell arms to 'pariah 
states ') were seen as controversial abroad as well as at home since they were made 
to countries with poor human rights records, involved in regional wars or arms 
races, contributing to international instability and endangering world peace and 
security. It can be argued that, in the search for new markets to sell its arms, Pretoria 
contributed to increased international insecurity and warfare. 
Thus, while Pretoria was aligning itself with the promotion of democracy, human 
rights and international peace and security, it made decisions on a case-by-case basis 
that would indicate an opposite stance. This chapter showed that such decisions 
were the rule rather than exception. In addition to the problems of implementation of 
South Africa's arms sales policy, it was observed that the new arms sales policy 
itself was flawed. Some of the countries to which South Africa could sell armaments 
with no restrictions, were the very countries that engaged in human rights violations, 
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non-democratic practices, and competitive arms race behaviour at the time the 
policy list was published. 
The country case study research on sales to so-called 'pariah states' included Israel, 
Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, People's Republic of China, 
Republic of China (Taiwan), Colombia and Cyprus. It was found that 57 out of 83 
South Africa's arms recipients between 1996 and 1999 did not meet the National 
Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC) criteria. For this reason, this 
thesis argues that the arms sales policy itself contained inherent ambiguities that 
created a type of 'permission' or space to bend rules. From the exposition in this 
chapter it became quite clear that the Mandela government was not implementing its 
foreign policy when it made decisions on the export of South African defence 
industry'S products to 'pariah states'. These actions as a consequence led to the 
contradictions in post-apartheid South African foreign policy. 
Pretoria' s position is explainable in that short-term interests come about as a result 
of necessity or expediency and take priority over long-term interests (aspirations). In 
other words, since the economic concerns of Mandela' s government compelled it to 
maintain the defence industry production and exports in the shrinking post-Cold 
War global arms market, this economic interest overrode its universalist interests 
that originated in the new government' s ideology and past anti-apartheid struggle. In 
this way 'aspirations' were put on hold to address the more immediate needs of the 
new government. 
If one analyses this apparent contradiction between the official arms sales policy and 
the deals made in practice, one can come to the same conclusion as Human Rights 
Watch did in 2000 - that South Africa' s arms sales were not based on NCACC 
principles but on considerations of realpolitik and economics. 
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The research subsequently establishes that the Mandela government found itself 
compromising its own foreign policy principles when it concluded dealings with 
'pariah states' - weaponry that was needed to keep those regimes in power. Whether 
ambiguous foreign policy principles caused this outcome, or disrespect for foreign 
policy principle caused the ambiguity - is difficult to surmise. The study nonetheless 
argues that the result of going against set foreign policy principles and arms sales 
policy criterion rendered Pretoria's foreign policy ambiguous in both instances. An 
analysis of South Africa's foreign policy from 1994 to 1999 therefore displays these 
ambiguities especially in the implementation of foreign policy, which was the result 
of the government's 'faulty' decision making process that facilitated the sale of arms 
to the so called 'pariah states' to take place. 
This study has therefore provided strong evidence in support of the mam 
argument that South Africa's problems with the implementation of a principled 
foreign policy based on universalist values, came from its own moral conflict -
pursuing its economic and national interests by engaging into relations with 
states that did not share South Africa's values. In the process, it was 'forced' to 
choose between its national interests and universalist principles since it was not 
possible to uphold these principles in state relations with other states when it 
came to pursuing its economic interests, and - as the case studies show - the 
selling of arms to 'pariah states' . 
It can be concluded that, even though South Africa's foreign policy between 1994 
and 1999 appeared full of contradictions, inconsistencies and ambiguities to its 
critics, it was more or less consistent in pursuing its economic national interests 
through the arms sales. Each country case study of arms sales therefore highlights 
how the pursuit of universal values cannot be reconciled with the pursuance of 
economic interests when a state's trade partner disregards the exact universal values 
on which a state's foreign policy is based. 
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In terms of its foreign policy and the principles on which it is based, one can 
conclude that South Africa has basically two options. Firstly, future ambiguities can 
be avoided by redefining the foreign policy principles in such a way that they reflect 
more immediate and 'realist' national interests. Secondly, if Pretoria wants to regain 
its credibility as a defender of human rights and peaceful co-existence among 
nations as well as being a responsible arms seller in the international community, 
then it needs to follow its set foreign policy principles as well as its official arms 
sales policy. 
A distinction should be made, however, between the promotion of human rights and 
ensuring respect for such rights. Promotion of human rights is a broad commitment, 
manifested for example in South Africa's efforts to facilitate a democratic transition 
in some of the countries mentioned in this thesis. A less significant objective might 
be to assist in ensuring observance of basic human rights. Even though the sale of or 
refusal to sell arms is difficult to justify as a means to promote human rights, any 
sale can be guided by whether or not there is respect for human rights in the states 
wishing to purchase arms (Suttner, 1997: 300-301). 
Ultimately, one comes to the question of whether South Africa can afford to be a 
responsible arms dealer and what consequence this would have for the defence 
industry. This is a question that would require further research and analysis. Also 
related to this issue is the question of the economics of arms production, its spin-off 
effects to the rest of the economy. Since many scholars cannot agree on whether a 
defence industry represents an asset or liability for an economy, this issue would 
benefit from further research. 
Another area that requues further research involves the development of arms 
production in the Third World. Since Third World countries are sensitive to trends 
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on global markets, it would be relevant to establish whether the development of an 
arms industry would be beneficial for their industrialization and development of 
manufacturing sectors. Given that Third World states are recipients of arms, the 
issue of arms transfers is a relevant study area as regards the costs and benefits for 
the suppliers and recipients. Here, one must not only think of economic, but also 
strategic and political benefits. 
In addition, the issue of arms transfers is also related to the problem of 
accountability. As the Yemen case has demonstrated, arms can be resold or 
relocated to third parties by either the supplier or recipient. As a result, the problem 
of re-transfers emerges, and the question of the adherence to and enforcement of 
end-user commitments emerges. This is a research area that should be explored 
further, but raises an additional problem: data on arms re-transfers is difficult to 
obtain, since these are often conducted on black and grey markets. 
Finally, the study of South African foreign policy would also benefit from further 
research on the decision-making processes in the Mandela government, as well as 
the present administration. In this way, identification of those responsible for 
decision-making would be possible, which could eventually bring more 
accountability into the decision-making process. 
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ANNEX 1: DIVISIONS AND PRODUCTS OF ARMSCOR DURING 
APARTHEID 
1. Divisions 
SOMCHEM was an Armscor subsidiary and the oldest South African ammunition 
and mining explosives industry, dating back to 1896 when the first dynamite factory 
was established in the Transvaal. In 1924, Ernest Oppenheimer and Lord McGowan 
of Nobel Industries created the African Explosives and Chemical Industries (AECI) 
owned by Britain's Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) and De Beers of South 
Africa. During the Second World War, AECI supplied munitions and propellants to 
Allied forces. In 1962, AECI sold its munitions sector. Consequently, munitions, 
propellants and other military explosives were handed over to Somchem, which was 
created in 1962 as a sub-section of AECI. In 1971, Somchem was incorporated into 
Armscor as a full subsidiary. By the end of the 1980s, Somchem was manufacturing 
a wide range of rockets, propellants and explosives for the SADF (Rand Daily Mail, 
16 October 1981). 
NASCHEM was also an Armscor subsidiary and one of the largest ammunition 
manufacturers in the southern hemisphere. Naschem's Lunz plant, which began 
operating in the late nineteenth century, shared its manufacturing work with the 
Boskop plant (established in 1979) that specialized in base-bleed 155mm 
ammunition for the G-5 howitzer. New technology ammunition was developed here, 
including bunker-breaking munitions and armour-breaking sub-munitions, of which 
some was exported. 
PRETORIA METAL PRESSINGS (PMP) produced 7.7 mm .303 ammunition for 
British Vickers, 7.62 mm ammunition for the Belgian FN rifle, the 5.56mm 
ammunition for the R4 rifle from Israel, 20mm and 30mm ammunition for DEFA 
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552/553 guns from France and the 35mm ammunitions for the Oerlikon anti-aircraft 
guns from Switzerland. The PMP opened a new plant in 1981, which was able to 
manufacture the most sophisticated types of rapid-fire ammunition. 
2. Products of Armscor 
Ammunition and Explosives 
After the 1977 arms embargo, South Africa's offIcial suppliers stopped trading with 
it, and consequently Pretoria's goal was to become self-suffIcient in ammunition 
production. By 1981, Armscor was able to supply the entire ammunition 
requirements of the SADF, of which 141 types of ammunition were produced 
including naval ammunition (The Star, 18 September 1981; The Times, 7 March 
1970). In 1983, local ammunition was tested for the first time for the 76/62 mm 
Italian-supplied Oto-Melara compact guns arming minister-class missile aircraft. By 
1985, the 76 mm naval ammunition was among those items that Armscor exported. 
Grenades 
Grenades were used in the operational area by the SADF infantry units. Only two 
types of explosive grenades were used - a South African and Portuguese 
type/origin. All types of hand-grenades were manufactured locally with technology 
under foreign licence and developed further according to war-fighting requirements. 
The standard hand grenade in South Africa was similar to the US M26 and British 
L2Al. A new South African designed grenade was unveiled in 1983, which was 
capable of killing and injuring with a blast of needle-sharp white-hot fragments. 
Other, older types of anti-personnel rifle grenades were produced in two models -
the South African combination of the US M26 design and the old Mecar design that 
could be fired from 7.62 mm and 5.56 mm rifles. Other South African productions 
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included the US designed 40 mm fragmentation grenade developed for the M-79, 
designed to fill the gap between the maximum range of a hand-thrown grenade and 
minimum range of a platoon mortar. 
In 1985, Armscor launched a 6-shot semi-automatic 40 mm launcher for counter-
insurgency (COIN) and conventional combat, while other developments were the 
single-shot stopper 37 mm grenade launcher and the 75 mm rifle grenade designed 
by Naschem. 
Bombs 
Since 1964, ammunition for all types of mortars and mortar bombs has been 
produced in South Africa. Though original designs were French-licenced, significant 
modifications were introduced to adapt to climatic conditions, for example, the 
South African smoke bombs that use titanium tetrachloride instead of white 
phosphorous. 
Other developments were Pretoria' s re-design of the old limpet bomb that could be 
stuck to any surface, like magnet-operated bombs. In addition, in 1983, a locally 
produced fuse was introduced - the Menlin proximity/impact fuse that could be 
used with any calibre of mortar bomb. 
In 1986, Armscor unveiled details of three new types of bombs developed in South 
Africa. The first one was a 450kg cluster bomb - CB 470 or Alpha MK-2 - that 
was first tested in May and October 1985 on the Mirage F-l fighter. It was designed 
according to the needs that came about in the Angolan war to produce high-density 
uniform fragmentation patterns over a large ground area. The second bomb was a 
120kg shrapnel bomb and the third was a 250kg practice bomb for aircraft use. By 
1985, all these bombs were available for export (Flight International, 15 April 1986: 
10-11). 
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SMALL ARMS 
Rifles 
1. RII7.62mm - In 1961, Pretoria obtained the licence from the Belgian 
Fabrique National (FN) for the NATO standard weapon. Lyttleton 
Engineering Works (LEW) produced over 300 000 units. In South Africa, the 
rifle was designated Rl and replaced the old British Bren and Vickers .303 
type. The South African licence was revoked after 1963 as a result of 
voluntary arms embargo but production continued. 
2. R4/5.56mm - This rifle was a replacement for the Rl but the Israeli Galil 
rifle sufficed eventually since the Rl was not as effective as the AK-47 used 
in Angola and Namibia. Furthermore, the Galil resembled the AK-47. In 
South Africa, the licence produced Galil was designated R4 and offered for 
export in 1979. Between 1985 and 1986, the R4 completely replaced the Rl 
in the SADF (Janes Defence Weekly, 25 February 1984). However, a 
commercial counterpart - the LM4 was produced and sold on the civilian 
market by Armscor subsidiary Musgrave Manufacturers and Distributors. 
3. R5/5.56mm - From 1983, LEW began work on a shorter version of the R4 
to meet SADF standards. This version was called the R5 that was used 
exclusively with the Ratel armoured personnel carrier (APC). It was 
developed to counter the Russian small version of the AK-74. 
Machine Guns 
1. FN 7.62mm and MG4 - The Belgian FN MAG 7.62mm and British 
Browning M1919 A4 were licenced and produced in South Africa from 1960. 
The South African Browning was designated M-G4 and was mainly a vehicle 
mounted machine gun arming the Eland and Ratel armoured vehicles. After 
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extensive modifications, the South African versIOn was rebuilt to fit the 
7.62mm NATO calibre (Defence and Armament No 24, November 1983). 
Consequently, the MG-4 was available in two versions namely the MG-4CA 
co-axial machine gun and the MG-4AA for infantry support. 
2. UZI - Pretoria obtained the licence from Belgium to produce the Israeli Uzi 
sub-machine gun. The Belgian Fabrique National had acquired the licence for 
the Uzi from Israel in 1955. The Uzi was the standard weapon of the SADF 
and although production stopped after the SS-77 was developed, it was still in 
use with the South African Railways Police Task Force until 1985 (Paratus, 
December 1985). 
3. SS-77, which was first presented in 1985, was conceived in 1977 and the 
designers were Smith and Soregi (hence 'SS'). Modifications on the SS-77 
were undertaken to meet SADF specifications. It used the NATO 7.62mm 
cartridge and was designed by Armscor and the Army. New equipment 
related to the machine gun was locally produced in 1985 with a new 
mounting design called the Rattler which could be used for the SS-77, FN 
7.62mm and the MG-4 Browning. The mounting could also be on all 
armoured vehicles, naval vessels and was primarily designed for anti-aircraft 
use. 
4. GI-2/20rnrn (Wick-Fire Cannon), which was purchased under licence in 1974 
to equip the first Ratel armoured cars, was extensively upgraded by Armscor 
and is based on the French F2. After the SADF became dissatisfied with it, 
LEW re-designed certain features of the F2 and in 1985, it was renamed the 
G 12 gun and offered for export. 
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5. GA-1/20mm was a multi-purpose automatic cannon unveiled by Armscor in 
1986. It was based on the Messerschmidt MG-751 of the Second World War 
that included a hydraulic sight. It was mounted on armoured vehicles and 
new generation attack helicopters. 
6. BXP-9 was a parabellum sub-machine gun presented by Armscor in 1984. 
Pistols and Shot Guns 
1. The 9mm MAMBA was an indigenous production while the rest were of 
foreign origin. This specific type of gun was not widely distributed. 
2. STRIKER - In 1985, a company by the name Armsel announced that its 
striker semi-automatic 12-bore shotgun was to be produced for military and 
police use. It was locally designed and produced from 1980 and was mostly 
used as an anti-riot weapon. 
Mortars 
These include the 60mm, 81 mm and 120mm mortars of French Hotchkiss and 
Brandt design. They were used in the SADF and produced under French licences 
locally. After the first batches were imported from France in 1960 and licence-
produced under a 1964 agreement, local manufacture continued even after the 
licences expired. The 60mm mortars from the 1980s were replaced by a locally 
developed version - the M4 series. The M4 60 mm mortar was developed in South 
Africa according to infantry specifications and based on the French M 1. 
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ANNEX 2: ELECTRONIC PRODUCTS OF SOUTH AFRICA'S 
DEFENCE INDUSTRY 
1. COMPUTERS - Amongst South Africa's products was the AS-80 computer 
controlled artillery fire-control system that was offered for export by 
Armscor. The system was produced by ESD and consisted of a 16 bit digital 
mini computer, a terminal unit with a keyboard, printer and visual display 
facilities. 
2. RADAR - The Plessey Electronics Corporation (UK) was the first supplier 
of radios and radar technology to South Africa. Plessey (South Africa) was 
set up in 1963, which in conjunction with CSIR developed a distance-
measuring instrument, the MRAS, for military purposes. This device was 
exported from South Africa to Third World Countries. Plessey also 
developed (through Armscor) the EMVA MK-lOB muzzle velocity radar 
analyser that was produced by Global Chemicals in Capetown (Janes Weapon 
Systems, 1986: 20). 
3. COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT - During the apartheid era, military 
communications was an industry in which Pretoria had developed 
considerable know-how. These included: 
a. frequency-hopping radios, 
b. man-pack and vehicle radio set transmitters, 
c. receivers and transceivers for base station and strategic applications, 
d. airborne, ground-to-air, air/sea and maritime communication systems, 
e. walkie-talkies, line-of-sight equipment, telegraph converters, 
f. antenna systems and field telephones (Armscor, 1984: 1811). 
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In the 1960s, Pretoria began operating its first modem military communication 
network - the Advocaat Telecommunication System - that was contained at the 
Silvermine Control Centre at Simons town Naval Base. This sophisticated C3 centre 
was designed under the Simonstown Agreement with Britain to protect Western 
shipping in the South Atlantic and Indian Ocean. The West German company 
Telefunken supplied this hardware. General Electric Corporation (GEC) equipped 
the South African national communication and telecommunication network, and the 
military Troposcatter C3 Network. 
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ANNEX 3: THE USE OF FOREIGN MILITARY TECHNOLOGY ON SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENCE 
EQUIPMENT AND ARMAMENTS 
THE AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY 
Type 
Impala series 1-3 COIN 
fighter/armed trainer 
Bosbok transport/liaison 
Foreign military technology 
JtalyfUK (MB 326) 
ItalyfUSA (AM-3C) 
C-4m Kudu transportlliaison ItalyfUSA (AM-3C. AL-60) 
Mirage F-l C/ A iet fighter France (Mirage F-1 C/ A) 
Cheetah iet fighter FrancelIsrael (Mirage-3) 
Alpha XH-1 gunship helicopter France (Alouette-3) 
Stage of know-how 
Stage 5: 
From assembly to manufacture (400 
units) 
Programme completed in 1986 
Stage 2: 
Assembly of 40 units from imported 
components 
Programme completed in 1975 
Stage 2: 
Local modification in 1973 (25 units) 
Programme completed in 1976 
Stage 2: 
Assembly of 48 units 
Programme completed in 1977 
Stage 5: 
Local redesign 
Prototype - 1986 
Stage 5: 
Local redesign 
Prototype - 1986 
Method of disimp1ementation 
Licence - 1965 
Sold as 'unarmed trainer' 
Licence - 1971 
Sold as ' light plane' 
Sold as ' light plane' 
Sold for 'external defence' 
Licence - 1971 
Planned local production of 100; stopped 
by embargo 
Unofficial technical co-operation for 
modification of 47 Mirage-3 still in 
service 
Unofficial technical co-operation 
SOURCE: Landgren. Signe (1989) Embargo Disimplemented: South Africa's Military Industry. Oxford: Oxford University Press, P.261 
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THE MISSILE INDUSTRY 
Type 
Cactus surface-ta-air 
Scorpion ship-to-ship 
Kukri air-ta-air 
Exocet ship-to-ship 
ATM anti-tank 
Foreign military technology 
France (Crotale) 
Israel (Gabriel 2) 
FrancelUSAlIsrae1 
(Magic, Sidewinder) 
France (Exocet) 
FrancelFederal Republic of Gennany 
(FRG) 
(Entac, Milan, SS-II) 
Stage of know-how 
Stage 2: 
Assembly 
Stage 2: 
Assembly 
Stage 5: 
Local RDT&E from 1964. Previous V3 
and Whiplash cancelled. 
Kukri redesign - 1980 
In production from 1984 
Stage 5: 
Local redesign 1982 
Under development 
Project unconfirmed 
Stage 5: 
Local redesign - 1984 
Under development 
Project unconfirmed 
Method of disimplementation 
=l 
Licence - 1964 
Developed in France with South Nrican 
financing and South African specifications 
Sold for 'external defence' 
Licence - 1974, 
to arm 12 Reshef patrol boats 
Unofficial technical co-operation with Israel 
Unofficial technical co-operation 
Believed to be based on types in use with 
Army 
SOURCE: Landgren, Signe (1989) Embargo Disimplemented: South Nrica's Mili tary Industry. Oxford: Oxford University Press, P.262 
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ARMOURED VEHICLES 
Type Foreign military technology 
Eland series 1-7 armoured car France (Panhard AML-60/90) 
Ratel series armoured car BelgiumIFRO 
AC- IOO armoured car 
AC-200 armoured car 
(Sibmas) 
BelgiumIFRO 
(Sibmas) 
Belgium!FRO 
(Sibmas) 
Ohfant main battle tank UKlIsrael (Centurion) 
Valkiri multiple rocket Israel 
launcher 
0 -5/0-6 self-prop, long-range Canada/USA/BelgiumlSweden 
howitzer 
Stage of know-how 
Stage 5: 
From assembly to manufacture of 
1600 units 1966-84 
Stage 5: 
Local redesign late 1960s 
1500 units produced 
Programme continued 
Under development in 1986, 
based on Ratel 
Local redesign - 1982 
Stage 5: 
Local redesign of Israeli copy of 
'Stalin organ' - 1980 
10 production 
Stage 5: 
Local adaptation of foreign-
designed concepts 
Production start in 1977 
Method of disimplementation 
Licence - 1963 
Not defined as 'COIN' weapon 
Clandestine acquisition 
Continued use of imported technology 
Unofficial technical co-operation 
Modification of 250 Centurions 
originally imported from UK 
Unofficial technical co-operation 
Developed by Space Research Corp. in 
USNCanada and Belgium according to 
South African specification 
Clandestine acquisition in 1976 
----I 
SOURCE: Landgren, Signe (1989) Embargo Disimplemented: South Africa's Military Industry. Oxford: Oxford University Press, P.263 
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MILITARY TRUCKSfTRANSPORTERS 
Type 
Landrover, jeep 
Trax,jeep 
Sami! series, trucks 
Over 70 variants including: 
Buffel APC 
Bulldog APC 
Rhino troop carrier 
Magnis series, trucks 
Sakom series, light trucks 
Sakom-50 
Casspir series transporter 
HippolRibbok transporter 
Foreign technology 
UK 
FrancelUKfUSA 
FROnsrael 
FRO/Japan 
FRO 
Unkoown 
Unkoown 
Stage of know-bow 
Stage 5: 
From assembly to manufacture 
(1962-1980) (1) 
Stage 5: 
Local design 
In production from 1976 (?) 
Stage 5: 
From assembly to manufacture 
Redesign based on Samil-20, 
Samil-50 and Samil- IOO 
Stage 5: 
In production [rom 1984 
Stage 5: 
Redesign base on Samil-50 -
1982 
Stage 5: 
1972 
Stage 5: 
1976 
Method of disimplementation 
Licence 1961; not defined as 'COIN weapon' 
Licenced engines from Chrysler, Leyland and 
Peugeot; to replace Landrover UK radio 
communication system 
Licence - 1964 
Magirus-DeutzlUnimog 
Reported Isreali-designed armour plate 
Continued use of imported technology 
Merger of Magirus/Nissan technology; to replace 
Samil 
Continued use imported technology 
Reportedly developed in co-operation with Rhodesia 
Reportedly developed in co-operation with Rhodesia 
SOURCE: Landgren, Signe (1989) Embargo Disimplemented: South Africa's Military Industry. Oxford: Oxford University Press, P.264 
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THE WARSHIP INDUSTRY 
Type 
P 1558 large patrol boat 
Flexible torpedo recovery ship 
De Mist tug 
De Neys and De Noorde tugs 
Navigator training ship 
87-tonne rescue launchers 
'Namacurra' -class 5-tonner 
harbour patrol boat 
'Minister of Defence' - class 
missile-armed F AC 
Voortrekker-II ocean racing 
yacht 
Shirley-T .!:elicopter carrier 
Foreign technology 
Unknown 
UK 
UK 
UK 
Unknown 
FRG 
Unknown 
israeilltaly 
Unknown 
Stage of know-how 
Stage 5: 
One unit produced (1974-76) 
Stage 2: 
One unit produced in 1969 
Stage 5: 
One unit produced in 1978 
Stage 5: 
Two units produced in 1961 
and 1969 
Stage 5: 
One unit produced in 1964 
Stage 2: 
Produced in 1961 and 1962 
Stage 5: 
Reported as local design; 
30 units produced in 1979 
Stage 2: 
12 units in production from 
1978 
Stage 5: 
Produced in 1983 
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Method of disimplemeDtaiton 
Armed with Bofors guns 
Built by foreign subsidiary Dorman Long (Africa); 
probably licence 
Built by foreign subsidiary Dorman Long (Africa); 
probably licence 
Built by Globe Engineering Works 
Built by Fred Nicholls 
Probably licence 1961 
FL9AR type built by 
Krogerwerft 
Licence - 1974 
Armed with 010 Melara guns 
In Navy service 
Type 
Tafelberg armed helicopter 
carrier 
Drakensbcrg fleet replenishment 
Foreign technology 
Unknown 
DenmarklIsraeV 
Switzerland 
vessel FRO 
Submarine Type-209 
FRO 
Stage of know-how 
Stage 5: 
Prototype 1982 
Stage I: 
Conversion of aged tanker 
(1983-84) 
Purchased from Denmark in 
1965 
Stage 5: 
One unit produced (1984-86) 
First unit planned in 1992 
Method of disimplementaiton 
Reportedly produced for Israel : Unconfirmed 
Modification of imported civi lian vessel 
Armed with Scorpion missi les and Oerlikon guns 
Announced as the first naval vessel designed and built 
in South Africa 
Clandestine acquisition of blueprints in 1985 
Reported technical aid also from Chile and Turkey 
SOURCE: Landgren, Signe (1989) Embargo Disimplemented: South Africa's Military Industry. Oxford: Oxford University Press, P.26 
215 
ANNEX 4: COMPANIES CONSTITUTING THE SOUTH AFRICAN 
DEFENCE INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION 
1. The Denel and its subsidiaries 
The Denel group is divided into three major sectors namely, Aerospace, Ordnance 
and Commercial sectors. 
AEROSPACE 
~ 
AVI ........ ' ...., 
. ·0'-'"'-
-- -
. . 
-- . .. 
.......... "--
Denel Aviation 
)enei Aviation Military Aircraft 
aintenance, repair, overhaul and production of fixed and rotary wing 
mi Ii tary aircraft. 
l)PS 
Denel Personnel Solutions (Pty) Limited provides, in addition to labour 
brokerage, labour-related services, including among others, payroll 
bureau, security services and training in numerous fields. 
1<:Ioptro 
ploptro commands a wide spectrum of capabilities in the development, 
manufacture, integration and support of a select range of high-tech 
products in the electro-optical field. 
Kentroll 
Kentron is the division of Denel Aerospace responsible for the 
development, production and support of leading-edge technology 
products in the areas of guided missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles 
(UAV Systems) and sighting systems. 
OTB 
OTB is a versatile missile and aircraft test range specialising in in-flight 
s ystems performance measurements for the local and international 
aerospace industries. 
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ORDNANCE 
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~ 
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~ .. - --=. -" ~ ~ --. . V£1t 70_R~. 
COMMERCIAL 
L1W 
esign, development, assembly and support of a whole spectrum of 
turrets for artillery, armour, infantry and naval applications. 
La l'orge 
Supplier of forged, heat-treated and machined ammunition components 
made from aluminium alloys and steel for artillery and naval gun systems 
as well as forgings for the automotive industry. 
Mechcm 
Supply of mine-clearing equipment and mine-protected vehicle (MPV) 
platforms as well as execution of mine clearing contracts. 
'uschcm 
Design and supply of medium to heavy calibre ammunition systems, 
ammunition, detonics and related products for all types of armed forces. 
;r'MJ> 
Manufacture of small and medium calibre military and commercial 
ammunition as well as brass strips and cups for use in ammunition 
component manufacture for own use and exports. 
~omchem 
pevelopment, industrialization and manufacture of propulsion systems lor artillery, tactical rockets and missiles, warhead subsystems, 
propellants for small calibre ammunition and power cartridges and also 
civilian and military applications of energetic material. 
{'war tklip }'roducts 
Supplier of pyrotechnics and related products which include 155 mm 
pyrotechnic carrier rounds and industrial cartridges. 
rcktor 
Design, develop and manufacture of machine guns, rapid-fire cannons, 
mortars and hunting rifles and rifle actions . 
Densecure (Pty) Limited - This is the captive insurance company of the Denel 
Group. 
Source; www.denel.co.za 
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2. Other companies 
I. ATE 
2. AMS 
3. Aerosud 
4. ADS 
5. African Gabions 
6. Alpine 
7. A-M-D 
B. ANSYS 
9. Avex Air 
10. Avitronics 
II. Avitronics 
Maritime 
12. Bureau Veritas 
13. Cabris 
14. Canvas&Tent 
15. ccn Systems 
16. Century Avionics 
17. Cochrane Steel 
lB. Comenius 
19. Contactserve 
20. Cranord ATV's 
21. Cybersim 
22. Delkon 
23. Diel 
24. Divetek 
25. Epsilon 
26. Eurocopter 
27. EADS 
28. Execujet 
29. Fuchs Electronics 
30. Futuristic BS 
31. Gennan Systems 
32. Grintek Ltd. 
33. Grintek Comm. 
34. Grintek Ewation 
35. HSI / Plexsa 
36.ILC 
37. Isis Inf. Systems 
3B. 1ST Dynamics 
39. lTC Services 
40. Kal-Gard 
41. Kimberley EW 
42. Krone (Africa) 
43. Laingsdale Eng. 
44. Lasibon Video 
45. Lechabile QS 
46. Log-Tek 
47. MGL Milkor 
48. MOH-9 
49. PISA 
50. Pertec 
51. Proton Marine 
52.PTS 
53. Racal 
54. Red-i-Laser 
55. Rescomp 
56. RDL 
57. RDI 
58. RRS 
59. RSD 
60. SA Bullet R. Glass 
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61. Samil Motor Corp. 
62. Stingray Marine 
63. TEC 
64. Techno Arms 
65. Tellumat 
66. Thales Adv. Eng. 
67. Three Spears Int. 
68. Tools for Decision 
69. Truvelo Manufact. 
70. Turbomeca Africa 
71. Unistel Tech. 
n. Vaportec 
ANNEX 5: WORLD-CLASS TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPED AND 
PRODUCED BY THE DEFENCE INDUSTRY 
2 
3 
I: 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
Ultramobility heavy wheeled vehicles 
Light wheeled armoured vehicles 
Security vehicles 
Transponders 
Low cost simulators 
Combat helicopters 
Composite rotor blades for helicopters 
Composite materials 
Radar 
Fibre-optics and applications 
Sonar 
Light weapon systems 
Lasers 
Ordnance 
Fuse technology 
Electronic warfare 
Flat screen technology 
Optics 
Secure communications 
Avionics 
Single crystal turbine blades for aircraft engines 
Counter mine technology in protection, detection and clearing 
Refurbishing and upgrading dated equipment 
SOURCE: HArrY, Paul (1996) "Defence Industry Overview - Today and the Future" In African Security 
Review 5 (3). [On-line] hnp:llwww.iss.co. z.alPubs/ASRl5.3IDefencc%20induslIy.html 
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ANNEX 6: 'NON-PARIAH' RECIPIENTS OF SOUTH AFRICA'S ARMS 1994-1999 
Recipient! No. Weapon Weapon Year of Year(s) No. Comments 
Supplier (S) Ordered Designation Description Order! of Delivered! 
or Licencer (L) Licence Deliveries Produced 
Canada 2 RG-31 Nyala APC 1999 1999 2 For use in Kosoyo 
S: South Africa 
r-I AMY France 5 Chubby-Husky 1996 1996-97 (5) Part of 'Chubby' mine-clearing system for use in 
S: South Africa Bosnia 
5 Chubby-Meerkat AMY 1996 1996-97 (5) Part of 'Chubby' mine-clearing system for usc in 
Bosnia 
Ghana (2) SA-316B Alouene-3 Helicopter (1995) 1996 (2) 
S: South Africa 
Malawi (13) AML-901EIand-90 Armoured car (1994) 1994 (13) Ex-South African army; may incl AML-60 version 
S: South Africa 
Namibia 24 5.5in Gun Mk-3 Towed gun 1998 1998 24 Ex-South African army; gift; South African 
S: South Africa designation G-2 
Peru 4 RO-107 107mm MRL (1997) 1998 4 
S: South Africa 
Sweden (6) Mamba Mk-2 APC 1998 11998 6 For use by Swedish UN forces in West-Sabara 
S: South Africa 
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Recipienti No. Weapon Weapon Year of Year(s) No. Comments 
Supplier (S) Ordered Designation Description Order! of Delivered! 
or Licencer (L) Licence Deliveries Produced 
UK 3 Chubby·Husky AMY 1996 r96 3 Part of 'Chubby' mine-clearing system for use with S: South Africa !FOR in Bosnia; ex-South African Army; refurbished 
before deli very 
3 Chubby-Meerkat AMY 1996 1996 3 Part of "Chubby" mine-clearing system for use with 
!FOR in Bosnia; ex-South African Army; refurbished 
before deli very 
6 MarnbaMk-2 APC 1996 1997 (6) For use with UK forces in Bosnia; UK designation 
Alvis-4 and Alvis-8 
USA 
S: South Africa 
(10) Chubby-Husky AMY ( 1997) 1998 (10) Part of 'Chubby' mine-clearing system; deal worth 14 
million US dollars 
(10) Chubby-Meerkat AMY (1997) 1998 (10) Part of 'Chubby' mine-clearing system; deal worth 14 
million US dollars 
(5) RG-31 Nyala APC 1996 1996 5 For use in peacekeeping operations; option on 5 more 
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Recipient! No. Weapon Weapon Year or Year(s) No. Comments 
Supplier (S) Ordered Designation Description Orderl of Delivered! 
or Licencer (L) Licence Deliveries Produced 
17 Mamba Mk-2 APe (1994) 11995 17 Ordered via UK company; for use with UN forces in 
30 RO-31 Nyala APe 1995 1995 (30) Bosnia (UNPROFOR) 
United Nations 27 RO-32 Scout APe 1998 1998-99 (27) For UN peacekeeping. monitoring and humanitarian 
S: South Africa operations 
23 RO-32 Scout APe 1998 1999 (23) For UN peacekeeping, monitoring and humanitarian 
operations 
75 RO-32 Scout APe 1999 1999 (35) Deal worth $9 m; for use with UN in Kosovo 
*The above data refers to actual deliveries of major conventional weapons. All figures are trend-indicator values expressed in million US dollars at constant 
(1990) prices. 
Source: STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE (SIPRI) DATABASE. 2001. 
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ANNEX 7: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SANCTIONS ON THE 
SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY DURING APARTHEID 
Calculated Economic Impact (annual cost to target country in US dollars) 
UN-led Sanctions 
Phase 1,1963-1978: 
Increased cost of arms imports resulting from 
diversion of purchases from US, UK suppliers; 
welfare loss estimated at 10 percent of average 
annual imports, 1963-78. 
Economic security cost of holding large oil 
stockpiles 1974-78; welfare loss estimated at 10 
percent of estimated value of stockpile. 
Reduction in Eximbank loans to South Africa; 
welfare loss estimated at 70 percent of reduced 
transfers. 
Total, 1963-78 
Phase II, 1979-85: 
Mandatory UN arms embargo; welfare loss 
estimated at 30 percent of average annual recorded 
imports, 1979-85. 
Economic cost of holding large oil stockpile, 1979-
85; welfare loss estimated at 10 percent of estimated 
value of stockpile. 
Price premium on imports of oil after Iranian 
revolution in 1979; welfare loss estimated as 10 
percent of average annual value of crude oil imports, 
1979-85. 
Total, 1979-85 
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7 million 
100 million 
9 million 
116 million 
3 million 
300 million 
220 million 
523 million 
UN and US-led sanctions, 1985-94 
Mandatory UN arms embargo; welfare loss 
estimated at 30 percent of average annual recorded 
imports, 1986-94. 
Economic cost of holding large oil stockpile, 1986-
94; welfare loss estimated at 10 percent of estimated 
value of stockpile. 
Price premium on imports of oil after Iranian 
revolution in 1979; welfare loss estimated as 10 
percent of average annual value of crude oil imports, 
1986-94. 
Impact of US trade sanctions (excluding coal, see 
below); welfare loss estimated at 30 percent of 
reduction in trade from average annual value in 
1982-85. 
Impact of US, French, Nordic, Commonwealth ban 
on South African coal imports; welfare loss 
estimated at 40 percent (because of significant 
discounting) of reduction in trade from average 
annual value in 1982-85. 
Impact of krugerrand ban; welfare loss estimated at 
3 percent of value of gold used in coins (calculated 
as 100 metric tons of 1982-84 average annual price 
of 386 US dollars per ounce). 
Reduction in access to international capital due to 
federal, state, local government measures; welfare 
loss calculated at 10 percent of average annual 
change in net flows, 1986-90 compared to 1980-84. 
Total 
74 million 
200 million 
120 million 
210 million 
103 million 
41 million 
260 million 
1008 million 
NB: The estimated costs of the oil embargo are based on the $lb-$4b range for the cost of stockpiling in 
Lewis (p. 103) and Lewis ' estimate (p. 60) of imports for daily consumption of 70m barrels annually and 
annual average prices of $311bbl in 1979-85 and $181bbl in 1986-94. 
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Relative Magnitudes 
Gross indicators of South African economy 
South African GNP (1964) 
South African population (1964) 
South African GNP (1979) 
South African population (1979) 
South African GNP (1985) 
South African population (1985) 
Annual effect of sanctions related to gross 
indicators 
Percentage of GNP (1964-base) 
Per capita (1964-base) 
Percentage of GNP (1979-base) 
Per capita (1979-base) 
Percentage of GNP (l985-base) 
Per capita (1985-base) 
$9.8 billion 
18.1 million 
$43.8 billion 
27 million 
$52.6 billion 
33 million 
1.2 
$6.40 
1.2 
$19.37 
1.9 
$30.55 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, 1998; rMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, various issues. 
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